Communication in the Ruins: Walker Percy and the Art of Symbolic Mediation by Bonanno, Justin
Duquesne University 
Duquesne Scholarship Collection 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations 
Summer 8-8-2020 
Communication in the Ruins: Walker Percy and the Art of 
Symbolic Mediation 
Justin Bonanno 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/etd 
 Part of the Rhetoric Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bonanno, J. (2020). Communication in the Ruins: Walker Percy and the Art of Symbolic Mediation 
(Doctoral dissertation, Duquesne University). Retrieved from https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/1906 
This One-year Embargo is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Duquesne 
Scholarship Collection. 
 
 
COMMUNICATION IN THE RUINS: 
WALKER PERCY AND THE ART OF SYMBOLIC MEDIATION 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Submitted to the McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts 
 
 
 
Duquesne University 
 
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for  
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
By 
Justin N. Bonanno 
 
August 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by 
Justin N. Bonanno 
 
2020
 
iii 
 
 
 
 
COMMUNICATION IN THE RUINS:  
 
WALKER PERCY AND THE ART OF SYMBOLIC MEDIATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
Justin N. Bonanno 
 
Approved July 10, 2020 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
Ronald C. Arnett 
Chair & Professor of Communication & 
Rhetorical Studies 
(Committee Chair) 
 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
Janie Harden Fritz 
Professor of Communication & Rhetorical 
Studies 
(Committee Member) 
________________________________ 
Anthony M. Wachs 
Associate Professor of Communication & 
Rhetorical Studies 
(Committee Member) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
ABSTRACT 
 
COMMUNICATION IN THE RUINS: 
WALKER PERCY AND THE ART OF SYMBOLIC MEDIATION 
 
 
 
By 
Justin N. Bonanno 
August 2020 
 
Dissertation supervised by Ronald C. Arnett 
 This dissertation proposes to explore the mediating function of the symbol through the 
work of Walker Percy. In the first chapter, I provide the necessary background for undertaking 
this project. First, I situate Percy in his historical moment and review key events in his life that 
helped to shape his philosophy of communication. Second, I sketch out some of the primary 
coordinates in Percy’s thought. Percy’s hermeneutic of the self requires an understanding of the 
difference between sign and symbol, dyadic and triadic events, environment and world, and 
immanence and transcendence. Third, I review some of the key intersections with Percy’s work 
and the field of communication. Percy responded to several schools of thought important to the 
field of communication, including information theory, General Semantics, behaviorism, 
symbolic interactionism, structuralism, poststructuralism, and the New Rhetoric. Several voices 
within the field of communication also drew upon Percy’s work in topic areas such as rhetoric, 
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communication ethics, philosophy of communication, media ecology, and communication 
pedagogy. The final section of the first chapter provides a preview of the chapters to come. The 
second chapter covers the glories of symbol use, which follow from the successful mediation of 
existence. In the third chapter, I review the shadow side of symbolic mediation, which occurs 
when individuals encounter symbols instead of existence, leading to alienation and solipsism. 
The fourth and final chapter investigates the means for escaping from symbolically induced 
alienation and, paradoxically, makes a case for the importance of non-symbolic phenomena. 
Altogether, this dissertation aims to solidify the importance of Percy’s work for the field of 
communication, especially his philosophical realism, which subverts the temptation to idealism 
faced by scholars of rhetoric and communication.  
 
vi 
DEDICATION 
 
To my wife, Anna 
 
vii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
 
I would like to acknowledge the following generous individuals for their encouragement, 
financial support, wisdom, counsel, spiritual guidance, prayers, and more. You helped to make 
this dissertation a reality, and I am so very grateful for you.  
First, I would like to thank Leslie Marsh for keeping the conversation going about 
Percy’s works and Rhonda McDonnell for corresponding with me over email about Percy. A 
special thanks goes out to Karey Perkins for giving me direction on how to navigate the Walker 
Percy Papers at UNC Chapel Hill. Thank you Zoë Bodzas, Mary Pratt Lobdell, Ann Percy 
Moores, and McIntosh & Otis, Inc. for granting me the appropriate permissions to take full 
advantage of my visit to the Walker Percy Papers. Thank you Matthew Turi and the rest of the 
staff at the UNC Wilson Special Collections library for maintaining Percy’s unpublished 
manuscripts and personal library as well as for being so helpful during my visit to the Walker 
Percy Papers. Thank you Anthony and Jeri Naccarato and Sam and Kim Naccarato for giving 
Anna and me a place to stay, food to eat, and love during our visit to Chapel Hill. Thank you 
Anthony and Melisa Wachs for your support and encouragement during this time. You are kind 
and generous people. I am also grateful for the team at Black Hills Information Security for 
providing me with work, which helped to financially support this project. Thank you to Andrew 
Chrystall, Rob Grano, David Mills, and Eric Grabowsky for your stimulating intellectual 
conversation and friendship.   
I want to thank the Duquesne University Community, especially Dr. Ronald C. Arnett, 
Dr. Janie M. Harden Fritz, and Rita McCaffrey, for everything you’ve done for me over the past 
several years. Spiritus est qui vivificat. Thank you also to Lynn Dutertre, Jean Henry, and all of 
 
viii 
the staff at the Gumberg Library. Thank you to my students, especially those from my Fall 2018 
interpersonal communication course who gave me the opportunity to teach Percy. 
Thank you Canon William Avis, Canon John O’Connor, Fr. Adam Potter, and Fr. Jamie 
Power for administering the sacraments, upholding the truth, and bringing “news from across the 
seas” for castaways who find themselves in quite the predicament. I would also like to 
acknowledge the many saints in Heaven who have accompanied us on this journey, including St. 
Francis DeSales, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, St. John Henry Newman, Our Lady Undoer 
of Knots, and St. Joseph Terror of Demons. Ora pro nobis peccatoribus. Thank you to Walker 
Percy for recognizing the difference between a genius and an apostle and for taking the time to 
write about it in such a clever way. Thank you to Bunt Percy, too, for supporting Walker.  
Thank you Beth Hawks, my sister, for your kindness and for once giving me a shirt that 
says, “Who are ‘they’?” on it. Percy would have appreciated this. Thank you also Chad, Claire, 
and Cole Hawks for your love. Thank you Mom and Dad, Gene and Sue Bonanno, for being 
such loving parents. You watched our dog, lent us your car, suffered through my ramblings on 
topics such as the Enlightenment, and have done so many important things for me that I cannot 
mention them all. You have been truly wonderful, and I am so thankful for you.  
Thank you Pat, Linda, and Paul Kemper for welcoming me into your family and for 
supporting me on this journey. I am blessed to have such wonderful in-laws.  
 Above all, I would like to acknowledge and thank my wife, Anna, uxor mea, mother of 
my child, fellow traveler, and breakfast-time interlocutor. I love you per omnia saecula 
saeculorum. Adjutórium nostrum in nómine Dómini, qui fecit caelum et terram.  
 
ix 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction, Coordinates, and Chapter Preview ............................................................. 1 
Situating Percy in the Historical Moment ....................................................................................... 3 
Key Coordinates in Percy’s Philosophy of Communication ....................................................... 13 
Intersections with the Field of Communication: Schools of Thought......................................... 30 
Intersections with the Field of Communication: Scholars Who Drew upon Percy .................... 40 
Implications of Percy’s Work and Preview of Chapters .............................................................. 47 
Chapter 2: C1 Consciousness, The Joy of Mediation....................................................................... 65 
C1 Consciousness and the Symbolic Breakthrough ..................................................................... 66 
Cassirer and Langer: Symbolic Transformation ........................................................................... 74 
A Realist Account of the Symbol .................................................................................................. 84 
Implications for Rhetoric, Philosophy of Communication, and Media Ecology ....................... 95 
Chapter 3: C2 Consciousness, The “Pit” of the Self ...................................................................... 111 
C2 Consciousness and the “Pit” of the Self ................................................................................ 112 
Sartre and Marcel: From Self as “Nought” to Homo Viator ...................................................... 122 
Heidegger: Everydayness as the “Reverse Phenomenon”  ......................................................... 135 
Implications for Rhetoric, Philosophy of Communication, and Media Ecology ..................... 148 
Chapter 4: C3 Consciousness, Redemption .................................................................................... 168 
Defining C3 Consciousness ......................................................................................................... 170 
Defamiliarization and the Recovery of Existence: Shattering the Symbolic Simulacra .......... 179 
Kierkegaard and Aquinas: The Apostle and the “Means”  of Salvation in C3 Consciousness 192 
Implications for Rhetoric, Philosophy of Communication, and Media Ecology ..................... 208 
 
 
 
1 
Chapter 1: Introduction, Coordinates, and Chapter Preview 
 Everyone has had that awful sensation of knowing the right word for something and yet 
struggling to utter it aloud. And everyone knows the glorious release from having discovered the 
right word hitherto at the tip of their tongue. Scientists, for example, patiently observe natural 
phenomena looking to name what lies before them. Try to imagine the feeling felt by the first 
marine biologist to have identified that elongated slimy thing as an “eel.” “What is that? An eel!” 
Authors, too, must grope their way through a manuscript, stretching for the appropriate noun or 
verb, participle or adjective. All too often, writers describe the sensation of being moored in the 
sea of language, writer’s block, unable to take flight and articulate themselves. A terrible tension 
follows from the inability to remember names, even (and perhaps especially) of other people. 
Imagine a group of students sitting before you early in the semester, undifferentiated by their 
names. Who is who? Recall the embarrassment of someone who has called you by the wrong 
name. In my own case, I have been called “Jason” on many occasions by priests, relatives, and 
acquaintances alike, even though my real name is “Justin.” I do not hold this against them. If 
anything, I am usually embarrassed by their embarrassment. Why might anxiety follow from the 
inability to name something? Why does embarrassment follow from using the wrong word? And 
why might pronouncing the right word (or hearing another find the right word) lead to elation 
and a sense of release? Such questions, which exemplify the crossing of the semiotic and the 
existential, lie at the heart of Walker Percy’s investigation into the symbol’s capacity to mediate 
existence, the subject of this dissertation.  
In this chapter, I lay the groundwork for the rest of the dissertation. First, I introduce the 
reader to Walker Percy and his historical moment. Second, I work through Percy’s works and 
identify some primary coordinates in his thought. Third, I situate Walker Percy’s work in the 
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communication literature. Finally, I preview the forthcoming chapters in the dissertation. 
Ultimately, this dissertation traces the contours of the mediating function of the symbol. What 
does the symbol mediate? Existence. Investigating the capacity of symbols to mediate existence 
also raises the question as to what happens when symbols cease to mediate: a host of problematic 
existential conditions, not the least of which includes solipsism. The joys of discovering a 
symbolically mediated world also imply phenomenological degeneration, the shadow side of 
language use. Thus, I seek to answer the following questions, “What implications follow from 
the symbolic capacity to mediate existence? What happens when symbols fail to mediate 
existence?” This dissertation seeks to acknowledge the importance of the symbol without falling 
into the idealist trap of reducing all existence to mere symbolic phenomena. Existence both 
precedes and transcends the realm of the symbol. Thus, I embark on this dissertation with realist 
presuppositions.  
This dissertation’s interest in mediation will impinge primarily upon rhetoric, the 
philosophy of communication, and media ecology. While certain voices in the field of 
communication have taken an interest in Percy, for the most part, communication scholars have 
only scratched the surface regarding everything that Percy has to offer. Communication scholars 
have hinted at the ontological and epistemic importance of metaphor in Percy’s work, but a more 
thorough investigation of the “symbol” (and its potential to mediate existence) would support 
and extend these scholarly analyses (e.g., Campbell; Caraher; Cleary; Engnell; Lessl; Osborn and 
Ehninger). Above all, communication scholars could benefit from an appreciation of Percy’s 
realism (Percy, Symbol & Existence 235). Idealist and materialist investigations into 
communication may capture important aspects of communicative phenomena. And yet, both fail 
to capture the entirety of the symbolic event.   
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Situating Percy in the Historical Moment  
In this section, I review Percy’s life within his historical moment. As a young man, Percy 
experienced tragedy that would orient the rest of his life. Percy first turned to science for answers 
to life’s deepest questions. But as Percy matured, he turned toward religion and eventually 
converted to Catholicism. Ultimately, this section seeks to understand Percy as a diagnostician of 
the ills of modernity, especially the problematic project of the autonomous self. Percy studied 
medicine, wrote novels, and philosophized about the nature of communication. Entire 
biographies on Percy, especially those written by Tolson and Samway, provide detailed and rich 
portraits of Percy. Here I seek to foreground only those aspects of Percy salient to my project: his 
rejection of scientism, his reading of Continental and American philosophy, his conversion to 
Catholicism, and his responsive disposition toward the exigences of his time.  
It is difficult to understand Percy apart from his tragic, Southern background. Born in 
Birmingham, Alabama in 1916, Percy was the oldest of three brothers. Percy’s other brothers 
were born shortly after him, LeRoy Pratt in 1917 and Billups Phinizy (or Phin, as his family 
called him) in 1922. The Percy family legacy “acquired mythical or at least legendary 
dimensions” in the South (Tolson 24). Percy came from a long line of soldiers, lawyers, and men 
of honor. Percy’s paternal great grandfather, William Alexander Percy, nicknamed the “Gray 
Eagle of the Delta,” served as a soldier in the Confederate army during the Civil War (Tolson 
25). Percy’s grandfather, also named Walker Percy, worked as a lawyer and suffered from severe 
depression, ultimately killing himself in 1917 (Tolson 25, 31-32). As George Waring Ball wrote 
in his diary, “Tragedy pursues the Percy family like Nemesis” (Ball as qtd. in Tolson 99). 
Percy’s father, LeRoy Pratt, also a lawyer, committed suicide in 1929 (Tolson 44-45, 73). After a 
brief stint living in Athens, Georgia, with Percy’s maternal grandmother, Percy, his mother, and 
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his two brothers went to live with his uncle, William Alexander Percy (“Uncle Will”), in 
Greenville, Mississippi (Tolson 46-47). Percy’s mother, Martha Susan Phinizy, drowned after 
driving her car off a bridge only a few years later (Tolson 98). After the death of his father and 
mother, Percy’s Uncle Will adopted Walker and his two brothers. Concerning Uncle Will’s 
influence, Tolson explains Uncle Will’s “values and outlook” as “the first and greatest spur to his 
[Percy’s] writing at all” (Tolson 149). Uncle Will—a lawyer, planter, and former WWI infantry 
officer—wrote poetry and appreciated the arts, inviting figures such as William Faulkner and 
Harry Stack Sullivan over to his house. The literary genius of Percy’s Uncle Will, as well as 
Percy’s childhood friend Shelby Foote, would inspire Percy throughout the entirety of his life 
(Tolson 83). Percy’s tragic upbringing would lead him to question the ability of science and 
technology to answer life’s most pressing questions. Existential phenomena such as anxiety, 
despair, suicide, and death required something more than science and the prevailing conventional 
wisdom could offer. Further, darkness in the Percy family reflected the larger shadow cast over 
the post-religious, technological age that Percy found himself in, a persistent theme in his 
writings.  
Before turning to the Catholic Church for answers, however, Percy invested his faith in 
science. Tolson relates that Percy looked for “certainties” in high school, finding them in an 
“exaggerated faith in science that is called scientism” (Tolson 96). After high school, Percy went 
to the University of North Carolina, where he was first exposed to behaviorism (Percy, Signposts 
in a Strange Land 382; Tolson 128-129). Upon graduation from UNC, Percy made his way to 
Columbia University’s College of Physicians and Surgeons to study pathology (Tolson 132, 
148). Percy’s work in pathology put him in touch with cadavers, one of which contaminated him 
with tuberculosis. In August 1942, Percy departed for Trudeau Sanatorium in Saranac Lake, NY, 
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to recover from the illness (Tolson 161-166). Tolson suggests that Percy read Kierkegaard’s 
essay “The Difference Between a Genius and an Apostle” while recuperating at Trudeau (Tolson 
174). According to Percy, Kierkegaard’s essay was decisive in his eventual conversion to 
Catholicism. Percy confessed, “If I had to single out one piece of writing which was more 
responsible than anything else for my becoming a Catholic, it would be that essay of 
Kierkegaard’s” (Dewey 110). Later, in the early 1950s, Percy would begin to read other 
existentialists more extensively, whose influence on Percy I sketch out below (Percy as qtd. in 
Dewey 106; Tolson 174-183, 238). Nevertheless, Percy also discovered the work of Susanne 
Langer, Thomas Aquinas, Augustine, and the Church Fathers during his time at Saranac Lake 
(Samway, “Grappling” 37; Tolson 174, 237). Langer had discovered something that would 
preoccupy Percy for the rest of his life: the unique and unprecedented capacity for human beings 
to use symbols to communicate with others. As for the Catholic philosophers, Percy read 
Aquinas and Augustine so that he might better debate a Catholic friend of his, Art Fortugno 
(Tolson 174, 198). It appears as though Providence placed various Catholic friends throughout 
Percy’s life, friends who eventually turned Percy toward the Church (Tolson 156). Friendship 
has a strange way of opening the heart to what another has to say (Weil, The Need for Roots 
205). While not converting at first, Percy began attending Mass with Fortugno (Tolson 175). 
Percy eventually received instruction in the Catholic faith from the Jesuits at Loyola University 
in New Orleans (Tolson 198-202). Percy had married by this time, and his wife, Bunt, 
accompanied him on his journey into the Church (Tolson 201). Despite his conversion to 
Catholicism, Percy never lost his appreciation of the true merits of science. Like the poet, the 
scientist discovers being through the mediation of the symbol (Percy, Symbol & Existence 196-
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197). The danger, Percy knew, lies in scientists’ and technicians’ unwillingness to acknowledge 
any limits on what science and technology can accomplish.  
Despite his training in medicine, Percy turned to writing novels, reviews, and 
philosophical essays. A substantial inheritance from his Uncle Will allowed Percy the leisure to 
write (Tolson 166). Furthermore, Percy could read and write while recovering from tuberculosis 
(Tolson 182, 196-197). All the while, Percy’s childhood friend (and fellow novelist) Shelby 
Foote would critique and comment upon Percy’s writings (Tolson 197). Percy spent roughly six 
years teaching himself how to write fiction before he began to write nonfiction essays in 1954 
(Tolson 211). Percy wrote two “apprentice” novels, The Charterhouse and The Gramercy 
Winner, both of which were never published. The Charterhouse, like Percy’s later novels, 
involved a confused young protagonist searching for meaning in life (Tolson 215). The 
Gramercy Winner tells the story of Will Grey, another searcher (Tolson 230). As per Tolson, 
Percy sought to write about the “initiation into a Christian comic vision of truth rather than a 
tragic one” (230). After failing to publish these two apprentice novels, Percy wrote The 
Moviegoer, which won the National Book Award in 1962. In The Moviegoer, the protagonist 
Binx Bolling seeks to overcome despair and malaise. Kierkegaard’s philosophy especially 
influenced The Moviegoer. As Lawson argues, The Moviegoer depicts Binx Bolling’s transition 
from the aesthetic to the ethical modes of existence (Lawson 870, 889). After winning the 
National Book Award, Percy wrote five more novels, including The Last Gentleman (1966), 
Love in the Ruins (1971), Lancelot (1977), The Second Coming (1980), and The Thanatos 
Syndrome (1987). Percy used the medium of the novel to convey philosophical ideas to a large 
audience, especially in an age beset by scientism and the reign of technology over everyday life. 
Percy, well aware of his audience’s recalcitrance regarding “deep” religious or philosophical 
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ideas, sought indirect means for conveying larger religious and philosophical truths. While Percy 
has primarily been remembered as a novelist, Percy thought that posterity would remember him 
for his work in the philosophy of communication, which I expand upon further below (Gulledge 
285; see Lawler 97). 
In addition to writing novels and philosophical essays, Percy busied himself with other 
projects, too. Percy’s conversion to Catholicism granted him a new perspective on racial issues 
(Tolson 203-204). Originally a segregationist, Percy would later argue against segregation and 
advocate for racial justice. In “Stoicism in the South,” Percy compares the tragic inadequacies of 
Stoicism with the hopeful possibilities of Christianity; the Christian cannot sit idle and remain 
complicit in the face of racial injustice (Percy, “Stoicism in the South”). Other essays, including 
“A Southern View” and “The Southern Moderate,” argue for a reconciliation between North and 
South over the issue of race (Percy, “The Southern Moderate” 96; Percy, “A Southern View” 
92). Like a good Kierkegaardian, Percy knew that real Christians did not have the luxury of 
simply waiting for the hereafter but had to work out their faith with “fear and trembling” (Collins 
13-17). Not content with remaining in the realm of speculation, Percy translated his ideas into 
ethical practices. Beginning in 1968, Percy joined the Community Relations Council of Greater 
Covington, which sought to heal the divide between black and white communities (Tolson 347). 
During his tenure with the Council, Percy served on the education committee, which established 
a local Head Start program and day-care center. Percy himself drove buses for the program due 
to problems finding and paying for drivers (Tolson 347). Further, Percy helped start a credit 
union to help African Americans obtain loans for starting businesses or buying homes (Tolson 
347-348). Beyond racial issues, Percy also held a lifelong interest in (and skepticism toward) 
psychiatry, given its focus on existential issues and philosophical questions like the relationship 
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between the mind and the body (Tolson 311). Psychiatrists, according to Percy, had to somehow 
account for the human person as a peculiar creature with a desire for religious transcendence 
(Percy, “The Coming Crisis in Psychiatry”). Percy’s writings on the philosophy of 
communication led Gentry Harris, a psychiatrist, to seek out Percy for help in understanding 
schizophrenia. Beginning in 1963, Percy consulted with Harris on specific cases of schizophrenic 
patients and their families (Tolson 312). As Tolson writes, “Percy’s job was to read and decode 
the linguistic performance of various members of a special ‘intersubjective’ community” (Tolson 
312). Percy warned Harris about the schizophrenic’s proclivity to assume unhelpful scientific 
categories of understanding as well as the schizophrenic’s deficient use of language (Tolson 
319). Finally, in addition to occupying his time responding to exigences in civil rights and 
psychiatry, Percy spent time as a teacher. Percy taught courses at Loyola University in 1967 and 
1976 and at LSU from 1974 to 1975; the subject matter of Percy’s classes included existential 
themes in literature and fiction writing (Tolson 342-343, 391-397, 407). Joking about teaching, 
Percy once wrote,  
For me, teaching is harder work than writing. It is hard enough to deal with words but 
having to deal with words and students overtaken as they are by their terrible needs, 
vulnerability, likeability, intelligence, and dumbness wears me out. How I respect and 
envy the gifted teacher! (Percy, “Why I Live Where I Live” 4) 
Altogether, Percy’s time as a novelist, advocate for justice, consultant, and teacher give the 
impression of Percy as a complex man dedicated to improving the spiritual and material welfare 
of those around him.  
Certain key figures and philosophical trends shaped the direction of Percy’s work. 
Dostoyevsky’s ability to critique larger societal movements inspired Percy (Samway, Walker 
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Percy: A Life 127; Tolson 183; Wilson, Walker Percy, Fyodor Dostoevsky, and the Search for 
Influence). Like Dostoyevsky, Sartre and Camus also influenced Percy, in large part because of 
their ability to package philosophical themes into novel form (Holditch 17). Percy began novel 
writing and philosophizing as an outsider. Percy felt free to read widely, searching for truth 
across traditions. Percy engaged with both American and Continental philosophical traditions 
alike. The Thomist James Collin’s book The Existentialists: A Critical Study introduced Percy to 
the existentialists, including Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Husserl, Sartre, Jaspers, Marcel, and 
Heidegger (Collins; Percy, Symbol & Existence 10).1 Percy read Julius Friend’s and James 
Feibleman’s books on Peirce, including Feibleman’s (1946) An Introduction to Peirce’s 
Philosophy, Interpreted as a System (Samway, Introduction to A Thief of Peirce x-xi). Samway 
writes, “The exposure of Friend and Feibleman most likely helped Percy, particularly as a 
beginning novelist, to compare further the thought of American philosophers with that of their 
European counterparts” (Samway, Introduction to Thief xi). Despite their disparate origins, 
perhaps Percy saw in both Continental existentialism and American pragmaticism a thirst for the 
concrete and the real. As Collins writes in his preface to The Existentialists, “For their part, 
contemporary Thomists—notably, Gilson and Maritain—have spoken of their doctrine as the 
authentic existentialism, or, at least, as the only philosophy of being in which existence receives 
its rightful place” (Collins, Preface to The Existentialists xiv). Percy would draw upon Maritain 
and other Thomists, including Frederick Wilhelmsen, in formulating his philosophy of 
                                                   
1 Despite his interest in Heidegger, Percy’s Thomistic understanding of analogy set him apart from Heidegger. 
Lawler writes, “There is no existentialist decisionism and no historicization of Being in Percy’s appreciation of 
Heidegger. The Thomist attempts to give a realistic account of the individual human experiences Heidegger often 
describes so well” (Lawler 84). Like Jaspers, Heidegger failed to appreciate the analogical relationship of Being to 
beings (Collins 112, 115-117; see Hart 251 for a discussion of Heidegger’s failure to realize the importance of 
analogy). Percy’s appreciation for analogy allows him to conceive of the analogical relationship between Being and 
beings. Being qua Being is neither the totally transcendent One nor the immanent, diverse Many. By implication, 
Percy appreciated the importance of history without reducing Being to history. Perhaps most importantly, Percy 
appreciated the revelatory aspect of Heidegger’s thinking without relativizing revelation.  
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communication. Responding to the larger philosophical currents of his day, Percy sought the 
middle path between idealism and materialism: realism (Percy, Symbol & Existence 235). 
Materialism failed to account for mind, soul, and self, while idealism failed to grasp the 
recalcitrant materiality of the world. These larger philosophical trends ended in catastrophe 
because of their implications for the human person in the concrete, a creature desiring 
transcendence, community, and contact with being.  
Until the end of his life, Percy continued to respond to problematic exigences in the 
historical moment. In 1983, Percy penned Lost in the Cosmos, a mock self-help book that 
satirized the therapeutic quest for self-discovery. According to Percy, the development of the 
autonomous self has wreaked havoc upon the world ever since the time of Descartes (Percy, Lost 
in the Cosmos 44). The autonomous self, not knowing from whence it came nor where it goes, 
wanders about the world seeking transcendence through science, art, sex, drugs, war, etc. Percy 
called into question the myth of Progress and wondered why, if everything keeps getting better 
and better, the twentieth century has had so many deaths from war and genocide (arguably more 
deaths than all other centuries combined) (Percy, Lost 190-191). A pervasive atmosphere of 
passive consumerism, induced in large part by the mass media, has left the autonomous self in 
awe of what Heidegger called the “they,” or those who know (Percy, Lost 75, 119; Percy, The 
Message in the Bottle 54, Heidegger, Being and Time, 164). The autonomous self can surrender 
“sovereignty” to the attitudes of the “they” in both science and art (Percy, Lost 122; Percy, The 
Message 185). “They,” whether modern scientists or postmodern literary theorists, say who or 
what the self is, mere brain or mere language. For Percy, certain postmodern trends 
overemphasized the social construction of the self, which tends to disappear in a sea of 
competing discourses of equal authority (Tolson 279-280). The self may not be completely 
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autonomous, but the self is not completely determined by language, either. Tolson writes, “Percy 
could not understand their [certain academics’] attraction to such French theorists as Derrida. He 
saw the deconstructive enterprise as little more than rehashed Nietzscheanism, an attempt to get 
rid of God by first disposing of grammar” (Tolson 460). Despite his critique of scientism, Percy 
never abandoned the importance of knowledge in favor of irrationalism. Percy critiqued both 
rationalist and irrationalist trends in philosophy, especially in semiotics. Percy held a lifelong 
interest in the Thomist John Poinsot, whom Percy likely first learned about from Maritain (Percy, 
Symbol & Existence 51; Percy as qtd. in Samway, A Thief of Peirce 179; Maritain, Ransoming 
the Time 217-254; Tolson 471). Sometime around 1987, the semiotician John Deely asked Percy 
to review his translation of Poinsot’s Tractatus de Signis, a Thomist account of semiotics (Percy 
as qtd. in Samway, Thief 179). Citing lack of expertise while turning down Deely’s request, 
Percy nevertheless expressed hope in Poinsot’s realist semiotics to heal the divide between 
“neurone scientists and the literary structuralist-post-structuralists [sic]” (Percy as qtd. in 
Samway, Thief 179). Just one year before his death, Percy confided to his friend and Peirce 
scholar Kenneth Laine Ketner that he planned to use Peirce’s semiotics to support a work on 
Catholic apologetics (Percy as qtd. in Samway, Thief 130-131). No one has discovered Percy’s 
last, lost work of apologetics, which he had titled Contra Gentiles after Aquinas’ work by the 
same name (McDonnell). Percy never lost sight of the importance of philosophical realism to his 
Catholic faith. Like Flannery O’Connor, Percy believed that the Eucharist had to be the Real 
Presence of Christ (Desmond 220; Percy as qtd. in Samway, Thief 25-26; Walter 235). 
Christianity offered more than a functional, therapeutic “myth” providing individuals with the 
necessary means for coping with existence (Percy, Symbol & Existence 27-28): “And if Christ be 
not risen again, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain” (1 Co. 15:14  DRA). 
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Realism—which acknowledges the reality of other selves, the priority and importance of being, 
and perhaps above all the abiding relationship between words and things—places necessary 
limits on the self that ever seeks to escape its predicament (Crawford 167; Tolson 455). The 
predicament of the self is its own unspeakableness. The symbol can render everything in the 
world formulable with the exception of the self, which I describe further in the third chapter of 
this dissertation (Percy, The Message 283-286; Percy, Symbol & Existence 75). 
Percy kept his faith until the end, dying from prostate cancer in 1990 at age 73. Percy was 
buried in the cemetery of St. Joseph’s Abbey, where he belonged to the Benedictines’ lay 
confraternity (Tolson 488). Percy left behind two daughters, Mary Pratt and Ann, and his wife 
Bunt. The malign spirit of self-annihilation that overcame his grandfather and father would never 
reach Percy. As Percy once told a student, his whole life had been an attempt to understand his 
father’s suicide (Tolson 396). Indeed, Percy spent his life writing for an audience of solitary 
pilgrims in a secular age (Tolson 489). Percy lived a life marked by tragedy and comedy, despair 
and hope, immanence and transcendence. While writing his novel Lancelot in the 1970s, Percy 
nearly lost his faith (Tolson 382-383, 413). Psychology did not save Percy during this crisis 
(Tolson 483). Science and art did not, either. Only grace pulled him through. Near the end of his 
life, Percy confided to his daughter Ann that only the Church had saved him (Tolson 483). Percy 
also told Ann, “I think sometimes that God gave me such a wonderful family later in life to make 
up for the sadness that went on in my family when I was young” (Percy as qtd. in Tolson 483). 
As his cancer progressed, Percy confessed his readiness to die to his friend Shelby Foote: 
“Dying, if that’s what it comes to, is no big thing, since I’m ready for it, am prepared for it by the 
Catholic faith which I believe” (Percy as qtd. in Tolson 481). Percy lived his life “transparently 
before God,” just like those religious minds that he admired: Simone Weil, Martin Buber, 
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Dietrich Bonhoeffer, and Flannery O’Connor (Percy, Lost 157; Wilson, Reading Walker Percy’s 
Novels 132). Percy has largely been remembered as a novelist writing about existential and 
religious themes. However, as evidenced by the recent publications of Percy’s Symbol & 
Existence and Marsh’s Walker Percy, Philosopher, scholars continue to explore and appreciate 
Percy’s philosophical meditations on the nature of communication (Marsh).  
 
Key Coordinates in Percy’s Philosophy of Communication 
Percy formulated his philosophy of communication using a variety of different sources, 
including anthropology, existentialism, Thomism, and semiotics.2 Therefore, in this section I will 
go into greater depth about the theoretical grounding of Percy’s works. I will focus primarily on 
Percy’s philosophy of communication as articulated in his nonfiction works. Where appropriate 
throughout this dissertation, I will use Percy’s novels to illustrate his philosophical ideas. Many 
have focused on Percy as a novelist; in this dissertation, however, I foreground the coordinates 
that appear in Percy’s nonfiction works, which deal explicitly with the nature of symbolic 
mediation. Percy published one work of collected essays in his lifetime, The Message in the 
Bottle, in 1975. Eight years later, Percy published Lost in the Cosmos, which contains a compact 
                                                   
2 Percy’s understanding of “semiotics” differs from many modern and postmodern conceptions of “semiotics.” 
Unlike those working in zoo-semiotics, Percy did not take an interest in animal communication (Percy, Lost 85n). 
Neither did Percy care for the mere analysis of syntax or semantics (Percy, The Message 167-168; Percy, Symbol & 
Existence 158). As I explore in the following section, Percy disagreed with certain behaviorist, structuralist, and 
poststructuralist varieties of semiotics that neglected to give an account of human consciousness. At the most basic 
level, Percy thought of semiotics as a type of anthropology. You cannot merely study signs and symbols. You must 
study the human being using signs and symbols (Percy, Lost 85n-87n; Percy, The Message 11). Percy stressed how 
language use (and abuse) can lead to existential insight into human experiences, such as joy and despair, which the 
“semiotic primer of the self” in Lost in the Cosmos seeks to explore (Percy, Lost 86–126). On a related note, the 
editors of Symbol & Existence speculate that Percy preferred to use the term “semiotic” when referring to his own 
work instead of “semiotics.” The term “semiotic,” the editors allege, distanced Percy’s work from the “semiotics” of 
Morris and others (Ketner et al., preface to Symbol & Existence xiii, note 12). Nonetheless, in my estimation, Percy 
has used both “semiotics” and “semiotic” favorably in his writings, depending on the context (e.g., Percy, Lost 82, 
85; Percy, The Message 243-264). For this dissertation, I will use “semiotics” and “semiotic” interchangeably, 
bearing in mind key differences discussed below that separate Percy’s understanding of “semiotics” from certain 
behaviorist, structuralist, and poststructuralist accounts (Percy, Lost 85n-87n).   
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account of his philosophy of communication. Fr. Samway put together another collection of 
Percy’s nonfiction essays in 1991, just one year after Percy’s death. Finally, a group of dedicated 
scholars released Percy’s hitherto unpublished manuscript Symbol & Existence in September 
2019. These four books constitute the core of Percy’s philosophical works on the nature of 
communication. If philosophy deals in the art of marking distinctions, then Percy was a first-rate 
philosopher (Sokolowski). Several key distinctions appear in his work: sign/symbol, 
dyadic/triadic, environment/world, and immanence/transcendence. Indeed, Percy often dealt with 
two terms in dialectical tension. Unlike the work of a Hegelian, however, Percy’s dialectical 
pairings do not resolve into some higher synthesis. All idealistic, dialectical syntheses fail to 
encapsulate the individual human being in its unique particularity. Rather, Percy uses each 
dialectical pair to probe the empirical nature of the concrete, existential self.  
 
Sign/Symbol 
After failing to publish the two apprentice novels previously mentioned, Percy began 
writing essays on the nature of language and communication in the 1950s. In 1954, Percy 
published a review of Susanne Langer’s Feeling and Form, which extended upon Langer’s 
earlier work Philosophy in a New Key, a book that stressed the unique human capacity for 
symbolization. Percy appreciated Langer’s distinction between the “sign” and the “symbol” 
(Percy, “Symbol as Need” 385-386). Signs involve a pair of stimulus and response, or cause and 
effect. Animals use signs to communicate with one another. The classic example of Pavlov’s dog 
demonstrates sign behavior; the causal stimulus of a bell elicits the response of salivation. 
Symbols, on the other hand, transcend the mechanism of stimulus and response. A sign 
“announces” something, whereas a symbol “re-presents” something (Percy, “Symbol as Need” 
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385, 389). Symbols enable real “conception of an object” and real knowledge inexplicable in 
functional terms (Percy, “Symbol as Need” 385-386, 388). Humans use symbols to communicate 
with one another. Explanations of communication in terms of the sign alone fail to capture the 
true nature of the communicative event. Ultimately, Langer’s distinction between sign and 
symbol allowed Percy to critique positivists, behaviorists, and General Semanticists alike (Percy, 
“Symbol as Need” 385-386). Despite drawing upon Cassirer’s idealism in formulating her 
thoughts on the symbol, Langer still retained her naturalist presuppositions and explained the 
symbol in terms of a biological “need” (Percy, “Symbol as Need” 388-389). Percy rejected the 
reduction of human symbol-making to functional interpretations. Percy writes,  
Simply to call the symbolic transformation a need and let it go at that, is to set up an 
autonomous faculty which serves its own ends, the equivalent of saying that bees store 
honey because there is in bees a need of storing honey. (Percy, “Symbol as Need” 389).  
Symbols do not “constitute” knowledge in the idealist sense but rather mediate knowledge of 
reality (Percy, “Symbol as Need” 387-389). Symbols are not ends in themselves but rather means 
to knowledge of reality (Percy, “Symbol as Need” 389-390). In his review of Langer’s work, 
Percy reflects on the parallels between Langer’s philosophy and Thomistic realism (Percy, 
“Symbol as Need” 382). Without discounting the originality and importance of Langer’s 
contribution, Percy claims that both Langer and certain Scholastics refused to discount the 
intellectual significance of the symbol (Percy, “Symbol as Need” 382-384). As I hope to make 
clear throughout this dissertation, the symbol makes knowledge possible and existence 
formulable. One recognizes something true about what another has symbolized, something that 
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resonates with ontological and epistemological significance. Symbols reveal what something is 
and “affirm” that something is (Percy, Symbol & Existence 55-60, 212-213s).3  
In this early essay, the reader can appreciate larger implications that play themselves out 
in the rest of Percy’s body of work. First, Percy’s view of art, including novels, follows from his 
reading of Langer. As a symbol, the work of art is not an end in itself, despite Modernism’s 
protests to the contrary. Unlike his friend Shelby Foote, Percy always believed that art serves as 
a means to some end beyond itself (Tolson 491, 493). In Percy’s case, his novels portray 
characters in predicaments awaiting “news,” a certain type of knowledge relative to their 
alienated condition (see Percy, The Message 111). Second, following Langer, Percy admits that 
symbols may be either discursive or non-discursive—an important qualification that allows 
Percy’s philosophy to cover a wider range of communicative phenomena beyond the mere 
“discursive symbol, word and proposition” (Percy, “Symbol as Need” 381). A novel is a symbol, 
but so is a gesture. Third, Percy found Langer’s distinction between sign and symbol compatible 
with C. S. Peirce’s ontological categories of “secondness” and “thirdness.” Reference to Peirce 
does not appear in Percy’s review of Langer’s Philosophy in a New Key (although Langer does 
reference Peirce in her Philosophy in a New Key) (Langer 54, 77, 274). Percy would later 
                                                   
3 Percy distinguished between “sign” and “symbol” in Symbol & Existence, but in Lost in the Cosmos he used the 
word “signal” in place of “sign” and “sign” in place of “symbol”; in the preface to the 1951 edition of Philosophy in 
a New Key, Langer expressed her wish to have used “signal” in place of “sign” and “sign” in place of “symbol” 
(Langer Philosophy in a New Key x; Percy Lost 87n). Among other things, Percy feared that audiences would think 
of a “symbol” as something novel or rare rather than something permeating consciousness (Percy, Lost 87n; Percy, 
Symbol & Existence 74-75). Nonetheless, for the sake of this dissertation, I preserve Percy and Langer’s original 
terminology of “sign” and “symbol” because Percy more consistently uses the language of “sign” and “symbol” 
across the majority of his works. Further, the word “symbol” retains the etymological significance of symballein, a 
Greek term that means “putting together” or “thrown together” and implies “coupling,” a key term for Percy (Percy, 
as qtd. in Samway, Thief 172; “Symbol”). The action of “coupling” implies a “coupler,” a soul. In my estimation, 
the use of the word “sign” may shift undue attention away from the triadic nature of communication toward the 
study of signs alone. Percy proposed an anthropology and sought to study the human person, names, and things 
named in relation, which my continued usage of “symbol” seeks to preserve.   
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associate Langer’s “sign” with Peirce’s “dyadic” event and Langer’s “symbol” with Peirce’s 
“triadic” event.  
 
Dyadic/Triadic 
Modern scientists study reality as an interaction of dyadic, mechanistic forces, whereas 
Percy, following Peirce, sought to understand human beings as acting on a different ontological 
plane: the triadic. After reading Langer’s account of the symbolic breakthrough (in Helen 
Keller), Percy discovered that Peirce had been onto the same thing as Langer with his category 
of the “triad,” or “thirdness” (Percy, The Message 38-39). Examples of dyadic phenomena 
include “particles hitting particles, chemical reactions, energy exchanges, gravity attractions 
between masses, field forces, and so on” (Percy, Lost 85-86). Scientists working from naïve 
dyadic presuppositions understand the mind solely in terms of the brain: the brain causes certain 
mental states. Or, for idealists formulating their epistemology, an object imposes itself upon a 
subject and causes knowledge. Both materialists and idealists alike can fall prey to explaining 
human behavior in dyadic terms. The “neurone scientists and the literary structuralist-post-
structuralists [sic]” alike understand the “self” as a product of dyadic forces, whether those 
forces occur in the brain or in language (Percy as qtd. in Samway, Thief 179). Both Freud and 
Marx understood the human subject in dyadic terms, too. Freud understood the ego as a result of 
dyadic, unconscious interactions, while Marx understood the subject in terms of a dyadic 
dialectic, where a material ground caused certain ideas to take hold in the subject and society at 
large (Percy, Signposts 128, 284; B. Smith, Walker Percy and the Politics of the Wayfarer 42). 
Shannon and Weaver’s information transfer model of communication also relies upon a dyadic 
framework of sender and receiver. As Freire might suggest, the sender causes the receiver to 
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receive a message, just as a teacher might “deposit” knowledge in a student’s mind in a “banking 
model” of education (Freire). A preference for dyadic explanations reflects modernity’s 
preoccupation with efficient causality and the vis a tergo, or the force from behind (Burke, 
Permanence and Change 230, 261). Yet, dyadic accounts omit the most important datum of all: 
the human being. Describing the totality of phenomena in the universe in dyadic terms fails 
because theorists must account for their own behavior in dyadic terms. Thus, if he were 
consistent, Pavlov would have to explain his own theorizing in terms of stimulus and response.  
Percy believed that language use set the human being at a “distance” from the 
surrounding environment of dyadic, mechanistic forces (Percy, Symbol & Existence 48-49). 
Thus, linguistic, triadic events involve three constituent elements: a namer, a name, and a thing 
named. All communication, failed or successful, involves these three elements (Percy, The 
Message 40).4 Percy labeled the triadic event the “delta phenomenon” because when 
diagrammed the three constituent elements take the shape of a triangle (a Greek “delta,” or Δ) 
signifying “irreducibility” (Percy, The Message Ch. 1, 40, 42). You cannot reduce the triadic 
relationship to a sequence of dyadic causes, despite Ogden and Richards’ attempt to do so 
(Percy, The Message 40, 42). Efficient causes do not link the word, referent, and interpreter 
together (Percy, The Message 36-37). Rather, an intentional relation of identity couples words 
and things; a real, immaterial bond holds between language in all its “sensuous” forms and those 
material things that language mediates (Percy, Symbol & Existence 162, 185). As Percy might 
                                                   
4 More precisely, symbols involve three constituent elements at the “atomic level”; at the “molecular level,” 
successful symbolization, which results in communication, includes a fourth element: another human being (Percy, 
The Message 167n; see also Percy The Message 200, 270; Percy, Symbol & Existence 62-63, 159). Ultimately, the 
“tetrad” (including the fourth element of the other human being) can be reduced into two triadic relations: (1) 
speaker, name, thing named and (2) hearer, name, thing named (Percy, The Message 167n). On this point, Percy’s 
comments on the role of the other in the act of the symbolization might be extended and textured by Bakhtin’s 
analysis of the “utterance” as the basic unit of speech, which always implies the other (Bakhtin).   
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suggest, the word “water” is the water “in alio esse,” in a different mode of existence (Percy, 
Symbol & Existence 185). The perceptual word “water” carries the conceptual waterness within 
it (Percy, Lost 102n; Percy, Symbol & Existence 227). The word and thing interpenetrate, the 
former transforming into the latter in a real way (Percy as qtd. in Samway, Thief 172). That 
which “couples” the word and thing is also immaterial yet real (Percy, Symbol & Existence 72). 
Thus, a triadic account of human communication makes room for the human will. All too often, 
naturalistic explanations of human behavior neglect the role of individual volition in shaping 
interpretation and utterances. When explaining why someone acted the way that he did, 
individuals may quickly jump to the false dichotomy of nature or nurture. People look for dyadic 
explanations in genes or social environment. But the triadic nature of communication 
presupposes a subject capable of selecting and interpreting meaning from his world as well as 
entering into intersubjective union with others. Triadicity, or “thirdness,” presupposes a world of 
meaning shared in common.5  
                                                   
5 Scholars have made various attempts to classify (and thereby “dispose of”) Percy (Percy, Symbol & Existence 107-
109). Despite his interest in and ability to draw upon existentialism, Percy eschewed the label of existentialist 
(Percy, Signposts 375). For Percy, alienation did not result from the Enlightenment or life in a mass culture; rather, 
alienation is primordial because of the Fall (Percy, The Message 24). Many have labeled Percy a novelist; however, 
Percy thought that people would remember him for his work in the philosophy of communication (Gulledge 285; see 
Lawler 97). Others have labeled Percy as a pragmatist. In the preface to Percy’s Symbol & Existence, the editors 
write, “And it is to the pragmatists that Percy turns to support his philosophical hypothesis, his ‘radical 
anthropology’” (Ketner et al., preface to Symbol & Existence xii). One cannot blame Ketner, a pragmatist and Peirce 
scholar, in the least for trying to claim Percy’s work as a vindication of the verities of pragmatism. But Percy 
references Peirce on only two pages in Symbol & Existence. As Percy himself noted in a letter to Ketner written in 
1989, one year before his death,  
As you well know, I am not a student of Peirce. I am a thief of Peirce. I take from him what I want and let 
the rest go, most of it. I am only interested in CSP [C. S. Peirce] insofar as I understand his attack on 
nominalism and his rehabilitation of Scholastic realism. (Percy as qtd. in Samway, Thief 130)  
Percy continues, “I admire at most one percent of it [Peirce’s writing] (two pages) and with the understanding to 
[sic] that it would spin CSP in his grave” (Percy as qtd. in Samway, Thief 131). Percy claimed that he was interested 
in Peirce only insofar as Peirce’s philosophy could support Percy’s “Catholic apologetic” (Percy as qtd. in Samway, 
Thief 131). In one of his letters to Ketner, Percy writes, “Sometimes I could genuflect before CSP for his genius and 
for seeing, before his time and before our time still, the difference between dyadicity and triadicity” (Percy as qtd. in 
Samway, Thief  4). Percy continues, “Othertimes I could kick his [Peirce’s] ass for his deliberate withdrawal into 
logical games” (Percy as qtd. in Samway, Thief 4). Ultimately, Percy thought that Peirce was a “very bad” writer 
(Percy as qtd. in Samway, Thief 26). Despite some references to Peirce’s theory of “abduction,” for the most part 
Percy only used Peirce’s ontological categories of secondness (dyadic) and thirdness (triadic), eschewing notions of 
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Environment/World 
Percy’s distinction between dyadic and triadic leads to another important distinction 
between environment and world, Umwelt and Welt. Binswanger, Von Uexküll, Eccles, and 
Heidegger influenced Percy’s distinction between environment and world (Percy, Lost 86n; 
Percy The Message 203n). Animals, dealing in signs, inhabit an environment. Biologists may 
speak in terms of animals fulfilling various biological “needs” in their environments. 
Psychologists or sociologists may also insist that humans have various “needs” (e.g., for sex, for 
sociability, for community, and so on). But, as suggested above, Percy rejected the functional 
notion of the symbol that emphasizes the symbol as satisfying some biological, psychological, or 
sociological need (Percy, Symbol & Existence 25-29). To underscore the difference between 
animals and humans, Percy argued that human beings can have all their various biological, 
psychological, and sociological needs met and still suffer from alienation. The successful 
Westerner (e.g., a businessman) inhabiting the best of all possible environments may live a life 
of despair in the suburbs while St. Mother Teresa of Calcutta experiences joy in the slums of 
India (Percy, Lost 80-82, 122). But why? Because the environment does not matter so much as 
the world. The “triadic” breakthrough into a shared world of meaning presupposes its own 
unique successes and failures beyond explanation in dyadic terms (Percy, The Message 41). 
Upon discovering that one thing has a name, a child will begin to ask the name of everything else 
in their surrounding milieu (Percy, Signposts 126). In like manner, after finding that the word 
                                                   
firstness as unhelpful (Percy as qtd. in Samway, Thief 130). If anything, more so than a pragmatist or an 
existentialist, Percy was a Thomist (Lawler Ch. 3). Percy repeatedly cites and relies upon Thomists such as James 
Collins, Jacques Maritain, Frederick Wilhelmsen, John of St. Thomas, and St. Thomas Aquinas. Nonetheless, 
Tolson suggests that Percy shied away from using the language of Scholastic realism because such language would 
not have resonated with his contemporaries (Tolson 241). Below I will try to resist the temptation to label Percy as 
one thing or another, even as a Thomist. Percy, like Augustine, sought the truth wherever he found it, even if it 
meant reading atheist existentialists like Sartre.   
 
 
21 
“water” meant the water running over her hand, Helen Keller insisted upon knowing the name of 
everything else (Percy, Signposts 126). The joy of a child, a deaf-mute, a poet, or a scientist 
discovering the name of something is an ontological and epistemological joy, a revelatory insight 
into the thatness and whatness of being itself (R. Palmer 240; Percy, Symbol & Existence 55-60).   
Thirdness presupposes a world where everything has a name. Even the unknown, the 
ineffable, and the gaps have names: “unknown,” “ineffable,” and “gaps” (Percy, Lost 99-100). 
Humans experience the world as a “totality” of meaning, as “all-or-nothing” (Percy, Symbol & 
Existence 101). Ask someone to provide something that does not have a name, and inevitably he 
will fail. Amending certain phenomenologists’ understanding of intentionality, Percy states that 
consciousness is not merely “of” something but “of” something “as” something (Percy, The 
Message 272-273; Heidegger, Being and Time 56, 202; R. Palmer 128). Humans know the world 
around them under the auspices of the symbol (Percy, Lost 100, 211n-212n). I do not know only 
the symbol, as idealists suggest, but I know through the symbol (Percy, Symbol & Existence 184-
185). I hear the chirping sound outside my window “as” birds. I taste tea “as” bitter and sugar 
“as” sweet (Weaver 1360). The symbol makes both genuine knowledge and error possible 
(Percy, Symbol & Existence 75, 96). When presented with something truly novel, anxiety ensues 
(Percy, Symbol & Existence 195). Human beings will conceive that novelty “as” something, 
regardless. I run my hand under a classroom desk and feel something “as” gum, which later turns 
out to be only a knobby part of the desk. Percy describes the symbolic function’s tendency to 
“make use of whatever adventitial elements are at hand” (Percy, Symbol & Existence 107-109). 
Lacking the right symbol, another symbol will fill the void. Everything in the world is capable of 
being construed by the symbol with the exception of one thing: the self (Percy, Lost 211n-212n; 
Percy Message 283-284, Percy, Symbol & Existence 195, Percy, Signposts 126). The self has no 
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adequate symbol because all symbols apply equally to the self. Like everything else, the self 
must conceive of itself “as” something. A New Age pantheist might say, “I am everything.” A 
Sartrean Buddhist might say, “I am nothing.” Both “everything” and “nothing” apply and serve 
to place the self for a time. Failing to identify yourself “as” something means that others will 
identify you “as” something, anyway. As a triadic creature, the self must constantly struggle to 
place itself in the world and must repeatedly answer the questions, “What am I? Who am I?” 
Animals in environments suffer from no such solicitousness. Joy comes from naming the 
unnameable and hearing it heard (Percy, Lost 120-121; Percy The Message 97). We hear the 
unnameable heard anytime someone, especially an artist, articulates for us through the mediation 
of the symbol what had hitherto been unformulated (Percy, Lost 119, 121). Despair follows upon 
the lie, the identification of the self “as” something which it is not (i.e., “bad faith”) (Percy, 
Signposts 390). The self can act in “bad faith” and succumb to all sorts of impersonations 
regarding its identity (Percy, Lost 210; Percy, Symbol & Existence 111). As Percy notes, “The 
self in a world is rich or poor accordingly as it succeeds in identifying its otherwise unspeakable 
self….” as totem, as God, as creature under God, as transcendent, as immanent (Percy, Lost 
122). 
 
Immanence/Transcendence 
 Percy uses the terms “immanent” and “transcendent” as ways that the self may 
experience and understand itself. Quite simply, immanence may be described as “this-worldly,” 
while transcendence may be described as “other-worldly” (cf. Taylor, A Secular Age 13-16). The 
immanent is natural and ordinary, whereas the transcendent is supernatural and extraordinary. 
Immanence describes the material environment characterized by becoming, time, and change. 
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When conceived of as a purely immanent creature, the self is nothing more than a physical brain 
responding to dyadic signs. The purely immanent self assumes the disposition of a consumer in 
an environment with various material needs. Transcendence, on the other hand, refers to the 
immateriality of existence characterized by being, atemporality, and permanence. Historically, 
religion afforded the means for transcendence. In a secular age, however, Percy argues, science 
and art provide the primary avenues for transcendence. The transcendent scientist stands over 
against the world as a knower. Thus, scientists can explain the behavior of others in immanent 
terms while not having to account for their own transcendent scientific activity. The artist, too, 
can experience transcendence in the creation of a work of art. Breakthrough into the realm of 
transcendence implies a world opened by the copula “is.” Both the scientist and the artist name 
the world and discover being, opening up revelatory insight for themselves and others (Percy, 
Symbol & Existence 197).  
However, Percy observes that two difficulties emerge from transcendence in a 
postreligious age. First, the immanent consumer self hands over “sovereignty” to the 
transcendent knowers, the “they.” “They” write novels, and “they” do experiments (Percy, Lost 
119-124; Percy, Symbol & Existence 129-130). Surrender of sovereignty leads to scientism and a 
cult of the artist as well as a strict dichotomy between the lay “consumer” and the priestly 
“theorist” (Percy, Signposts 297). The immanent consumer self experiences transcendence 
vicariously through the scientist or poet. The angelic, “objective” “theorist” prescribes remedies 
for the beastly consumer’s various immanent “needs” (Percy, The Message 113). Second, 
transcendence can lead to “re-entry” problems, or the malaise of the ordinary that comes after 
experiencing the extraordinary (Percy, Lost 114-124). The abstracted self must find some way to 
reinsert itself back into everyday life. Transcendence is nothing short of a mystical experience. 
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Deprived of God, individuals seek transcendence in sex, drugs, violence, and war. Individuals 
will stop it nothing to escape from their predicament, the anxiety inducing inability to place the 
“self” in a world of meaning, the predicament of not knowing who they are or what they are 
supposed to be doing. The pleasure of transcendence comes not from finding the self but from 
losing the self, a type of ecstasy or ek-stasis, a standing outside of one’s self (“Ecstatic”; cf. 
Percy, Lost 124). In Kierkegaardian terms, rotation looks for transcendence in the future (e.g., a 
release from everydayness into novelty), while repetition looks for transcendence in the past 
(e.g., returning home, nostalgia, etc.) (Lawson 890). Percy likely read about immanence and 
transcendence in Collins’ (1952) The Existentialists. For Collins, only the Christian faith could 
“reconcile the immanent tendency to remain loyal to our earthly condition and the equally 
importunate drive toward transcendence” (Collins 16). Some may emphasize transcendence at 
the expense of immanence, placing God and the supernatural beyond experience and the reach of 
humanity; God in this sense becomes the utterly transcendent and unknowable Other. The 
Catholic Church, on the other hand, stresses the importance of both immanence and 
transcendence, the Incarnation, the Word made flesh, the sacramental and “anagogic,” the 
“holiness of the ordinary” (Percy, Signposts 368-370; Percy, Symbol & Existence 234).The 
human predicament involves both immanence and transcendence, primordial alienation (i.e., the 
Fall) and periodic transcendence. The key is to privilege neither immanence nor transcendence 
but to recognize the importance of both.  
Just as the symbol can reveal a shared world of transcendent knowledge and infuse 
experience with ontological joy, the symbol can also lead to ignorance and boredom (Percy, 
Symbol & Existence 96, 100-101). To read and discuss only the wonders of symbol use neglects 
the shadow side of communication in Percy’s work. Like Adam in Eden, the toddler naming his 
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world encounters existence as something extraordinary. Though not a Saussurean semioticist, 
Percy used the language of Saussure in Lost in the Cosmos to describe how the signified 
transforms the signifier.6 For example, at first the vocable “balloon” takes on characteristics of 
balloonness, of “the distention, the stretched-rubber, light, up-tending, squinch-sound-against-
fingers signified” (Percy, Lost 104). As mentioned above, words and things come to 
interpenetrate through repeated symbol use (Percy, Lost 102; Percy, Symbol & Existence 227). 
The perceptual word “apple” comes to carry around within it the conceptual quality of appleness 
(Percy, Lost 102n). Over time, however, the world becomes ordinary, mundane, taken for 
granted, familiar. As Percy notes, “there is a hardening and closure of the signifier, so that in the 
end the signified becomes encased in a simulacrum like a mummy in a mummy case” (Percy, 
Lost 104). Words no longer intend existence but only themselves. The symbolic-complex 
“disposes of” the truly novel as an instance of something already encountered (Percy, Symbol & 
Existence 107-109). Consider Percy’s example of a bird watcher identifying a bird as merely a 
“sparrow.” One bird watcher says to another, “What is that?” The other replies, “That is only a 
sparrow.” The bird in its concrete particularity has disappeared into the “sarcophagus” of the 
symbol “sparrow” (Percy, Lost 104). As Whitehead suggested with his “fallacy of misplaced 
                                                   
6 The most significant difference between Percy and Saussure is that Saussure presupposes a dyadic approach to the 
study of communication, whereas Percy presupposes a triadic approach to the study of communication. Saussure’s 
analysis of the “speaking-circuit,” which follows the sequence of “concepts” (signifieds) and “sound-images” 
(signifiers) between two speakers, strikes the reader as exemplary of his dyadic approach (Saussure 11-12, 67). 
Singer explains that Saussure’s “semiology” studies “the sign-function as a dyadic relation of signifier and signified 
that dispenses with both independent objects and subjects” (Singer 491). Saussure’s dyadic approach places him, the 
semioticist, in a transcendent relation to others (cf. Percy, Lost 118). Percy, on the other hand, goes to great lengths 
to critique the transcendent posture assumed by scientists and semioticians alike. Several figures reject Saussure’s 
dyadic approach. Ketner identifies both Saussure and Charles Morris as “arch-dyadic-scientists” (Ketner as qtd. in 
Samway, Thief 274). Berthoff also implicates Saussure’s semiotics as dyadic (Berthoff “I.A. Richards and the 
Philosophy of Rhetoric” 199-200). Thus, due to his dyadic approach, Saussure fails to grasp the importance of 
mediation, another name for thirdness or “triadicity” (Berthoff, “I.A. Richards and the Philosophy of Rhetoric” 199; 
Peirce, “A Guess at the Riddle” 248, 255).  
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concreteness,” the abstraction becomes more real than the thing itself (Percy, The Message 58). 
That is only an apple. That is only a balloon. That is only me. That is only you.  
In Percy’s essay “The Loss of the Creature,” he describes how tourists and students alike 
may assume the attitude of passive consumers, encountering only a reified symbolic apparatus 
instead of existence in its inexhaustible plenitude (Percy, The Message Ch. 2). Whether 
intentional or not, “experts” present symbols to tourists and students who may passively 
consume them (Percy, The Message 55). As Percy suggests, once the symbol-complex has 
formulated everything in advance, only with difficulty can a human being encounter something 
as it is (Percy, Symbol & Existence, 100, 113). In addition to catastrophe and “apprenticeship to a 
great man,” the use of poetic language can revivify the taken for granted (Percy, Lost 104; Percy, 
The Message 60). The Russian literary theorist Victor Shklovsky provided Percy with a glimpse 
into the relationship between familiarization and language. Art can “defamiliarize” and make 
strange all that has become familiar and taken for granted. As Shklovsky writes, “Habitualization 
devours works, clothes, furniture, one’s wife, and the fear of war” (Shklovsky, “Art as Device” 
[Lemon and Reis] 12). Shklovsky suggests, “… [A]rt exists that one may recover the sensation 
of life; it exists to make one feel things, to make the stone stony” (Shklovsky, “Art as Device” 
[Lemon and Reis] 12). Both Shklovsky and Percy would agree that perception and language are 
thoroughly interconnected, and that by deliberately tampering with language, one may indeed 
refresh perception of reality. In Shklovsky, the whole point of art is to remove “the automatism 
of perception” (Shklovsky, “Art as Device” [Lemon and Reis] 13). For his own part, Percy was 
thoroughly invested in using catastrophe and apocalypse in his novels and philosophical essays 
to render the familiar unfamiliar, whether sparrows or Wednesday afternoons (Percy, Lost 105; 
Percy, “The Man on the Train” 92). As Percy writes, “A poet can wrench signifier out of context 
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and exhibit it in all its queerness and splendor” (Percy, Lost 105). Percy states, “What I see when 
the poet salvages the word from its utility context and holds it up for my gaze is the thing in the 
word in another mode of existence, in alio esse” (Percy, Symbol & Existence 227). By 
implication, everyone, whether self-identifying as a poet or not, has the responsibility to actively 
recover being and the “holiness of the ordinary” from the encasement of the symbol (Collins 
205; Percy, Signposts 368-370).  
Percy’s ideas on the shadow side of communication have wide-ranging implications for 
religion and education. Even religious symbols may become familiarized and taken for granted. 
Percy writes, “It is a paradox that insofar as the religious symbol is allowed to slip away into the 
zone of the ‘religious’—a dissociated realm of activity where only ‘religious’ things happen—it 
loses its meaning for us” (Percy, Symbol & Existence 109). Percy used an indirect approach for 
conveying religious truths because he knew that, all too often, religious symbols may obscure the 
divine reality beyond them. The Christian apologist lives in a historical moment where the words 
themselves have been “emptied out” (Percy, Lost 21; Percy, The Message 116). A passive, 
consumptive attitude toward religious symbols threatens the faith just as much as a hostile 
attitude (Percy, Symbol & Existence 108). Percy explains that “old words of grace are worn 
smooth as poker chips and a certain devaluation has occurred, like a poker chip after it is cashed 
in” (Percy, The Message 116). The student, too, runs the risk of encountering only the media of 
education rather than the reality that those symbols intend. Lacking a first-hand referent, the 
symbol will make use of nearby “adventitial elements” (Percy, Symbol & Existence 106-109). 
The symbol “George Washington,” for example, may carry within it the mundane qualities of the 
elementary school classroom rather than the historical personage of George Washington—“the 
odor of book, two-dimensional pictures, etc.” (Percy, Symbol & Existence 107). Percy writes, “It 
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is the irony of the passively received education that what will be apprehended is not the thing 
which is taught but the paraphernalia of teaching. The vehicle transmits not its passenger but 
only itself” (Percy, Symbol & Existence 107). A great book on the life of George Washington, 
however, could transform the symbol “George Washington” once again, restoring the 
“existential object in all its inexhaustibility” (Percy, Symbol & Existence 109). Thus, Percy 
thought that students truly desiring to learn had to take an active role in their education. The 
apocalyptic ruins make for a better place to discover Shakespeare than the classroom (Percy, The 
Message 5, 56-57). The educator must struggle against the consumptive attitude in the classroom 
and defamiliarize symbols devalued by years of passively received education. For the realist 
teacher or student, the mystery of being is inexhaustible (Percy, Lost 105).  
 
Percy’s Hermeneutic of the Self 
In sum, Percy’s hermeneutic of the self requires an understanding of the distinctions 
between sign/symbol, dyadic/triadic, environment/world, and immanence/transcendence. Percy 
suggested that the proper object of study for semiotics is “not texts and other coded sign 
utterances but the self which produces texts or hears sign utterances” (Percy, Lost 83). Like 
Martin Buber in Between Man and Man, Percy offered an anthropology rooted in communication 
(Buber 199, 243). Man is the symbol-using and “asserting” animal (Percy, Symbol & Existence 
30-33). Signs occur on a purely immanent plane of dyadic, stimulus-response interactions. 
Animals respond to signs in their environment. Humans, on the other hand, use symbols to 
mediate their knowledge of reality. Symbols consist of both material and immaterial 
components, matter and form (Joseph 15-16; Percy, The Message 156; Percy, Symbol & 
Existence 34, 96, 187-188). As a means of knowledge, symbols transport the symbol user beyond 
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the material sphere of immanence. Humans achieve transcendence through their use of symbols. 
Triadic events involve three components: an interpreter, a symbol, and a referent. An intentional, 
real relation of identity holds between the symbol and its referent. The interpreter (a soul, a 
mind, a self) couples the symbol and referent together (Percy, The Message 43-44, 251; Percy, 
Symbol & Existence 72). Symbols tell us both that and what something “is,” not necessarily what 
something “does” (Percy, The Message 71-72). Triadic events cannot be reduced to causal, 
dyadic events. The symbol opens the human being to a world of meaning beyond an environment 
of various biological needs. Humans share a triadic world with others; thus, a shared world 
implies an immaterial nexus of meaning between subjects. Consciousness emerges because of 
the symbol. Etymologically speaking, the word “consciousness” comes from the Latin con + 
scire, or “to know with” (Percy, The Message 274). The symbol affords intersubjectivity, the 
immaterial bond of Namer and Hearer (Percy, The Message 265-276; Percy, Symbol & Existence 
188). Scientists can understand everything in the universe in dyadic terms except for the self 
(Percy, Lost 211n-212n). Importantly, scientists cannot account for their own activity in dyadic 
terms. As a triadic creature, the self searches for symbols to understand its predicament. 
However, the autonomous self searches in vain for the ultimate symbol to reveal who or what it 
is because such a revelation would imply a transcendent, religious source. As a primordially 
alienated creature, the fallen self must await “news” from beyond itself, in Percy’s understanding 
the euangelion, to know once and for all who it is and what it should do. In the language of 
Kierkegaard’s “The Difference between the Genius and the Apostle,” the genius operates in the 
realm of immanence and yields knowledge sub specie aeternitatis, or knowledge that holds true 
under the aegis of eternity in all times and all places; however, the apostle brings “news” (the 
euangelion) from a transcendent source relative to a particular person in a specific historical 
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moment (Percy, The Message 147). The triune God of the Christians is both immanent and 
transcendent, both inside time and outside time. God the Father stands outside time, while God 
the Son and God the Holy Ghost enter time. To use the language of St. Irenaeus, the Son and the 
Holy Ghost operate like the Father’s hands, entering immanence from transcendence (Irenaeus 
531). Thus, the self comes to understand its predicament as a fallen creature by entering into the 
unity of immanence and transcendence in the triune God. At this juncture, theology surpasses 
philosophy. Having discussed some of the primary coordinates in Percy’s thought, I now 
transition to a discussion of how Percy responded to schools of thought important to the field of 
communication.  
 
Intersections with the Field of Communication: Schools of Thought  
Percy responded to several schools of thought important to communication studies, 
including information theory, General Semantics, behaviorism, symbolic interactionism, 
structuralism, poststructuralism, and the New Rhetoric. Percy offered a textured reply to each 
school, finding those schools most agreeable that stressed the social origins of the “self” without 
dismissing it altogether. On the other hand, Percy took issue with those schools that adopted a 
dyadic approach to the study of communication, such as Ogden and Richards’ New Rhetoric. As 
a realist, Percy critiqued the implicit nominalism in certain schools like General Semantics, 
which insisted upon the non-identification of word and thing. Words can in fact contain and 
reveal an underlying reality (Percy, Symbol & Existence 74-75, 184-185). Understanding Percy’s 
stance toward these schools grants the reader a better appreciation for how Percy might 
contribute to the field of communication. In the next section, I review the particular voices 
within the field of communication that utilized Percy in their own research.  
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 While Percy does not offer an extended meditation on Shannon and Weaver’s 
“information theory,” reference to Shannon and Weaver’s (1949) The Mathematical Theory of 
Communication appears in the bibliography of Percy’s The Message in the Bottle. Percy hints at 
the inadequacy of “information theory” to capture the triadic nature of language (Percy, The 
Message 13-14, 165). Shannon and Weaver conceived of communication as the transfer of 
information between sender and receiver in a “channel” (Strate Amazing Ourselves to Death 47; 
McLuhan and McLuhan, Laws of Media 86-87). Shannon and Weaver’s information theory, 
originally known as “communication theory,” developed out of research on telephony during the 
1920s and cryptography during World War II (Peters, Speaking into the Air 23). Shannon argued 
in a 1938 paper for a conception of “information” as a commodity, like any other, that could be 
processed (Beniger, The Control Revolution 408). Work in information theory (or 
“communication theory”) led to the rise of computer science and to an interest in “signals” 
instead of “significance” (Peters, Speaking 23; Strate, Amazing Ourselves to Death 77). Over 
time, Shannon and Weaver’s information theory has served as a foil for more interpretive 
approaches to communication as well as for media ecology (Klyukanov, A Communication 
Universe 53-57).7 McLuhan and McLuhan write, “The Shannon-Weaver model of 
communication, the basis of all contemporary Western theories of media and of communication, 
typifies left-brain lineal bias” (McLuhan and McLuhan, Laws of Media 86). The sender-receiver 
model of communication stresses the elimination of “noise” that might disrupt the reception of a 
message (McLuhan and McLuhan, Laws 87). Further, the Shannon-Weaver model explains 
communication in terms of efficient causality, the “only sequential form of causality” (McLuhan 
and McLuhan, Laws 87). Percy would have rejected Shannon and Weaver’s information theory 
                                                   
7 Note that Kylukanov seems to place the Shannon-Weaver model, rhetorical theory, and McLuhan’s media ecology 
in the same camp (Klyukanov, A Communication Universe 53-57). 
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as rooted in the study of efficient, dyadic causes. The Shannon-Weaver model also takes for 
granted the hidden “ground” of meaning on which information transfer occurs, what Percy called 
a “world” (McLuhan and McLuhan, Laws 87).  
Beyond information theory, Percy critiqued General Semantics for its unwillingness to 
admit the real identification of words and things. Alfred Korzybski introduced General 
Semantics in 1933 (Strate, Media Ecology 19). General Semantics influenced the field of media 
ecology, especially thinkers such as Postman, Anton, and Strate (Strate, Media Ecology 19-20). 
According to Strate, General Semantics presupposes that human beings use language to make 
maps of their reality, which grow increasingly more abstract and removed from the concrete 
(Strate, Media Ecology 19). Korzsybski insisted that “a map is not the territory” and that “a word 
is not the object it represents” (Korzybski 58). The word “pencil” is not the pencil itself. Anton 
writes, “General Semanticists routinely draw attention to the non-identification between the 
symbolic realm and first-order processes of reality” (Anton, Communication Uncovered 69). Yet, 
as mentioned above, Percy believed that the word is the thing, albeit in a different mode of 
existence (in alio esse). In his essay “Semiotic and the Problem of Knowledge,” Percy writes,  
Confronted by a pencil, Korzybski (1952) says, it is absolutely false to say that this is a 
pencil: to say that it is can only lead to delusional states. Say whatever you like about the 
pencil, but do not say that it is a pencil. “Whatever you might say the object ‘is’, well it is 
not” (35). (Percy, Symbol & Existence 186)  
Stuart Chase, another figure associated with General Semantics, complained of man’s “perverse 
habit of confusing words with things” (Percy, Symbol & Existence 46). In his 1938 Tyranny of 
Words, Chase writes, “Try as you may, you cannot eat the word ‘oyster,’….” (Chase 98; Chase 
as qtd. in Percy, Symbol & Existence 53). Percy replies, “You cannot eat the word ‘oyster,’ 
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Chase (1938) assures us, but then not even the most superstitious totemistic tribesman would try” 
(Percy, Symbol & Existence 184). As Percy explains, saying what something is is a precondition 
for knowing anything about it at all (Percy, Symbol & Existence 187). According to Percy, Chase 
and others disliked the identification of word and thing because such an identification could not 
be explained in causal, dyadic terms (Percy, Symbol & Existence 54, 64). Solely because of their 
metaphysical assumptions, positivists like Korzybski and Chase could not admit a real yet 
immaterial identification of word and thing.  
 Behaviorism tried to explain language acquisition and language use in dyadic terms, too. 
Behaviorists tried to study meaning as occurring within a “casual-adaptive nexus” (Percy, 
Symbol & Existence 94). Throughout Lost in the Cosmos, Percy lampoons behaviorists who 
desperately try to teach language to animals using the stimulus-response mechanism. Percy 
writes,  
So anxious, in fact, have some people been to communicate with Washoe, the most 
famous chimp, that in the attempt to make signs for Washoe three psychologists have had 
their fingers bitten off for their pains. Alas for man: rebuffed again. (Percy, Lost 170)  
For Percy, humans differ qualitatively from other animals because humans can use symbols. 
Though B. F. Skinner was alleged to have taught pigeons how to use “symbols,” Percy still 
considered Skinner’s experiment as trying to explain “language, symbols, [and] sentences” in 
dyadic terms (Percy, Lost 93). Morris, another behaviorist, considered the triadic symbol as a 
mere dyadic sign (Percy, The Message 269). Furthermore, Percy protested that the behaviorists 
simply dismissed immaterial realities such as consciousness, mind, soul, and self altogether. 
Watsonian behaviorism, for example, failed to discuss the emergence of “consciousness” (Percy, 
Symbol & Existence 150). Percy writes, “My difficulty with the behaviorists is that they rule out 
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mind, self, and consciousness as inaccessible either on the doctrinal grounds that they do not 
exist or on methodological grounds that they are beyond the reach of behavioral science” (Percy, 
Lost 86n-87n). Percy refused to reduce the mind to a byproduct of stimuli and responses.  
Despite rejecting behaviorism’s dyadic approach to language, Percy appreciated the work 
of George Herbert Mead, a figure associated with “social behaviorism” (Percy, Symbol & 
Existence 141). Mead’s “symbolic interactionism” has influenced scholars in the field of 
communication, especially in interpersonal communication (Arnett, McManus, and McKendree, 
Conflict between Persons 108, 141; Fritz, Professional Civility 112; Roloff 113). While Percy 
disagreed with Mead’s “transposition of the stimulus-response schema to the societal level,” 
Percy admired Mead for not dispensing with the question of consciousness altogether like other 
behaviorists had done (Percy, Symbol & Existence 151). Unlike Descartes and Chomsky, Mead 
stressed the social origins of the self (Percy, Lost 87). In his critique of Mead, however, Percy 
explained that consciousness involves more than just “the response of the organism to its own 
responses” (Percy, The Message 268). Consciousness emerges not in a matrix of causal 
sequences but as a product of triadic communication with another human being. Percy writes, 
“The act of consciousness is the intending of the object as being what it is for both of us under 
the auspices of the symbol” (Percy, The Message 274). Consciousness implies another human 
being to tell me what something is so that I might know with them (con + scire, “to know with”) 
(Percy, The Message 170, 274).  
Like certain behaviorists, some French structuralists, poststructuralists, and 
deconstructionists dismissed the notion of the “self” altogether. Many communication scholars 
have drawn upon the work of French structuralism, poststructuralism, and deconstruction, 
especially Foucault and Derrida (Biesecker; Chang 172; Gunkel). Lacan, a genealogical 
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descendent of structuralism and poststructuralism, continues to influence scholarship in 
rhetorical criticism (Gunn; D. Palmer 4, 12). Percy would certainly admit the need to dethrone 
the “autonomous self” from its position of privilege. Percy suggested that the grandiose 
expectations of the “autonomous self” led to the first two World Wars and would likely lead to 
World War III (Percy, Lost 157, 185-192). Rather than considering the self as causa sui, a cause 
of itself, Percy considered the self as derivative of the symbol function (Percy, Lost 82). Yet, 
Percy thought that certain French structuralists and poststructuralists went too far in their 
enthusiasm for the eradication of the self. Calling the self derivative of the symbol function does 
not mean reducing the self to a puppet of language (Brummans et. al 181). According to Percy, 
Levi-Strauss boasted “of the dehumanization which his structuralism implies” (Percy, Lost 87n). 
Percy writes, “Michel Foucault argues that with the coming of semiotics the concept of the self 
has vanished from our new view of reality” (Percy, Lost 87n).8 Foucault advanced the notion that 
the being of language would eclipse “man” in The Order of Things (Foucault, The Order of 
Things 382-386). Foucault writes,  
…the fact that in it [philosophy] perhaps, though even more outside and against it, in 
literature as well as in formal reflection, the question of language is being posed, prove 
no doubt that man is in the process of disappearing. (Foucault, The Order 385)  
Foucault continues, “As the archaeology of our thought easily shows, man is an invention of 
recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end” (Foucault, The Order 387). When addressing the 
question “Who speaks?” the poststructuralist might answer: Language itself (Foucault, The 
Order 305-307, 382; Foucault, “What is an Author?”; Ijsseling 130). Not only did structuralism 
                                                   
8 Percy likely read Pettit’s The Concept of Structuralism, which summarizes both Levi-Strauss’ and Foucault’s 
positions on the human subject (Pettit 38). Citing Foucault’s The Order of Things, Pettit writes, “[H]e [Foucault] 
argues that with the semiological sciences the concept of the human subject has vanished from our Weltanschauung” 
(Pettit 38). 
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and poststructuralism go too far with their dehumanizing ideas, but these currents of thought also 
put forward bizarre, jargon-laden theories. In his essay “Herman Melville,” Percy writes,  
Now, there is a lot of real goofiness in structuralist criticism. One can imagine a 
structuralist critique of Moby-Dick in the style of Lévi-Strauss: a table of binary opposites 
listing right whales in one column and wrong whales in another, and the right whales are 
the sperm whales and the wrong whales are wrongly called right whales. (Percy, 
Signposts 199)  
Percy also criticizes “deconstruction” and the absolute disavowal of authorial intention (Percy, 
Signposts 199). In Lost in the Cosmos, Percy calls deconstruction the “whimsical stepchild” of 
French structuralism; he adds, “I do not feel obliged to speak of the deconstructionists” (Percy, 
Lost 87n). Despite its “goofiness,” however, Percy found some of what French structuralism 
advanced as true, such as the notion of “intertextuality” (Percy, Signposts 199). Writers write in 
community: “[T]here’s no such thing as a sovereign and underived text, except for possibly 
Faulkner….” (Percy, Signposts 199). Percy suggested reading Moby Dick while keeping in mind 
Hawthorne as an “intertext” for Melville (Percy, Signposts 199). Despite his reservations about 
certain strands of postmodern thought, Percy nevertheless acknowledged the importance of 
understanding writers in conversation with one other (cf. Bakhtin 91).  
While perhaps not wholeheartedly agreeing with him, Percy appreciated the work of 
Ferdinand de Saussure. Percy lists the structural linguist Ferdinand de Saussure as one of the 
“friends” of his project in Lost in the Cosmos because Saussure offered a “fruitful analysis of the 
human sign as the union of the signifier (signifiant) and the signified (signifié)” (Percy, Lost 
85n). Nonetheless, as Berthoff suggests, Saussurian semiotics is dyadic because it leaves out the 
“act of knowing” (Berthoff, “I. A. Richards” 199-200; Percy, The Message 72). An analysis of 
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only signifiers and signifieds omits the most important part of all: the human being, which 
couples words and things. In other words, Saussurian semiotics appears to omit predication, or 
the act of judgment essential to knowledge (Ong, The Presence of the Word 151-158). Like 
Korzybski’s emphasis on the non-identification of word and thing, de Saussure’s nominalist 
structuralism also defined the relationship between words and things as arbitrary (D. Palmer 17-
21). For the most part, structuralism and poststructuralism dismissed the self altogether (like the 
behaviorists) or stressed the non-identification between word and thing (like the General 
Semanticists). Percy would have found cause to reject the majority of structuralism and 
poststructuralism for both of these reasons.  
Percy also replied to Ogden and Richards, two key voices in the New Rhetoric. Richards, 
who coined the term “New Rhetoric,” suggested that a study of metaphor could reveal “how 
words work” (Berthoff, “I. A. Richards” 196). Further, Richards used the terms “tenor” and 
“vehicle” to investigate metaphor (Fogarty 36-38). Ogden and Richards’ work in the New 
Rhetoric inspired key figures important to the field of communication such as Ricoeur, Burke, 
and McLuhan. Ricoeur utilized Richards’ work on metaphor in his The Rule of Metaphor 
(Ricoeur 76-83). Ogden and Richards’ scholarship in The Meaning of Meaning influenced 
Burke’s understanding of invoking a “magical” name and speaking “in the name of” something 
(Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form, 3-4). Burke also discussed Ogden and Richards in his 
Rhetoric of Motives when considering Malinowski’s “context of situation,” or the way that 
nonverbal and semiverbal elements factor into the meaning of a situation (Burke, A Rhetoric of 
Motives 64-65, 205-206; see also Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives 90). Finally, Marshall McLuhan 
studied with Richards at Cambridge, and Richards’ insistence on the importance of context and 
purpose informed McLuhan’s study of media (E. McLuhan, Introduction to Essential McLuhan, 
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1; Gordon, Introduction to Gutenberg Galaxy xv). For McLuhan, the study of media should 
reveal the implicit, taken-for-granted assumptions in the nonverbal context for the sake of 
predicting and controlling technology for human purposes (Gordon, Introduction to Gutenberg 
Galaxy xv).  
Percy disagreed with Ogden and Richards’ understanding of Peirce, as well as their 
understanding of the meaning situation in terms of sign behavior. Ogden and Richards utilized 
Peirce’s notion of “triadicity” in their study of meaning, dedicating a part of their appendix in 
The Meaning of Meaning to Peirce (Berthoff, “I. A. Richards” 199). Yet, Ogden and Richards 
tried to reduce the irreducible triadic relationship between namer, name, and named to a 
sequence of dyadic relationships (Fogarty 41-42; Percy, The Message 164, 199). Further, 
drawing upon Malinowski, Ogden and Richards’ “contextual or sign theory of language” sought 
to make sense of South Pacific islanders fishing together in terms of sign behavior (Percy, 
Symbol & Existence 71). For Ogden and Richards, words cause people to direct their attention to 
a particular thing (Percy, The Message 199). Ogden and Richards believed that causal relations 
held between thoughts and symbols (Percy, Symbol & Existence 175). In other words, symbols 
cause thoughts, and thoughts cause symbols (Fogarty 41-42; Percy, The Message 164, 199). 
Ogden and Richards insisted upon an “imputed” relation, as opposed to a “real” relation, 
between word and thing (Percy, The Message 36-37; Percy, Symbol & Existence 52-53, 176). 
Due to their unwillingness to admit the metaphysical identity between word and thing, Percy 
labeled Ogden and Richards as positivists and lumped them together with the General 
Semanticists, Korzybski and Chase (Percy, Symbol & Existence 64). Yet, Berthoff implies that 
Richards, at least, was not a positivist because Richards appreciated the importance of 
“mediation” (Berthoff, “I. A. Richards” 197). Berthoff claims that Richards did not believe that 
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humans could have unmediated contact with reality (Berthoff “I.A. Richards” 197). Positivists 
might stress thought as preceding language and might consider language merely as the “garment 
of thought” (Berthoff, “I.A. Richards” 198). On Berthoff’s reading of Richards, however, 
language shapes thought (Berthoff, “I.A. Richards” 196-198). Nevertheless, Percy’s analyses in 
Symbol & Existence and The Message in the Bottle make it clear that Ogden and Richards 
subscribed to a dyadic understanding of language use. By implication, careful investigation 
might also reveal whether such dyadic presuppositions made their way into Burke, Ricoeur, and 
McLuhan.  
 Thus, Percy commented on several schools of thought important to the field of 
communication. To recap, Percy rejected those ideas that dismissed the self altogether, 
understood language in dyadic terms, or presupposed the non-identification between words and 
things. Nonetheless, Percy’s writing on each school reveals a textured engagement with thinkers 
and a willingness to grapple with ideas. For example, although Percy mostly rejected 
behaviorism, Percy appreciated the “social behaviorism” of George Herbert Mead. Percy’s 
willingness and ability to read scholars from a wide range of traditions contributed to the 
complexity of his thought. While not an existentialist, Percy appreciated certain existentialist 
insights, such as the “uniqueness of human existence” (Percy, Symbol & Existence 9; see also 
Percy, Symbol & Existence, 6-10, 18-22, 34). And in like manner, while not a devotee of 
scientism, Percy valued an empirical approach to the study of language use and abuse (Percy, 
Symbol & Existence 36). In the next section, I transition from general schools of thought that 
Percy wrote about to particular voices within the field of communication that employed Percy’s 
ideas.   
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Intersections with the Field of Communication: Scholars Who Drew upon Percy 
Throughout the history of the field of communication, communication scholars have 
drawn upon Percy’s work. Not only did Percy write in response to currents of thought that 
influenced the field of communication, but communication scholars also wrote about Percy and 
his ideas. Therefore, in this section I review how scholars in the field of communication have 
drawn upon Percy’s work, especially in the areas of rhetoric, communication ethics, philosophy 
of communication, media ecology, and communication pedagogy. In order to compile the 
following research, I reviewed numerous communication journals, including international, 
national, and regional publications.  
Rhetorical scholars have looked to Percy’s writings for direction on the philosophical 
nature of language. Several articles in the field of communication have utilized or investigated 
Percy’s article “Metaphor as Mistake” (Campbell; Caraher; Cleary; Engnell; Lessl; Osborn and 
Ehninger). “Metaphor as Mistake,” which first appeared in The Sewanee Review in 1958 and 
later appeared in both The Message in the Bottle and Symbol & Existence, argues for the 
importance of metaphor as a cognitive trope. A good metaphor is in some sense an “error,” the 
“wrong” word applied to something, which nevertheless reveals something inaccessible by other 
means (Percy, The Message 65-66). Analogical metaphors discover being (Percy, The Message 
77). Cleary’s 1959 essay “A Bibliography of Rhetoric and Public Address for the Year,” the 
earliest article in the field of communication to cite Percy, highlights the importance of Percy’s 
“Metaphor as Mistake.” Cleary, the editor of Speech Monographs at the time, listed “Metaphor 
as Mistake” as one of the “more important publications on rhetoric and public address appearing 
in the year 1958” (Cleary 183, 201). Osborn and Ehninger (1962) cite Percy’s “Metaphor as 
Mistake” in a footnote when discussing how the study of public address might benefit from 
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consideration of metaphor (Osborn and Ehninger 223n3). In his analysis of metaphors in 60 
Minutes, Campbell (1987) briefly highlights Percy’s insight that metaphors discover being 
(Campbell 347). Lessl (1989) uses Percy’s thoughts about the nature of metaphor to justify his 
use of the “priestly” metaphor when investigating scientific discourse (Lessl 185, 194). Caraher’s 
(1981) article in Philosophy & Rhetoric considers the nature of metaphor. Despite grounding his 
epistemology in Kantian idealism, Caraher nonetheless approvingly cites Percy’s comments on 
how metaphor yields knowledge (Caraher 83-88). In addition to the aforementioned interest in 
“Metaphor as Mistake,” Robert L. Scott, well known for his article “On Viewing Rhetoric as 
Epistemic,” reviewed Percy’s book The Message in the Bottle in 1976 for Communication 
Quarterly. In his review, Scott speaks highly of Percy’s phenomenological and novelistic 
approach to language, as well as Percy’s triadic theory of meaning, although, Scott critiques 
Percy’s repetitiveness (i.e., the repeated anecdote of Helen Keller learning the symbol “water”) 
(Scott 51-52). In the final analysis, Scott praises Percy’s work: “Fragmented as they may be, 
Walker Percy’s insights shimmer with value” (Scott 52). While Percy never appeared to have 
written anything about the nature of “rhetoric,” Percy’s insights on language nevertheless 
appealed to many rhetorical scholars.  
Several articles in the field have applied Percy’s ideas to communication ethics. For 
example, Engnell’s (2001) article in the Southern Journal of Communication offers one of the 
more detailed investigations into Percy’s work. In particular, Engnell focuses on Gabriel 
Marcel’s influence on Percy, as well as Percy’s philosophy of denotation. Per Engnell, the 
combination of Marcel’s axiological ontology and Percy’s semiotics of denotation leads to an 
ethic of “creative fidelity” that can guide the evocation of holocaust-related language (Engnell 
312). Engnell implies that the unreflective use of holocaust-related language in contemporary 
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political rhetoric diminishes the gravity of the holocaust (Engnell 312). Holocaust-related 
language becomes familiarized, which leads to a concomitant devaluation of the reality of the 
holocaust. Engnell uses Percy’s denotative account of language to understand how “value is 
taken up into language” (Engnell 313). Mattson’s (2012) essay in Fritz and Groom’s edited 
volume Communication Ethics and Crisis uses Percy’s The Moviegoer to suggest the possibility 
of sharing “epideictic discourse with others,” despite the moral fragmentation of postmodernity 
(Mattson 13). In this essay, Mattson emphasizes the existentialists’ influence on Percy while 
overlooking the influence of figures such as Aristotle, Aquinas, and Poinsot (Mattson 13). 
Mattson claims that Percy was not an Aristotelian (Mattson 13). At the very least, however, 
Percy advocated for Aristotle’s understanding of the imagination and the soul (Percy, Symbol & 
Existence 72, 96). Engnell’s and Mattson’s essays demonstrate the applicability of Percy’s 
thought to ethical questions in postmodernity.  
Others within the field have approached Percy’s work from the perspective of the 
philosophy of communication. When discussing the indexical nature of language in her 1977 
article in Communication Quarterly, Litton-Hawes turns to Percy’s essay “Toward a Triadic 
Theory of Meaning” (Litton-Hawes 4, 4n8). The indexical characteristic of naming concerns our 
ability to imply or infer meaning when using or attending to demonstratives and pronouns 
(Litton-Hawes 4). Litton-Hawes recognized Percy, in addition to Husserl and Chomsky, as a key 
figure indicating the flexibility of language to convey meaning, oftentimes in ways that the then-
prevailing “linguistic models” did not account for (Litton-Hawes 4). Anton, a scholar typically 
associated with both philosophy of communication and media ecology, has done much to bring 
Percy’s thought into the field of communication. Reference to Percy appears in several of 
Anton’s scholarly articles as well as Anton’s (2011) Communication Uncovered. Like Percy, 
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Anton believes that speech provides insight into what it means to be human. In his 1998 article 
“Concerning Speech: Heidegger and Performative Intentionality” in Philosophy & Rhetoric, 
Anton writes, “Thus, in earnestly asking about the Being of speech, we are at root asking about 
the Being of the human” (Anton, “Concerning Speech” 142). Anton points out how Percy, like 
Heidegger, understood that a proclivity for theory can eclipse the magnificent particularity of a 
concrete existent (Anton, “Agency and Efficacy in Interpersonal Communication: Particularity 
as Once-Occurrence and Noninterchangeability” 168). As mere consumers of a symbolic 
“package,” individuals can elevate theory over and above existence (Anton, Communication 
Uncovered 18). On this point, Anton utilized Percy to critique the prevalence of a consumer 
attitude in education (Anton, Communication Uncovered 17-18). Furthermore, Anton’s 2007 
article “On the Nonlinearity of Human Communication: Insatiability, Context, Form” in the 
Atlantic Journal of Communication explores Percy’s understanding of “denotation” (Anton, “On 
the Nonlinearity of Human Communication” 81-84). Anton writes, “Denotation is thereby cast as 
a kind of valuation; it is an ability to equate what is not equal” (Anton, “On the Nonlinearity of 
Human Communication” 81). The spoken or written word involves equating a perceptible sound 
or visible mark with another perceptible object. Percy would suggest that the relation between 
these two nonequal, material entities is real (yet immaterial). However, Anton likens Percy’s 
understanding of how words relate to things with Korzybski’s belief in the non-identification of 
words and things (Anton, “On the Nonlinearity of Human Communication” 81). As mentioned 
before, Percy disagreed with Korzybski and other General Semanticists on how words relate to 
things. For Percy, the word is not the thing, and the word is the thing (in alio esse). Following 
Korzybski, Anton stresses the former, which tends to obscure the importance of the latter 
(Anton, “On the Nonlinearity of Human Communication” 81). Nonetheless, Anton points out 
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elsewhere the ironies of Korzybski’s attempts to defend the non-identification between words 
and things by using “the very resources that he [Korzybski] calls into question” (Anton, 
Communication Uncovered 64). In other words, Korzybski uses the resources of language, words 
themselves, to insist upon the non-identification between words and things; he relies upon the 
identifications inherent in language to argue for the non-identification of words and things 
(Anton, Communication Uncovered 64). Altogether, Anton highlights the important intersection 
between semiotics and existentialism in Percy’s thought: language use can induce both joy and 
despair (Anton, “On the Nonlinearity of Human Communication,” 83). 
While Anton clearly appreciates aspects of Percy’s work, Anton finds Percy’s work 
deficient in at least one area. According to Anton, Percy did not adequately account for 
alphabetic literacy or other mediums of communication when formulating his philosophy of 
denotation. Anton writes, “Like so many characterizations of denotative utterance, his [Percy’s] 
fails to account for the multiple and varied impacts of alphabetic literacy (and other kinds of 
communicative technologies)” (Anton, “On the Nonlinearity of Human Communication,” 84). 
While it is true that Percy did not investigate the full effects of literacy on human perception and 
social organization like media ecologists such as Havelock or Ong, Percy’s other writings do 
reflect an interest in the impacts of other forms of mass media on shaping individual and 
collective expectations. As Percy once related in an interview with Hobson, “With a good theory 
of semiotics, we could get at what I was talking about before—what happens when people watch 
so much television” (Percy as qtd. in Hobson, “The Study of Consciousness” 225). Percy 
believed that television creates unrealistic expectations about easy resolutions to difficult 
predicaments in life (Hobson, “The Study of Consciousness” 220-221; Percy, “Decline of the 
Western” 182). Percy hoped to study different mediums more thoroughly. In a letter to Shelby 
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Foote, for example, Percy expressed his desire to “spend a few years figuring out how TV rots 
the brain (nobody knows)” (Tolson 427). Percy confessed to watching PBS and The Incredible 
Hulk and stated that “it would be interesting to figure out the nature of the effect television has 
had on people’s consciousnesses” (Percy as qtd. in Hobson, “The Study of Consciousness” 220). 
Although the era of social media and smartphones came after Percy, Percy still lived through and 
commented upon the mass culture brought about, at least in part, by developments in 
communication technology.  
Aside from Anton, other scholars working from the perspective of media ecology have 
written about Percy. Bennett briefly alludes to Percy’s The Moviegoer in her article about how 
technology erodes friendships (Bennett 254). Bennett describes the seductive allure of films and 
photographs, something demonstrated by Binx Bolling in The Moviegoer; today so-called friends 
can easily opt for “‘catching up’ through images and posts on Facebook” rather than meeting 
face to face (Bennett 254). In his 2017 article “The Sacramental View of Marshall McLuhan, 
Walter Ong and James Carey” in Explorations in Media Ecology, Cali draws upon Percy to 
describe a “sacramental view” of life. Cali writes, “Sacramental views expressed in literary and 
other art forms may thus be regarded as disruptive, distortive and extreme—upsetting of the 
pestilent conditions wrought by technology” (Cali 148). As evidence of the “disruptive” nature 
of Percy’s novels, Cali writes, “Percy’s wayfaring characters suffer stifling effects of scientism, 
technological deification and consequent abstractions: a ‘grave predicament’ of dislocation, 
disorientation and alienation” (Cali 148). Some of Percy’s characters suffer from making science 
and technology into idols. Will Barrett, the main character in Percy’s The Last Gentleman, for 
example, operates in a thoroughly abstract manner, relying upon conceptual “thinking” as his 
guide (Cali 148; see also Pridgen 298). The experience of ordeal can release individuals from 
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their abstractions, such as Ted in Percy’s Love in the Ruins (Percy, Love in the Ruins 37). Cali 
cites McLuhan, who suggested, “Our only hope is apocalypse” (McLuhan as qtd. in Cali 150). 
Percy would agree. Apocalypse and ordeal strip away the conceptual schemes and abstractions 
that hinder engagement with existence. Altogether, Cali concludes, “…media ecologists who 
express a sacramental view perform a kind of catechism on the mediated world for those of us 
unlettered in the senses of the soul” (Cali 153). Although not typically characterized as a “media 
ecologist,” Percy’s critiques of scientism, abstraction, and “technological deification” place him 
the company of thinkers such as Ellul, McLuhan, Postman, and others. It is worth mentioning 
that Percy corresponded with Walter J. Ong, a key figure in media ecology. The Walker Percy 
Papers at UNC Chapel Hill contains correspondence between Percy and Ong. 
Finally, some have applied Percy’s ideas to pedagogy (Corder; Engen; Rex). Corder 
questions how rhetoric changes teachers (or how rhetoric influences how teachers teach) (Corder 
4-5). In Corder’s section on “generative ethos,” Corder briefly mentions Percy when reflecting 
on how language entails a world for both speaker and hearer (Corder 33). Extending Percy’s 
thought, Corder wishes to suggest that an “utterer” can speak in such a way so as to expand the 
“world” of meaning to encompass both the “utterer and receiver” (Corder 33-34). Corder stresses 
a conception of communication as “invitation” rather than as the transmission of information 
(Corder 33-34). For Corder, students benefit from going beyond the information transmission 
model of communication in order to consider how communication involves a meaningful world 
of discourse (Corder 33-34). Rex uses Percy’s “Loss of the Creature” as a metaphor to discuss 
how certain “representations of reading, writing, and speaking” can get in the way of educating 
students (Rex 39). Engen reflects on how to cultivate a “communicative imagination” in the 
minds of students; teachers should interest students in communication and its applicability to 
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their lives (Engen 41). A communication teacher should not present mere “facts” but should 
“cultivate” a certain “attitude toward communication” (Engen 41). Engen mentions Percy briefly 
while discussing the role that teachers can play in students’ lives. Engen writes, “In short, as our 
students go about the business of, as Walker Percy would have it, ‘sticking themselves into the 
world,’ they need vision and they need leadership” (Engen 53). Teachers can provide “vision” 
and “leadership,” but good teachers can also “defamiliarize” the taken for grantedness of 
everyday life. A teacher today, much like a contemporary novelist, must use indirect methods to 
appeal to students who live in a mediated world that idolizes the autonomous self and lacks any 
sense of the sacred.  
Altogether, Percy has had a significant influence on the field of communication. I have 
sought to foreground those articles in topic areas that I wish to focus upon in this dissertation, 
including rhetoric, philosophy of communication, and media ecology.9 Each of the 
aforementioned scholars in this section has recognized the importance and value of Percy’s 
thought. And yet, I contend that communication scholars could benefit from a more extended 
meditation on Percy’s ideas about “mediation,” a notion that hints at the prospect of a broad 
philosophical realism (Percy, Symbol & Existence 235).  
 
Implications of Percy’s Work and Preview of Chapters 
In the preceding sections, I reviewed Percy’s life in his historical moment, key 
coordinates in Percy’s thought, and intersections between Percy and the field of communication. 
In this section, I provide a preview of the chapters to come. I use Percy’s distinction between C1, 
                                                   
9 Percy appears briefly in other articles in the field, too, especially in book reviews, footnotes, and endnotes 
(Campbell 191-192; Hawes 15n18; Killingsworth 57; Payne 39n28; R. Smith, “Semiotics and Communication 
Theory” 209-210; Switzer et al. 398-399). 
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C2, and C3 consciousness as a paradigm to arrange the next three chapters (Percy, Lost 207-218, 
211n-212n). In a comical exchange in Lost in the Cosmos between a spaceship from Earth and an 
alien species, Percy has a group of aliens question a human about the nature of their 
consciousness. “What’s your C-type? Are you C1? C2? C3? Over and out. Come back,” the alien 
asks (Percy, Lost 207). The earthling struggles to articulate an answer, but it slowly becomes 
clear why the alien wants to find out. Like Adam in the Garden, the aliens enjoy C1 
consciousness, an Edenic, “preternatural” state of bliss that involves the joyful concelebration of 
being with others through symbol use (Percy, Lost 209). C1 consciousness is turned ecstatically 
outward (Percy, Lost 211n). But C2 consciousnesses, on the other hand, tend to be very 
dangerous and turned inward on themselves. The alien will not let a C2 consciousness come 
near. Why? The alien states, “A C2 consciousness is a consciousness which passes through a C1 
stage and then for some reason falls into the pit of itself” (Percy, Lost 210). C2 consciousness 
involves self-consciousness, shame, deceit, lying, a proclivity for violence, deviant sexual 
behavior, and so on (Percy, Lost 209-211). In the broadest terms possible, C2 consciousnesses do 
not know who they are or what they are supposed to be doing (Percy, Lost 210-211). A C2 
consciousness tries to conceive of its “self” as it conceives of everything else in the universe , a 
project inevitably doomed to failure (Percy, Lost 211n-212n). Finally, as Percy writes, “A C3 
consciousness is a C2 consciousness which has become aware of its predicament, sought help, 
and received it” (Percy, Lost 212). C3 consciousness has become receptive to and received 
“news from across the seas,” the “message in the bottle” from a transcendent source (Percy, The 
Message 119-149). Further, C3 consciousness has come to understand its predicament “through 
auspices other than symbolic conception” (Percy, Lost 212n). These three different types of 
consciousness—C1, C2, and C3—correspond roughly to Eden, the Fall, and Redemption.  
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Thus, in the second chapter of this dissertation, I will explore what Percy called C1 
consciousness, the Edenic state wherein symbols successfully mediate existence. The book of 
Genesis reads, “And Adam called all the beasts by their names, and all the fowls of the air, and 
all the cattle of the field: but for Adam there was not found a helper like himself” (Gen 2:20 
DRA; cf. Percy, Symbol & Existence 60). C1 consciousness names the world and experiences 
joy, much like Adam in the Garden. In this chapter, I will explore the intellectual roots behind 
Percy’s interest in the symbol: Ernst Cassirer and Susanne Langer. Cassirer influenced Langer, 
and both influenced Percy. Nonetheless, Percy struck out on a different, realistic path otherwise 
than Cassirer’s Kantian idealism and Langer’s naturalism. Symbols mediate but do not 
“constitute” reality. The idealistic preference for “constitution” claims too much for 
communication and refuses to place limits on what language can accomplish. The reduction of 
symbol use to a biological “need,” on the other hand, claims too little for the miracle of the 
symbolic breakthrough. After discussion of Cassirer and Langer, I will review the influence of 
Jacques Maritain on Percy’s thought. Maritain provided Percy with a realist understanding of 
how symbols operate. The symbol is the thing in alio esse, in a different manner of existence. 
After reviewing these formative influences on Percy’s thought, I consider some implications that 
an understanding of C1 consciousness has for rhetoric, philosophy of communication, and media 
ecology. 
In the third chapter, I explore C2 consciousness, which involves the failure of symbols to 
mediate existence. While symbols can reveal the whatness and thatness of being, leading to 
wonder, symbols can also induce a pernicious, solipsistic, alienating idealism. After discovering 
the joys of symbol use, the self eventually moves toward introspection, self-consciousness, 
higher degrees of abstraction, and individualism. Everything in the cosmos has a name, “but 
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what am I?” (Percy, The Message 284). Like the preceding chapter, this chapter will focus on 
several thinkers that influenced Percy’s thought: Jean-Paul Sartre, Gabriel Marcel, and Martin 
Heidegger. According to Percy, Sartre provides a “masterly analysis” of phenomenological 
“deterioration,” the “sodden passivity of things” (Percy, Symbol & Existence 111). Sartre’s 
description of being-in-itself reflects the thingified world of C2 consciousness (cf. Percy, Symbol 
& Existence 105). Further, Sartre’s phenomenological descriptions of “bad faith” demonstrate 
the self’s quest to disguise itself “as” something or another (Percy, Signposts 390). Beyond 
Sartre, Marcel’s descriptions of “simulacra” appear repeatedly throughout Percy’s work. Percy 
appreciated how Marcel had captured the capacity of existence to vanish beneath the symbolic 
simulacra (Percy, Lost 104; Percy, Symbol & Existence 105-106). Marcel also provided Percy 
with an anthropology that fit with Percy’s understanding of the human being. A human is homo 
viator, or man the traveler on a pilgrimage towards a transcendent home. After reviewing 
Sartre’s and Marcel’s influence on Percy, I discuss the place of Heidegger in Percy’s thought. 
Among other things, Percy drew upon Heidegger’s account of “everydayness” and Dasein’s fall 
into the “they,” which both reveal a better understanding of what Percy meant by C2 
consciousness. I conclude the section on Heidegger by suggesting that Percy understood 
authenticity otherwise than Heidegger. Percy thought of authenticity as an intersubjective 
phenomenon, whereas Heidegger tended to stress the authentic individual. Like the previous 
chapter, I conclude this section by reviewing implications for rhetoric, philosophy of 
communication, and media ecology. This chapter aims to problematize angelism, idealism, 
immanent consumerism, and ignorance, linking these phenomena to the failure of symbols to 
mediate existence. Further, this chapter seeks to respond to the overemphasis on the glories and 
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possibilities of symbol use, a temptation frequently faced by scholars of communication and 
rhetoric.  
In the fourth and final chapter of this dissertation, I investigate C3 consciousness, or the 
redemption of C2 consciousness from its fallen state. In particular, I focus on how existence 
appears once more for C3 consciousness. I begin by distinguishing between true, religious C3 
consciousness and pseudo C3 consciousness. True, religious C3 consciousness implies an 
awareness of the predicament of C2 consciousness and the need for help beyond the self. Pseudo 
C3 states, on the other hand, involve the temporary forgetfulness of the self as well as the 
momentary experience of community thanks to the mediation of the symbol. The creation and 
experience of art stands as an exemplar of pseudo C3 consciousness. The artist and audience 
enjoy momentary transcendence when creating or appreciating a piece of art. However, “reentry 
problems” follow after the accomplishment of pseudo C3 consciousness. After unpacking the 
basics of religious C3 consciousness and its secular analogues, I move onto a discussion of 
Viktor Shklovsky, the Russian literary theorist who informed Percy’s understanding of 
“defamiliarization,” the process of recovering existence from the symbolic simulacra. I suggest 
that Percy used art and ordeal, two tactics of defamiliarization, to move individuals toward true 
C3 consciousness. Next, I review the place of Kierkegaard and Aquinas in Percy’s thought. 
Kierkegaard’s critique of speculative philosophy and Kierkegaard’s distinction between the 
genius and the apostle informed Percy’s thought. Nevertheless, despite Percy’s appreciation of 
Kierkegaard, Percy sided with Aquinas on the harmony between faith and reason. Percy believed 
that in addition to “news from across the seas,” the apostle brought C2 consciousness the means 
of salvation, including the Church and the sacraments. Paradoxically, after reviewing the 
triumphs and failures of symbolic mediation in the preceding chapters, I conclude this chapter by 
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discussing the importance of a dyadic phenomenon: the sacraments. As a Catholic, Percy would 
have believed that the sacrament acted as an efficient cause upon the soul, infusing the soul with 
grace and thereby transforming it (Maritain, Ransoming the Time 226; Percy, Symbol & 
Existence 121-122). Altogether, C3 consciousness recognizes its predicament and seeks help 
from an outside, transcendent source. Like the preceding chapters, I conclude this chapter by 
highlighting the implications of C3 consciousness for rhetoric, philosophy of communication, 
and media ecology.  
Percy’s work has wide-ranging implications for the field of communication. Percy admits 
the merits of scientific and artistic practices while acknowledging their limitations. In most all 
human practices, the symbol plays a role. No mere special instances of communication, symbols 
thoroughly permeate the human condition (Percy, Lost 87; Percy, Symbol & Existence 74). 
Indeed, the symbol can reveal real knowledge about existence. Nevertheless, the human 
condition, which includes the finality of death and the temptation to sin, requires a more all-
encompassing hermeneutic than either scientism or nihilistic postmodernism can afford. Instead 
of conceding to modern scientific experts or to postmodern cynics, Percy provides a way of 
interpreting human communicative activity that takes both knowledge and ignorance, joy and 
despair, into consideration (Percy, Symbol & Existence 105, 134-135). Thus, Percy’s insights 
into C1, C2, and C3 consciousness outline several promising avenues for the reconciliation of 
modernists and postmodernists, scientists and skeptics, idealists and materialists. C1 
consciousness enjoys the splendor of being thanks to the mediation of the symbol. C2 
consciousness repeatedly encounters symbolic reifications, the simulacra, which lead to 
undesirable existential states like boredom. Anxiety, too, follows upon the self not having an 
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adequate symbol for itself. Only in C3 consciousness does C2 consciousness find redemption 
and reprieve from the question of how to find one everlasting symbol for itself.  
 
54 
Works Cited 
Anton, Corey. “Agency and Efficacy in Interpersonal Communication: Particularity as Once-
Occurrence and Noninterchangeability.” Atlantic Journal of Communication, vol. 16, no. 
3/4, Sept. 2008, pp. 164–183.  
---. “Concerning Speech: Heidegger and Performative Intentionality.” Philosophy & Rhetoric, 
vol. 31, no. 2, 1998, pp. 131-144.  
---. “On the Nonlinearity of Human Communication: Insatiability, Context, Form.” Atlantic 
Journal of Communication, vol. 15, no. 2, June 2007, pp. 79–102.  
---. Communication Uncovered: General Semantics and Media Ecology. Institute of General 
Semantics, 2011.  
Arnett, Ronald C., McManus, Leanne M. Bell, and Amanda G. McKendree. Conflict Between 
Persons: The Origins of Leadership. 2nd ed., Duqubue, IA: Kendall Hunt, 2018.   
Bakhtin, Mikhail. “The Problem of Speech Genres.” Speech Genres & Other Late Essays. 
Translated by Vern W. McGee, edited by Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, Austin, 
TX: U of Texas P, 1986, pp. 60-102. 
Beniger, James R. The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the 
Information Society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1986.  
Bennett, Stephanie. “Jacques Ellul and the inefficiency of friendship: Social life and The 
Technological Society.” Explorations in Media Ecology, vol. 15, no. 3-4, 2016, 243-260. 
Berthoff, Ann E. “I. A. Richards and the Philosophy of Rhetoric.” Rhetoric Society Quarterly, 
vol. 10, no. 4, 1980, pp. 195-210.  
Biesecker, Barbara. “Michel Foucault and the Question of Rhetoric.” Philosophy & Rhetoric, 
vol. 25, no. 4, 1992, pp. 351-364.  
 
55 
Brummans, Boris H. J. M, Cooren, François, Robichaud, Daniel, and Taylor, James R. 
“Approaches to the Communicative Constitution of Organizations.” The SAGE 
Handbook of Organizational Communication: Advances in Theory, Research, and 
Methods, edited by Linda L. Putnam and Dennis K. Mumby, Los Angeles, CA: SAGE, 
2014, pp. 173-194. 
Buber, Martin. Between Man and Man. Translated by Ronald Gregor-Smith. London, EN: 
Routledge Classics, 2002.  
Burke, Kenneth. Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose. 3rd ed., Berkeley, CA: U of 
California P, 1935/1984. 
---. The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action. 3rd ed., Berkeley, CA: U of 
California P, 1941/1973. 
---. The Rhetoric of Motives. Berkeley, CA: U of California P, 1950.  
Cali, Dennis D. “The Sacramental View of Marshall McLuhan, Walter Ong and James 
Carey.” Explorations in Media Ecology, vol. 16, no. 2-3, 2017, pp. 139-156. 
Campbell, Richard. “Securing the Middle Ground: Reporter Formulas in 60 Minutes." Critical 
Studies in Media Communication, vol. 4, no. 4, 1987, pp. 325-350. 
Caraher, Brian G. “Metaphor as Contradiction: A Grammar and Epistemology of Poetic 
Metaphor.” Philosophy and Rhetoric, vol. 14, no. 2, 1981, pp. 69-88.  
Chang, Briankle. Deconstructing Communication: Representation, Subject, and Economies of 
Exchange. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1996.  
Chase, Stuart. The Tyranny of Words. San Diego, CA: A Harvest/HBJ Book, 1938/1966.  
Cleary, James W. “A Bibliography of Rhetoric and Public Address for the Year.” Speech 
Monographs, vol. 26, no. 3, 1959, pp. 183-216.  
 
56 
Collins, James. Preface. The Existentialists: A Critical Study, by Collins, Chicago, IL: Henry 
Regnery Company, 1952, pp. xi-xvi.  
---. The Existentialists: A Critical Study. Chicago, IL: Henry Regnery Company, 1952.  
Corder, Jim W. “Studying Rhetoric and Teaching School.” Rhetoric Review, vol. 1, no. 1, 1982, 
pp. 4-36.  
Crawford, Matthew. The World Beyond Your Head: On Becoming an Individual in an Age of 
Distraction. New York: NY, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015.  
Desmond, John F. “Walker Percy’s Eucharistic Vision.” REN, vol. 52, no. 3, 2000, pp. 219-231. 
Dewey, Bradley R. “Walker Percy Talks about Kierkegaard: An Annotated Interview.” 
Conversations with Walker Percy, edited by Lewis A. Lawson and Victor A. Kramer, UP 
of Mississippi, 1985, pp. 101-128.  
“Ecstatic.” Online Etymology Dictionary, Douglas Harper, available online at 
https://www.etymonline.com/word/ecstatic.  
Engen, David E. “The Communicative Imagination and Its Cultivation.” Communication 
Quarterly, vol. 50, no. 1, 2002, pp. 41-57.  
Engnell, Richard A. “Toward an Ethic of Evocative Language: Contemporary Uses of 
Holocaust‐Related Terminology.”  Southern Journal of Communication, vol. 66, no. 4, 
2001, pp. 312-322.   
Fogarty, Daniel. Roots for a New Rhetoric. New York, NY: Russell & Russell, 1959. 
Foucault, Michel. The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1970.  
 
57 
Foucault, Michel. “What is an Author?” Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, edited by James 
D. Faubion, translated by Robert Hurley et al., volume 2. New York, NY: The New 
Press, 1969/1998. 
Freire, Paulo. “The Banking Model of Education.” 1970. Critical Issues in Education: An 
Anthology of Readings, edited by Eugene F. Provenzo, Jr., Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE 
Publications, 2006, pp. 106-117.  
Fritz, Janie M. Harden. Professional Civility: Communicative Virtue at Work. New York, NY: 
Peter Lang, 2013. 
Gordon, W. Terrence. Introduction. The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man, 
by Marshall McLuhan. Toronto, CA: U of Toronto P, 1962/2011. 
Gulledge, Jo. “The Reentry Option: An Interview with Walker Percy.” Conversations with 
Walker Percy, edited by Lewis A. Lawson and Victor A. Kramer, Jackson, MI: UP of 
Mississippi, 1985, pp. 284-308. Interview conducted in 1984.  
Gunkel, David J. Thinking Otherwise: Philosophy, Communication, Technology. West Lafayette, 
IN: Purdue UP, 2007.  
Gunn, Joshua. “Refitting Fantasy: Psychoanalysis, Subjectivity, and Talking to the 
Dead.” Quarterly Journal of Speech, vol. 90, no. 1, Feb. 2004, pp. 1-23.  
Hart, David Bentley. The Beauty of the Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian Truth. Grand Rapids, 
MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2003. 
Hawes, Leonard C. “Elements of a Model for Communication Processes.” Quarterly Journal of 
Speech, vol. 59, no. 1, 1973, pp. 11-21. 
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, New 
York, NY: Harper & Row, 1962/2008. 
 
58 
Hobson, Linda Whitney, “The Study of Consciousness: An Interview with Walker Percy.” 
Conversations with Walker Percy, edited by Lewis A. Lawson and Victor A. Kramer, 
University of Mississippi Press, 1985, pp. 216-225.  
Holditch, W. Kenneth. “An Interview with Walker Percy.” Conversations with Walker Percy, 
edited by Lewis A. Lawson and Victor A. Kramer, Jackson, MI: UP of Mississippi, 1985, 
pp. 13-35. Interview conducted on 13 May 1980. 
Ijsseling, Samuel. Rhetoric and Philosophy in Conflict: An Historical Survey. Translated by Paul 
Dunphy, The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976.  
Irenaeus. “Against Heresies.” The Anti-Nicene Fathers: Translations of the Writings of the 
Fathers Down to A.D. 325, Volume 1, edited by Alexander Roberts and James 
Donaldson, translated by Alexander Roberts and William Rambaut, New York, NY: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1905, pp. 309-567, available online at 
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0103506.htm.  
Joseph, Sister Miriam. The Trivium: The Liberal Arts of Logic, Grammar, and Rhetoric: 
Understanding the Nature and Function of Language, edited by Marguerite McGlinn, 
Philadelphia, PA: Paul Dry Books, 1937/2002. 
Ketner, Kenneth Laine, et al. Preface. Symbol & Existence: A Study in Meaning: Explorations of 
Human Nature, essays written by Walker Percy, edited by Kenneth Laine Ketner, Karey 
Lea Perkins, Rhonda Renee McDonnell, Scott Ross Cunningham, Macon, GA: Mercer 
UP, 2019, pp. vii-xiv. 
Killingsworth, M. Jimmie. Review of Reasoning and the Logic of Things: The Cambridge 
Conferences Lectures of 1898, written by Charles Sanders Peirce, edited by Kenneth 
Laine Ketner. Rhetoric Society Quarterly, vol. 23, no. 1, 1993, pp. 57-60.  
 
59 
Korzybski, Alfred. Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General 
Semantics. 5th ed., Brooklyn, NY: Institute of General Semantics, 1933/1994.  
Kylukanov, Igor E. A Communication Universe: Manifestations of Meaning, Stagings of 
Significance. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010.  
Langer, Susanne K. Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and 
Art. 3rd ed., Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1942/1980.  
Lawler, Peter Augustine. Postmodernism Rightly Understood: The Return to Realism in 
American Thought. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999.  
Lawson, Lewis A. “Walker Percy’s Indirect Communications.” Texas Studies in Literature and 
Language, vol. 11, no. 1, 1969, pp. 867-900.  
Lessl, Thomas M. “The Priestly Voice.” Quarterly Journal of Speech, vol. 75, no. 2, 1989, pp. 
183-197. 
Litton-Hawes, Elaine M. “A Foundation for the Study of Everyday Talk.” Communication 
Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 3, 1977, pp. 2-11.  
Maritain, Jacques. Ransoming the Time. Translated by Harry Lorin Binsse, New York, NY: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1948.  
Marsh, Leslie, editor. Walker Percy, Philosopher, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.  
Mattson, Craig. “Impossible to Say: Walker Percy’s Moviegoing Epideictic in Crisis 
Conditions.” Communication Ethics and Crisis: Negotiating Differences in Public and 
Private Spheres, edited by S. Alyssa Groom and Janie Harden Fritz, Fairleigh Dickinson 
University Press, 2012, pp. 11-24.  
McDonnell, Rhonda. “Re: Contra Gentiles.” Received by Justin Bonanno, 28 Sept. 2019.  
 
60 
McLuhan, Eric. Introduction. Essential McLuhan, edited by Eric McLuhan and Frank Zingrone, 
House of Anansi Press Limited, 1995, pp. 1-10.  
McLuhan, Marshall, and Eric McLuhan. Laws of Media: The New Science. Toronto, CA: U of 
Toronto P, 1988.   
Ong, Walter J. The Presence of the Word: Some Prolegomena for Cultural and Religious 
History. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1967/2000.  
Osborn, Michael M., and Douglas Ehninger. “The Metaphor in Public Address.” 
Communications Monographs, vol. 29, no. 3, 1962, pp. 223-234.  
Palmer, Donald. Structuralism and Poststructuralism for Beginners. New York, NY: Writers and 
Readers Publishing, Inc., 1997/1999.  
Palmer, Richard. Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, 
and Gadamer. Evanston, IL: Northwestern UP, 1969.   
Payne, David. “The Wizard of Oz: Therapeutic rhetoric in a contemporary media ritual.” 
Quarterly Journal of Speech, vol. 75, no. 1, 1989, pp. 25-39.  
Peirce, Charles Sanders. “A Guess at the Riddle.” The Essential Peirce: Volume 1 (1867 – 1893), 
edited by Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel, Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 1992, pp. 
245-279. 
Percy, Walker. “The Coming Crisis in Psychiatry.” Signposts in a Strange Land, edited by 
Patrick Samway, New York, NY: Picador, 1991, pp. 251-262. 
---. “Decline of the Western.” Commonweal, 16 May 1958, pp. 181-183.   
---. Lost in the Cosmos: The Last Self-Help Book. New York, NY: Picador, 1983.  
---. Love in the Ruins. New York, NY: Picador, 1971.  
 
61 
---. “The Man on the Train.” The Message in the Bottle: How Queer Man Is, How Queer 
Language Is, and What One Has to Do with the Other. New York, NY: Picador, 1975, 
pp. 83-100.  
---. The Message in the Bottle: How Queer Man Is, How Queer Language Is, and What One Has 
to Do with the Other. New York, NY: Picador, 1975. 
---. Signposts in a Strange Land, edited by Patrick Samway, New York, NY: Picador, 1991.   
---. “The Southern Moderate.” Signposts in a Strange Land, edited by Patrick Samway, New 
York, NY: Picador, 1991, pp. 94-101. 
---. “A Southern View.” Signposts in a Strange Land, edited by Patrick Samway, New York, 
NY: Picador, 1991, pp. 89-93. 
---. “Stoicism in the South.” Signposts in a Strange Land, edited by Patrick Samway, New York, 
NY: Picador, 1991, pp. 83-88. 
---. Symbol & Existence: A Study in Meaning: Explorations of Human Nature, edited by Kenneth 
Laine Ketner, Karey Lea Perkins, Rhonda Renee McDonnell, Scott Ross Cunningham, 
Macon, GA: Mercer UP, 2019.  
---. “Symbol as Need.” Thought: Fordham University Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 3, 1954, pp. 381-
390.  
--- “Why I Live Where I Live.” Signposts in a Strange Land, edited by Patrick Samway, New 
York, NY: Picador, 1991, pp. 3-9.  
Peters, John Durham. Speaking into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication. Chicago, 
IL: U of Chicago P, 1999.  
Pettit, Philip. The Concept of Structuralism: A Critical Analysis. Berkeley, CA: U of California 
P, 1975.  
 
62 
Pridgen, Allen. “The Brownian leaves: Sacramental presence in Walker Percy’s The Last 
Gentleman.” Renascence, vol. 48, no. 4, 1996, pp. 297–308. 
Rex, Lesley Al. “Loss of the Creature: The Obscuring of Inclusivity in Classroom Discourse.” 
Communication Education, vol. 52, no. 1, 2003, pp. 30–46. 
Ricoeur, Paul. The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-disciplinary studies of the creation of meaning in 
language. Translated by Robert Czerny with Kathleen McLaughlin and John Costello, SJ, 
Toronto, CA: U of Toronto P, 1975/2000. 
Roloff, Michael E. “What an Interpersonal Communication Scholar Should Know.” 
Communication Monographs, vol. 75, no. 2, 2008, pp. 112-119.  
Samway, Patrick. “Grappling with the Philosophy and Theology of Walker Percy.” U.S. Catholic 
Historian, vol. 17, no. 3, 1999, pp. 35-50. 
---. Introduction. A Thief of Peirce: The Letters of Kenneth Laine Ketner and Walker Percy, 
edited by Patrick Samway, Jackson, MI: UP of Mississippi, 1995, pp. ix-xix. 
---, editor. A Thief of Peirce: The Letters of Kenneth Laine Ketner and Walker Percy. Jackson, 
MI: UP of Mississippi, 1995. 
---. Walker Percy: A Life. Chicago, IL: Loyola Pres, 1997.  
Saussure, Ferdinand de. Course in General Linguistics, edited by Charles Bally and Albert 
Sechehaye in collaboration with Albert Riedlinger, translated by Wade Baskin, New 
York, NY: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1959.  
Scott, Robert L. Review of The Message in the Bottle, written by Walker Percy, Communication 
Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 1, Winter 1976, pp. 51–52.  
Shklovsky, Victor. “Art as Technique.” Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays, edited by Lee 
T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis, Lincoln, NE: U of Nebraska P, 1965, pp. 3-24.  
 
63 
Singer, Milton. “Signs of the Self: An Exploration in Semiotic Anthropology.” American 
Anthropologist, vol. 82, no. 3, 1980, pp. 485-507. 
Smith, Brian A. Walker Percy and the Politics of the Wayfarer. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 
2017.  
Smith, Robert Rutherford.  “Semiotics and Communication Theory.” Journal of Communication, 
vol. 30, no. 1, 1980, pp. 205-210.  
Sokolowski, Robert. “The Method of Philosophy: Making Distinctions.” The Review of 
Metaphysics, vol. 51, no. 3, 1998, pp. 515-532.  
Strate, Lance. Amazing Ourselves to Death: Neil Postman’s Brave New World Revisited. New 
York, NY: Peter Lang, 2014.  
---. Media Ecology: An Approach to Understanding the Human Condition. New York, NY: Peter 
Lang, 2017.  
Switzer, Jo Young, Fry, Virginia H., and Larry D. Miller. “Semiotic and Communication: A 
Dialogue with Thomas A. Sebeok.” Southern Journal of Communication, vol. 55, no. 4, 
1990, pp. 388-401. 
“Symbol.” Online Etymology Dictionary, Douglas Harper, available online at 
https://www.etymonline.com/word/symbol#etymonline_v_22514.  
Taylor, Charles. A Secular Age. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard UP, 2007.  
Tolson, Jay. Pilgrim in the Ruins: A Life of Walker Percy. Chapel Hill, NC: The U of North 
Carolina P, 1992.  
Walter, Scott. “Out of the Ruins.” More Conversations with Walker Percy, edited by Lewis A. 
Lawson and Victor A. Kramer, Jackson, MI: UP of Mississippi, 1993, pp. 226-235 
 
64 
Weil, Simone. The Need for Roots: Prelude to a Declaration of Duties towards Mankind. 
Translated by Arthur Wills, London: EN: Routledge, 1949/2002. 
Wilson, Jessica Hooten. Reading Walker Percy’s Novels. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 2018.  
---. Walker Percy, Fyodor Dostoevsky, and the Search for Influence. Columbus, OH: Ohio State 
University Press, 2017.  
 
65 
Chapter 2: C1 Consciousness, The Joy of Mediation 
In Plato’s Cratylus, Socrates discusses the correctness of names with his interlocutors 
Hermogenes and Cratylus. The dialogue centers around whether words apply to things by 
convention or by nature. Some names do in fact appear correct, while others do not. At one point 
in the dialogue, Socrates suggests that the pronunciation of the Greek letter lambda has a certain 
gliding quality to it, such that the word “olisthanein” (“glide”) itself imitates the gliding 
movement of the tongue (Plato, Cratylus 427b). Percy uses this example taken from Plato’s 
Cratylus as an entrance into a discussion on symbolic transformation. Despite the onomatopoetic 
nature of certain words such as “shaggy” or “limber,” words that seem shaggy and limber, Percy 
thinks that the likeness between words and things (like the word “olisthanein” and the gliding of 
the tongue) is only an illusion (Percy, Symbol & Existence 76, 82-83). Rather, words only seem 
to imitate that which they denote because of the remarkable process of symbolic transformation, 
whereby a symbol becomes a vehicle of meaning and merges with what it represents (Percy, 
Symbol & Existence 76-81). Words and things do in fact interpenetrate but not because words 
isomorphically resemble the reality denoted (Percy, Symbol & Existence 82). Rather, a relation 
of analogy, a proportion between likeness and unlikeness, holds between symbol and existence 
(Percy, Symbol & Existence 82-90). Through analogy, the word becomes like a thing, so much so 
that a word’s conventional nature all but disappears from view.  Both “holy words” and “obscene 
words” strike us because they have taken up into themselves the existence denoted by them 
(Percy, Symbol & Existence 81). In like manner, a pregnant woman becomes queasy by even the 
mere mention of some foods or objects; the word “freezer” has transformed into a nauseating 
thing, an icebox smelling of cold air and preserved meals. The name “formaldehyde” stinks of 
dissection, embalmed frogs, and Mr. Hoover’s seventh grade classroom. The “bouquet of roses” 
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smells quite different. But how, specifically, do symbols (words, in this case) transform into 
things and thereby mediate existence?  
The following chapter will trace out a response to this question by investigating what 
Percy calls C1 consciousness. The first part of this chapter will describe how intersubjectivity, 
joy, and concelebration of a world in common characterize C1 consciousness. I focus in 
particular on certain paradigm exemplars of C1 consciousness, especially Helen Keller. The 
second part of this chapter reviews the influence of Ernst Cassirer and Susanne Langer on 
Percy’s thought. While acknowledging the importance of Cassirer’s and Langer’s work on the 
symbol, Percy disagreed with Cassirer’s idealism and Langer’s naturalism. Rather than 
constituting the world or serving as a biological “need,” the symbol allows human beings to sidle 
up alongside reality and to know it (Percy, Symbol & Existence 102, 186-187; Wilhelmsen 40). 
The third part of this chapter will review the influence of certain realists on Percy’s thought, 
especially Jacques Maritain, who provided Percy with a vocabulary for understanding how signs 
and symbols make known something other than themselves. Finally, I conclude with certain 
parallels between Percy’s work and thinkers in rhetoric, philosophy of communication, and 
media ecology.  
 
C1 Consciousness and the Symbolic Breakthrough  
In this section, I begin by providing a brief description of C1 consciousness. At bottom, 
C1 consciousness is “selfless” (Percy, Lost in the Cosmos 211n). C1 consciousness faces 
outward, symbolizing everything other than the self “through intersubjective transactions with 
others” (Percy, Lost 211n). Percy likens C1 consciousness both to the two-year old child who has 
just acquired language and to the primitive human who painted animals on the cave walls in 
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Lascaux, France (Percy, Lost 211n). Both the child and the primitive stand in a type of 
“preternatural” relation to the world of things and to others, having not yet fallen into the “pit” of 
themselves (Percy, Lost 209-210). The child and the primitive innocently identify symbols with 
things. The symbolic breakthrough involves the transformation of something sensuous—a 
spoken word, a written word, a painting, a gesture—into a vehicle of meaning. For those 
experiencing C1 consciousness, the sensuous symbol becomes the thing in an extraordinary, 
“unprecedented” way (Percy, The Message in the Bottle 157; Percy, “Symbol as Need” 387). In 
this section, I use various examples to illustrate the nature of C1 consciousness, including Helen 
Keller and Victor of Aveyron, two figures that Percy refers to. Reviewing examples of C1 
consciousness will lead to a better appreciation of how Langer and Maritain influenced Percy, 
because both thinkers also took an interest in symbolic transformation in children and primitives.  
Percy’s second daughter Ann played an important role in Percy’s understanding of 
language acquisition in children. Shortly after Ann was born, Percy and his family set out for a 
walk. Percy’s wife Bunt carried three-month old Ann while their other daughter, Mary Pratt, 
walked alongside them. A snake appeared along the way, which Percy killed with his shotgun. 
When Ann did not scream or cry at the sound of the gunshot, Bunt feared that something might 
be wrong with Ann’s hearing (Tolson 246). Sure enough, Ann suffered from hearing loss. 
Throughout Ann’s early years, Percy strove to get the best education for Ann as possible, 
eventually hiring a tutor by the name of Dorris Mirrielees (Tolson 246-249). Mirrielees’ 
pedagogical approach to the deaf exceeded the usual education for the deaf at the time. As 
Tolson writes,  
While the traditional method reduced the deaf child to rudimentary signaling, using 
words as signals to satisfy needs, the Mirrielees method brought the full symbolic power 
 
68 
of language to deaf children. It taught them to use words as a means of knowing the 
world and themselves. (Tolson 249) 
Thus, Mirrielees’ approach confirmed the difference between sign and symbol identified by 
Langer and Percy (Tolson 249). It is by no coincidence that Percy discovered Ann’s hearing loss 
in November 1954, the same year that he published “Symbol as Need,” a review of Susanne 
Langer’s Feeling and Form.  
The anecdote of Helen Keller learning language plays an extremely important role in 
Percy’s understanding of C1 consciousness. Percy began to take an interest in Keller while trying 
to reconcile the behaviorist account of language acquisition with the idealist account (Percy, The 
Message 30-34). The story of Helen’s breakthrough into a world of meaning appears in her 
autobiography, The Story of My Life (Percy, The Message 30). At first, Helen responded to and 
used signs, as opposed to symbols. If Helen wanted a piece of cake, for example, she could spell 
the word “C-A-K-E” in Miss Sullivan’s hand to indicate her desire (Percy, Lost 95; Percy, The 
Message 34). Everything changed for Helen, however, one day in the summer of 1887 at a well-
house in Tuscumbia, Alabama. Sullivan traced the word “W-A-T-E-R” in one of Helen’s hands 
while water gushed from a spout over Helen’s other hand. After Sullivan repeatedly spelled the 
word in Helen’s hand, Helen suddenly realized that the word “water” meant the cool, flowing 
stream of liquid (Percy, The Message 34-35). Helen recognized that the word was the thing in 
alio esse. As Percy writes, “Helen knows the water through and by means of the symbol” (Percy, 
Symbol & Existence 185). Being became intelligible for Helen in a radically unprecedented way 
because the symbol functions as a “discovery vehicle” for the cosmos (Percy, Lost 104). In her 
“pre-symbolic sentience,” Helen had oriented herself toward the water in terms of biological 
adaptation and did not know what water was (Percy, Symbol & Existence 99). After her 
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breakthrough, however, Helen understood the water “as” something (namely, “water”) (Percy, 
Symbol & Existence 99). In her moment of realization at the well-house, Helen broke through 
into language and moved from experiencing the environment as a dyadic creature to 
understanding the world as a triadic creature. After learning the word for water, Helen set about 
trying to determine the name of everything else (Percy, The Message 173, 203, 259). On an 
ontological level, Helen wanted to know what everything was (Percy, The Message 203, 259). 
Percy writes, “This orientation is no longer biological; it is ontological” (Percy, Symbol & 
Existence 193). For Percy, Keller represents the dramatic shift from sign use to symbol use 
(Percy, The Message 280). Percy understands Keller as a representative anecdote for what 
happens in all two-year old children acquiring language in addition to the primitive human 
beings who first used language in a manner otherwise than biological adaptation (Percy, The 
Message 38, 44).  
Importantly, Helen’s breakthrough into thirdness, what Percy called “the Helen Keller 
phenomenon,” always implies the existence of the other (Percy, Lost 209). In other words, Helen 
understood the water “as” “water” both for her and for Sullivan (Percy, Symbol & Existence 99-
100). Thanks to the symbol’s capacity to mediate existence, Helen could concelebrate the object 
with Sullivan as “being what it is under the auspices of the symbol” (Percy, Symbol & Existence 
100). By knowing the object as something with another, Helen became conscious for the first 
time in the sense that she could “know with” another, just as the etymological root of the word 
“consciousness” implies (con “with” + scire “to know”) (Percy, Signposts in a Strange Land 
124-125). Percy writes, “Helen Keller’s memorable revelation was the affirmation of the water 
as being what it is. But an affirmation requires two persons, the Namer and the Hearer. This is 
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water means that this is water for you and me” (Percy, Symbol & Existence 192). The primordial 
naming situation requires two beings: self and other.   
Helen Keller had Anne Sullivan to teach her symbols just as Ann Percy had Miss 
Mirrielees; and in like manner, all human beings who acquire language receive it from others. 
Left to their own devices, humans cannot create their own language ex nihilo. The case of Victor 
of Aveyron, a figure discussed by both Langer and Percy, demonstrated that learning to speak 
requires other human beings (Langer, Philosophy in a New Key 119-121; Percy, Symbol & 
Existence 55-56). Victor, the “savage of Aveyron,” survived in the wilderness apart from 
civilization for the first formative years of his early life (Percy, Symbol & Existence 56). Victor 
had nobody to teach him language; hence, he could not speak. But Victor did not remain apart 
from others forever. A man by the name of Dr. Itard tried to teach Victor to use a word as “a sign 
of a want” in a purely utilitarian manner (Percy, Symbol & Existence 56; Langer, Philosophy 
119). Dr. Itard first withheld water from Victor and tried to get Victor to use the word “eau” to 
obtain water. When Victor failed to use the word “eau” as a sign, Dr. Itard repeated his attempt 
using milk instead of water. Dr. Itard wanted Victor to use the word “lait” as a sign to get Dr. 
Itard to pour milk into a cup. Yet, much to Dr. Itard’s chagrin, Victor pronounced the word “lait” 
only after the doctor had poured the milk. Moreover, Victor expressed sheer joy at having 
coupled the word “milk” with the white substance in the cup (Langer, Philosophy in a New Key 
119-121; Percy, Symbol & Existence 55-56). As Percy writes, “He [Victor] had hit upon the 
symbol—the sudden incalculable inkling that the sound ‘lait’ is the white liquid in the glass” 
(Percy, Symbol & Existence 56). Victor discovered the symbol with the help of another and 
experienced wonder as a result. Sadly, Dr. Itard had so committed himself to the understanding 
of language as a mere instrument, a notion supported by Locke and Condillac, that he gave up 
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trying to teach Victor language altogether (Langer, Philosophy 121; Taylor, The Language 
Animal 3-5). As Langer writes, “Young children learn to speak, after the fashion of Victor, by 
constantly using words to bring things into their minds, not into their hands” (Langer, 
Philosophy 121). The examples of Helen Keller and Victor of Aveyron both testify to the 
importance of the other in language acquisition as well as the joy of coupling word and thing.   
For Percy, the “sensible symbol” not only mediates existence but also plays a crucial role 
in mediating intersubjectivity (Percy, Symbol & Existence 182). The question emerges as to 
whether intersubjectivity precedes the act of symbolization or not. Do individuals first intuit the 
presence of others and then learn to speak? Percy did not think so, and he disagreed with 
Hocking who posited that humans have a “direct experiential knowledge” of the other without 
which “the very ideas of ‘sign,’ ‘language,’ ‘other mind’ itself, could not arise” (Hocking 453; 
Hocking as qtd. in Percy, Symbol & Existence 182). Importantly, Percy pointed out that Hocking 
relied upon an understanding of intersubjectivity as “a direct unmediated bond” (Percy, Symbol 
& Existence 182; emphasis mine). Percy writes, “Hocking suggests that the symbol arises from 
the direct experiential knowledge that ‘We are.’ But surely it is that the ‘We are’ follows upon 
and is mediated by the symbolization, the joint affirmation that this is water” (Percy, The 
Message 281). Thus, Percy writes, “Symbolization is of its very essence an intersubjectivity” 
(Percy, The Message 281). The metaphysics of “We are” depends upon a recognition that this 
“is” such and such a thing for both you and me (Percy, Symbol & Existence 165). And, as 
indicated in the first chapter, everything in the world (with the exception of the “self”) is 
precisely such and such a thing for you and for me because consciousness is always “of” 
something “as” something. The presence of the other stands not only as a “genetic requirement” 
for language acquisition but the “enduring condition” of consciousness (Percy, Symbol & 
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Existence 160). In other words, the conversation continues all day long, whether in utterances or 
in thought, interiorly or in the presence of others, until sleep comes. “I can debate with myself, 
hassle myself endlessly, and be so thoroughly conscious, knowing-with, that I can’t go to sleep. 
When the dialogue stops, consciousness stops. Sleep ensues” (Percy, Signposts 125). Even in his 
solitary dwelling on a deserted island, Robinson Crusoe writing in his journal was engaged in an 
exercise in intersubjectivity (Percy, Symbol & Existence 181). All symbolic acts presuppose “a 
real or an ideal someone else for whom the symbol is intended as meaningful” (Percy, Symbol & 
Existence 160; see also “addressivity” in Bakhtin 95).   
Percy’s essay “Symbol, Consciousness, and Intersubjectivity” spells out how 
symbolization mediates knowledge of a world shared in common with other human beings 
(Percy, The Message 265-276; Percy, Symbol & Existence 139-165). In this essay, Percy 
critiques certain idealists and phenomenologists for failing to give an adequate account of 
intersubjectivity (Percy, The Message 266). Despite the merits of Husserl’s phenomenology, 
Percy found Husserl’s “famous epoché” too solipsistic (Percy, The Message 266-267, 272n). The 
“epoché” puts the reality of the external world “out of play” and allows the phenomenologist to 
study the entire world as it appears in consciousness and exists for the Ego (Husserl, Cartesian 
Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology 19-21). Husserl’s phenomenology, a descriptive 
account of consciousness’ intentional acts, thereby problematizes contact with other selves who 
exist independently of the Ego (Percy, Symbol & Existence 142-149). Husserl deals explicitly 
with charges of solipsism against his phenomenology in Cartesian Meditations and the preface 
to Ideas (Husserl, Cartesian Meditations 89, 148, 150; Husserl, Author’s Preface to the English 
Edition xliii).1 Like everything else, finding and recognizing the other becomes, paradoxically, a 
                                                   
1 Husserl suggests that the other’s ego appresents along with the presentation of their lived body (Husserl, Cartesian 
Meditations 119, 121-122). A hidden view of a wall, for example, appresents itself along with a visible presentation 
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process of losing the world through the “epoché” and rediscovering him or her through a 
“universal self-examination” (Husserl, Cartesian Meditations 157). In response to charges of 
solipsism, Husserl suggested that the Ego stood in a “co-transcendental” relationship to other 
selves (Husserl, Preface xliii; see also Percy, Symbol & Existence 146). Husserl also posited that 
the Ego constitutes the other along with itself and everything else in the world (Husserl, 
Cartesian Meditations 84).2 Due to his realist presuppositions, Percy could not accept that the 
Ego constitutes the other. Further, Percy could not see how the real existence of the other could 
survive the phenomenological “epoché” (Percy, Symbol & Existence 146-147). In addition to 
Husserl, Percy critiqued Cassirer for failing to recognize the importance of the other in 
consciousness. According to Percy, Cassirer committed himself to the Kantian understanding of 
the world as constituted by an “ego-consciousness” (Percy, Symbol & Existence 236). The 
analysis of Cassirer’s philosophical idealism below expands upon Cassirer’s debt to Kant. 
Altogether, Percy suggests that certain thinkers did not go far enough in recognizing that 
consciousness is always “of” something “as” something (Percy, The Message 272-274). Percy 
saw the symbol, especially the linguistic symbol, as a way out of solipsism. Percy writes, 
                                                   
of a wall (109). I might see only part of a wall, and consciousness fills in the rest (everything unavailable to my 
senses). I might walk up to the wall and peer around a corner to see its hidden view; however, I cannot approach the 
other in a similarly more revealing way (109). The other’s psyche is inaccessible to me “originaliter” (“originally”) 
(112, 124). And yet, “‘In’ myself I experience and know the Other; in me he becomes constituted – appresentatively 
mirrored, not constituted as the original” (149). From the experience of myself and my own lived body, Husserl 
suggests that I analogically transfer sense and consciousness to the other (118). Despite his attempt to redress 
solipsism in Cartesian Meditations, the ontological problem of the other still remains. Even if I constitute and know 
the other within my consciousness, the phenomenological bracketing problematizes the reality of their existence 
beyond me (see also Collins 33-37). Who or what might grant existence to other things and selves, if not the 
transcendental Ego? As Collins has pointed out, the Ego in Husserl’s phenomenology resembles a deity: “The 
Husserlian self is immanently present to itself and hence is the self-founded beginning of philosophy without any 
assumptions, logical or ontological. Unlike the Cartesian self, however, it is endowed with many of the functions of 
deity, since the order of knowing is also the order of the foundation of being” (Collins 37).  
2 Husserl writes, “If (as is in fact the case) there are transcendentally constituted in me, the transcendental ego, not 
only other egos but also (as constituted in turn by the transcendental intersubjectivity accruing to me thanks to the 
constitution in me of others) an Objective world common to us all, then everything said up to now is true, not alone 
in the case of my de facto ego and in the case of this de facto intersubjectivity and world, which receive sense and 
existence-status in my subjectivity” (Husserl, Cartesian Meditations 84).  
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“[S]emiotics provides an escape from the solipsist prison [of idealism] by its stress on the social 
origins of language” (Percy, Lost 102). Percy writes, “The symbol is not only distinct from ego-
consciousness, a something else; it implies a somebody else, for whom the symbol is 
meaningful” (Percy, Symbol & Existence 236). In short, idealism, having taken the ego as the 
starting point for all inquiry, cannot give an adequate account of intersubjectivity (Percy, Symbol 
& Existence 186). Only a “broad semiotical approach” could account for intersubjective relations 
and “bring one into the territory of epistemological realism” (Percy, Symbol & Existence 186).  
The anecdotes of Ann Percy, Helen Keller, and Victor of Aveyron demonstrate that the 
symbol mediates knowledge of existence. The child and primitive alike receive language and a 
world populated with meaning from others. Learning to speak puts us in touch with existence 
and other souls. While these examples of language acquisition inspired Percy, he also sought to 
ground his philosophy of communication in the thought of others who came before him, 
including Ernst Cassirer and Susanne Langer, whose work I now turn to consider.   
 
Cassirer and Langer: Symbolic Transformation 
 This section will review the role that Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945) and Susanne Langer 
(1895-1985) played in Percy’s thought, especially his understanding of symbolic transformation. 
First, I begin by reviewing how Cassirer influenced Percy. Cassirer, a German Neo-Kantian 
idealist, studied symbolic phenomena in various forms. In addition to Langer, Cassirer 
distinguished between signs and symbols. Cassirer also approached the study of symbols from an 
anthropological perspective, suggesting that the study of symbolic behavior would yield insight 
into the nature of what it means to be human, which Percy would have appreciated. However, 
Percy parted ways with Cassirer’s Neo-Kantian idealism in favor of realism: Humans do not 
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know symbols but rather know through symbols, which mediate existence. Percy believed that 
Cassirer omitted one of the most important and interesting aspects of symbolic phenomena: the 
symbolic transformation, the process whereby sensuous materials (spoken words, written words, 
etc.) come to mediate other real objects. Thus, the next part of this section reviews how Langer, 
an American philosopher interested in aesthetics and symbolic phenomena, accounted for 
symbolic transformation through a discussion of analogy. In order to serve as “vehicles for 
conception,” symbols must be analogical to that which they re-present. Finally, I discuss why 
Percy rejected both Cassirer’s and Langer’s conclusions about the nature of the symbol. Despite 
incorporating their insights on the symbol into his work, Percy refused to accept either Cassirer’s 
idealistic functionalism or Langer’s naturalism.3  
Reference to Cassirer appears throughout Percy’s works. Percy seems to appreciate all 
that Cassirer has done to underscore the importance of the symbol (Percy, The Message 202n). 
Citing Cassirer’s An Essay on Man, Percy explains how Cassirer distinguished between human 
and animal communication (Percy, Symbol & Existence 33). Cassirer writes, “The difference 
between propositional language and emotional language is the real landmark between the 
human and the animal world” (Cassirer, An Essay on Man 30). Cassirer understood that making 
propositions differs radically from merely responding on a biological level (Percy, Symbol & 
Existence 33, 47). Although Percy mostly turns to Langer for a discussion of the difference 
between sign and symbol, Cassirer also outlined the difference between sign and symbol, even 
using Helen Kellen as a representative anecdote to illustrate symbol use (Cassirer, An Essay 31-
                                                   
3 Langer herself seems to eschew any religious commitments. Langer writes, “That man is an animal I certainly 
believe; and also, that he has no supernatural essence, ‘soul’ or ‘entelechy’ or ‘mind-stuff,’ enclosed in his skin” 
(Langer, Philosophy 40). For his own part, Cassirer came from a Jewish background; despite becoming Rektor of 
the University in Hamburg in 1929, Cassirer later emigrated with his family in 1933 when the Nazis came to power 
(Jensen n.p.). Nonetheless, Percy focuses his attention primarily on these thinkers’ philosophical commitments: 
Langer’s naturalism and Cassirer’s idealism.  
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34).4 After relating Keller’s symbolic breakthrough, Cassirer argues that “everything has a 
name—that the symbolic function is not restricted to particular cases but is a principle of 
universal applicability ….” (Cassirer, An Essay 35). Percy would agree (Percy, Symbol & 
Existence 98-103). As mentioned above, Cassirer may have even given Percy the inspiration to 
approach the study symbols from an anthropological perspective, as a study in what it means to 
be human (Cassirer, An Essay 319; Percy, The Message 11). Without the symbol, human life 
would consist in nothing more than the fulfilment of biological needs or “practical interests” 
(Cassirer, An Essay 41). Without question, then, Cassirer played a major role in advancing 
Percy’s thought on the nature and scope of symbolization.  
Nonetheless, Cassirer’s thought on the nature of the symbol remained thoroughly 
entrenched in German idealism. Referring to Cassirer’s work, Percy writes, “But the empirical 
insights [into the symbol] are so submerged by the apparatus of German idealism that they are 
salvaged only with difficulty” (Percy, The Message 202n-203n). Following Kant’s lead, Cassirer 
proposed to explore the a priori symbolic forms that constitute reality in his The Philosophy of 
Symbolic Forms, Volume One: Language (Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Volume 
One: Language 73-114; Hendel, Introduction 1-12). Not content with “ontological metaphysics,” 
Cassirer prioritized the study of the “function” of thought over and above any independently 
existing reality (Cassirer, Volume One: Language 79). When the symbol takes absolute priority 
in the act of knowing, everything else seems to recede from awareness, especially existence 
(Percy, The Message 32-34). The various “forms” of thought—whether scientific, mythical, or 
religious—give shape to the world, in Cassirer’s understanding. Thus, Cassirer writes, “[T]hey 
[the a priori forms] become multiple efforts, all directed toward the one goal of transforming the 
                                                   
4 Cassirer does not cite Langer when relating the Helen Keller anecdote in An Essay on Man.  
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passive world of mere impressions, in which the spirit seems at first imprisoned, into a world that 
is pure expression of the human spirit” (Cassirer, Volume One: Language 80-81). Without the 
active shaping of the a priori forms, all experience would consist of chaos and void (Cassirer, 
Volume One: Language 107). Cassirer writes, “Myth and art, language and science, are in this 
sense configurations towards being: they are not simple copies of an existing reality but 
represent the main directions of the spiritual movement, of the ideal process by which reality is 
constituted for us as one and many—as a diversity of forms which are ultimately held together 
by a unity of meaning” (Cassirer, Volume One: Language 107). Intelligibility emerges only after 
the a priori symbolic forms have intervened. Cassirer writes, “Cognition, language, myth and 
art: none of them is a mere mirror, simply reflecting images of inward or outward data; they are 
not indifferent media, but rather the true sources of light, the prerequisite of vision, and the 
wellsprings of all formation” (Cassirer, Volume One: Language 93). Cassirer’s insistence upon 
how symbolic forms give shape to reality obscures how existence pushes back upon our a priori 
constructions of the world. The notion of “recalcitrance,” the stubbornness and concreteness of 
the world of things and others, seems lacking in Cassirer’s thought (Burke 255-261; Crawford 
31-206).  
Unlike Cassirer, Percy does not agree that symbols constitute the world (Percy, The 
Message 203n; Percy, Symbol & Existence 236). Cassirer found himself responding to 
rationalists and empiricists alike and perhaps saw Kant as providing a way to reconcile these two 
opposing approaches to epistemology. Cassirer attributes the axiom “Nihil est in intellectu, quod 
non ante fuerit in sensu” to sensationalism, a school of epistemology that reduced mental states 
and reasons for belief to sense perception alone (Cassirer, Volume One: Language 110; 
“Sensationalism”). This axiom, which translates to “Nothing is in the intellect that was not first 
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in the senses,” undoubtedly belonged to the Scholastics and to the Peripatetic School of Aristotle 
before any sensationalists may have claimed it for their own (see Adler, Aristotle for Everybody, 
135; Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate, q. 2 a. 3 arg. 19; Aristotle, De Anima 432a5-
10). Why is this significant? In the least, Cassirer’s rejection of the Peripatetic axiom matters 
because by rejecting it, Cassirer had to find another place to ground knowledge otherwise than 
existence: the a priori forms of consciousness (Cassirer, Volume One: Language 110-111). For 
Percy, things exist both before and after human consciousness. The existence of real human 
beings and real referents stands as a precondition for symbolization, and thereby knowledge 
(Percy, Symbol & Existence 234). A real world consisting not only of ideas but also of existents 
in their unique particularity must exist for symbolization to occur (Percy, Symbol & Existence 
234). For Cassirer, on the other hand, “The ‘real’ object tends to vanish into Kant’s noumenon” 
(Percy, Symbol & Existence 162). Indeed, the “thing in itself,” reality as it is, appears as nothing 
more than a “fallacy in formulation, an intellectual phantasm” to Cassirer (Cassirer, Volume 
One: Language 111). Cassirer writes, “[F]or the highest objective truth that is accessible to the 
spirit is ultimately the form of its own activity” (Cassirer, Volume One: Language 111). Cassirer 
thinks that symbol does all the work in the act of knowledge, rendering the otherwise 
unknowable noumenon meaningful (Cassirer, Volume One: Language 80-81; Percy, Symbol & 
Existence 91). Percy writes, “In Cassirer’s view, the interpenetration of symbol and thing is 
almost entirely a one-way street; the thing is specified by the constituting power of the symbol” 
(Percy, Symbol & Existence 91). Cassirer writes, “Physical reality seems to recede in proportion 
as man’s symbolic activity advances. Instead of dealing with the things themselves man is in a 
sense constantly conversing with himself” (Cassirer, An Essay 25; Cassirer as qtd. in Postman 
10). By implication, in Cassirer’s view, humans do not know reality but instead know symbols 
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(Percy, Symbol & Existence 91). If humans only know symbols, the extensions of themselves, 
then meaning is solely a human creation. Percy does his best to return meaning and significance 
to its rightful place: the ground of existence.  
Contra Cassirer, humans do not know the symbol itself but do in fact know existence 
“through” the symbol (Percy, Symbol & Existence 91). Percy writes, “But what is not taken into 
account [in Cassirer’s view] is that the [symbolic] transformation is above all intentional. The 
symbol is always a symbol of something and what we know is not the symbol but through the 
symbol ….” (Percy, Symbol & Existence 91). The symbolic transformation, then, relies upon 
existence. When symbols yield knowledge of existence, the symbol serves “as a transparent 
intentional instrument through which the thing is known” (Percy, Symbol & Existence 236). As 
Sr. Miriam Joseph has explained, the symbol “disappears” before its intentional object in 
ordinary usage (Sr. Joseph 36-40). And as other realists have been quick to suggest, the symbol 
is not that which is known but “that by which” existence is known (Adler, Ten Philosophical 
Mistakes 14-15, 66; Grabowsky 26; Thompson 201). Percy thought that Cassirer had asked the 
right question, namely, “[H]ow can a finite and particular sensory content be made into the 
vehicle of a general spiritual ‘meaning’?” (Cassirer, Volume One: Language 93; Cassirer as qtd. 
in Percy, Symbol & Existence 91). In other words, how can something sensuous become a means 
for spiritual content? Only, Cassirer offered a deficient reply to his own question and failed to 
describe the actual act of symbolic transformation, whereby the sensuous symbol becomes a 
vehicle for real meaning (Percy, Symbol & Existence 91). Percy writes, “In Cassirer’s view, 
nothing is actually transformed: an unknown and unknowable something is merely given its first 
formulation” (Percy, Symbol & Existence 92). On the other hand, Percy believed in a “mutual 
articulation and interpenetration” of word and thing (Percy, Symbol & Existence 92). Despite his 
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disagreement with Cassirer’s metaphysics, Percy still called Cassirer “the great German 
philosopher of the symbol” (Percy, The Message 153). Langer also had a great deal of respect for 
Cassirer. In her preface to the first edition of Philosophy in a New Key, Langer calls Cassirer 
“that pioneer in the philosophy of symbolism” (Langer, Preface to the First Edition xv). Langer 
also translated Cassirer’s Language and Myth into English. Yet, Langer did not fall prey German 
idealism, preferring instead to give a naturalistic explanation of symbol use (Langer, Philosophy 
40-41).  
In addition to distinguishing between sign and symbol, Langer sought to investigate the 
symbolic transformation of sensuous experience by the mind. According to Percy, both Langer 
and John of St. Thomas identified the “unique property” of the symbol: “that it in some sense 
comes to contain within itself that which is symbolized” (Percy, Symbol & Existence 74). Langer 
writes, “Symbols are not proxy [sic] for their objects, but are vehicles for the conception of 
objects” (Langer, Philosophy 60-61). Symbols allow humans to think “about” things rather than 
simply respond to them (Langer, Philosophy 221-223). If you say the word “ball” to a dog, the 
dog may go and look for their ball, having responded to the word as a sign; but if you say “ball”  
to your spouse, then he or she might respond, “What about it?” (Percy, The Message 153; see 
also Langer, Philosophy in a New Key 30-31). Symbols set humans at a distance from the play of 
dyadic interactions. Langer writes, “Instead of announcers of things, they [symbols] are 
reminders” (Langer, Philosophy in a New Key 31). Symbols allow humans to think about things 
in their absence; as a human, you can think about your food after having eaten it (Anton, 
“Syntagmatic and Paradigmatic Synergism: Notes on ‘Lanigan’s “Encyclopedic Dictionary”’” 
52; Langer, Philosophy 105, 135). Langer calls symbolization the “essential act of the mind” and 
“the starting point of all intellection in the human sense” (Langer, Philosophy 41-42). Although 
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transcendent at first and in artistic activity, symbolization is absolutely mundane. Humans 
constantly interpret signs and symbols, the “warp” and “woof” of the conscious experience of 
reality (Langer, Philosophy 280). Langer uses both dreams and humanity’s historical proclivity 
for magic as examples of the constant human “need” to symbolize experience (Langer, 
Philosophy 37-41). Upon going to sleep, the mind continues “actively translating experiences 
into symbols, in fulfilment of a basic need to do so” (Langer, Philosophy 41-42). Contra 
utilitarian interpretations of the symbol, dream symbols serve “no practical purpose” (Langer, 
Philosophy 37). Through magic and ritual, primitive man transforms experience and thereby 
makes better sense of it (Langer, Philosophy 48, 126, 158-159). Langer writes, “Whatever 
purpose magical practice may serve, its direct motivation is the desire to symbolize great 
concepts” (Langer, Philosophy 49). But certain questions remain, which Percy insists upon 
having answered. Concerning symbolic transformation, Percy asks, “What exactly is changed 
and into what? How does the change take place?” (Percy, Symbol & Existence 75).  
Arguably, Langer’s understanding of analogy provided Percy with a means for making 
sense of how symbolic transformation occurs (Percy, Symbol & Existence 74-94).5 Chapter three 
of Langer’s Philosophy in a New Key, entitled “The Logic of Signs and Symbols,” highlights the 
importance of analogy in symbolic transformation. In order for a symbol to serve as a vehicle of 
meaning, a symbol must not immediately resemble that which it represents. Percy invites his 
reader to consider again the case of Victor of Aveyron. Imagine that instead of trying to get 
Victor to use the spoken word “lait” to request a glass of milk, Dr. Itard set a picture of a glass of 
milk alongside the real thing. According to Percy, Victor would not have made the leap, the 
symbolic breakthrough, that he made when he coupled the spoken word “lait” with the liquid in 
                                                   
5 I.A. Richards, too, provided Percy with the requisite vocabulary of vehicle and tenor for making sense of symbolic 
transformation (see Percy, Symbol & Existence 85, 87, 217-218, 221). 
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the glass. Instead, Percy suggests that Victor would have seen two glasses of milk (Percy, 
Symbol & Existence 82, 86). The distinction between univocity (likeness), equivocity 
(unlikeness), and analogy (a proportion between likeness and unlikeness) becomes important 
here. In order for symbolic transformation to occur, the symbol must be neither univocal nor 
equivocal but analogical to the thing that it symbolizes. In Victor’s case, an iconic copy would 
have univocally represented the milk. But the spoken word served as an adequate vehicle for 
conception in this case, as well as in all human language acquisition—both in children and in 
primitive peoples.6 Percy calls the spoken word “a skeleton waiting to be fleshed” (Percy, 
Symbol & Existence 88). Percy writes, “In the vocable, then, the transforming power of the 
symbolific function is provided a framework of polarities and heterogeneities in which it can 
detect analogies and on which it can deposit the living flesh of the word” (Percy, Symbol & 
Existence 90). On this point, Langer writes, “[W]ords are naturally available symbols, as well as 
very economical ones” (Langer, Philosophy 75). Langer continues, “[T]hey [words] have no 
value except as symbols (or signs); in themselves they are completely trivial” (Langer, 
Philosophy 75). Finally, Langer writes, “The more barren and indifferent the symbol, the greater 
is its semantic power. Peaches are too good to act as words; we are too much interested in 
peaches themselves” (Langer, Philosophy 75). Langer points out that humans instinctively 
babble, but apes do not (Langer, Philosophy 105). Babbling in children provides the requisite 
material, the perceptual sounds, for symbolic transformation to occur. The availability and 
economy of the spoken word, combined with the fact that humans do not have earlids (as they 
have eyelids), make the spoken word the readiest medium for human communication (Langer, 
                                                   
6 Recall the cat or the dog who, not having the ability to understand symbols, sees only a canvas instead of a portrait 
(Langer, Philosophy 72). Dogs may watch TV, but they will not understand it. Why? Dogs see duplicates of things 
(e.g., of other dogs)—not symbols of them (cf. Langer, Philosophy 68-72). 
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Philosophy 75, 116-117, 129-130). Anything may become a symbol, but the spoken word 
happens to work best for transforming one thing (a sight, a feeling, a touch, etc.) into another (a 
sound) (Percy, Symbol & Existence 88; cf. McLuhan, Understanding Media 88-89).  
Ultimately, Percy parts ways with Cassirer and Langer due to their failure to recognize 
that symbols can yield real knowledge of existence. Percy critiques both Cassirer and Langer, 
despite their insights into the nature of the symbol, because neither thinker recognizes the full 
epistemological implications of the symbolic breakthrough. Unlike the idealist or the naturalist, 
Percy rejects progress or development as adequate criteria for judging symbols (Percy, “Symbol 
as Need” 387). The Holy Sacrifice of the Mass is something more than simply “a ‘higher form’” 
of a “native dog dance” (Percy, “Symbol as Need” 387). Further, symbols do more than simply 
integrate groups of people. Percy writes, “Thus, the idealist Cassirer would agree with [the] 
functionalist Malinowski in evaluating myth not according to a true-false scale but by its 
immanent role in integrating society, in conceiving the world” (Percy, Symbol & Existence 26). 
Judging symbolic activity based solely upon its ability to integrate human communities, 
however, conceals the fact that certain symbolic utterances can unite people for the worse, as 
totalitarian states in the twentieth century proved (Percy, Symbol & Existence 28-29). Thus, 
human symbolic activity, the instrument for knowing anything at all, cannot be evaluated by 
anything but the truth itself (Percy, “Symbol as Need” 390). Note that Percy does not claim to 
possess the truth in every case once and for all. Percy only claims that the symbol makes truth 
(and thereby error) possible. Responding to both naturalists and idealists, Percy asks, “If the 
language symbol is not just a sign in an adaptive schema, and if it does not itself constitute 
reality but rather represents something, then what does it represent?” (Percy, “Symbol as Need” 
389). Percy answers that the symbol represents nothing less than existence. If words represent 
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things, it is not in the manner of a copy or a duplicate. Rather, the word re-presents the thing 
itself in alio esse. By considering symbolic transformation, Percy shows us that words actually 
re-present things; words have become things, taken existence up into themselves, and 
disappeared as intentional objects in the process.7 Percy likely came to this understanding of 
words by reading and extending upon the work of Jacques Maritain, whose ideas I now turn to 
consider.  
 
A Realist Account of the Symbol 
This section reviews how Percy’s realist understanding of the symbol differed from 
Cassirer’s and Langer’s understandings of the symbol. First, I discuss Jacques Maritain’s (1882-
1973) influence on Percy, especially Maritain’s essay “Sign and Symbol.” In addition to 
explaining the role of the sign in mediating knowledge, Maritain distinguished between 
“instrumental signs” and “formal signs,” which I unpack below (Maritain, “Sign and Symbol” 
[Ransoming the Time] 218-220, 222-223). Formal signs function like Percy’s “symbol” insofar 
as they “disappear” before the objects that they intend. The formal sign differs from the symbol 
insofar as the former is a purely mental entity whereas the latter is a sensuous entity capable of 
empirical study. Second, I review the role of the imagination in the act of knowing, which relates 
to Maritain’s discussion of formal signs. An angelic approach to epistemology attempts to bypass 
the imagination as a necessary component for knowing, an approach that Maritain, Percy, and 
other realists since Aristotle have taken pains to avoid. Reviewing certain realists’ understanding 
of the role of the imagination in the act of knowing serves as an occasion to reflect upon where 
                                                   
7 On this point, some might say that “things” is a word; however, I would also add that the word “word” is a sensible 
thing on this page (cf. Anton, Communication Uncovered 44-45). Arguably, distinguishing between “first intention” 
and “second intention,” between the use of a word to intend existence and the use of a word to refer back to itself, 
resolves many of the problems that revolve around confusing things with words and vice-versa (Sr. Joseph 36-40).  
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Percy appears to have parted ways with Maritain and other twentieth century Thomists. Instead 
of focusing in on the formal sign, a phantasm, a mental image in the imagination, Percy focuses 
his attention on the sensuous, empirical symbol. Finally, I conclude with a brief discussion of the 
“direct sign” and “reverse sign” as these terms appear in Maritain’s work. While this section 
primarily reviews the “direct sign,” which C1 consciousness makes use of by looking outward, 
symbolizing and knowing things other than itself, consideration of the “reverse sign” will help 
build a bridge to the next chapter on C2 consciousness.  
Thus, Maritain provided Percy with a way to understand the symbol otherwise than 
Cassirer and Langer.8 Maritain—a French, Catholic philosopher and convert to Catholicism—
loomed large as one of the primary Thomistic voices in the twentieth century. Maritain wrote a 
number of important works, including Art & Scholasticism, a Thomistic work on aesthetics that 
had an especial impact on Percy.9 Both Percy and Flannery O’Connor read Art & Scholasticism, 
which influenced their approach to art. For Maritain, art does not traffic in mere emotions but 
involves the intellect (Maritain, Art & Scholasticism with Other Essays 10, 21). Art may produce 
emotions but only as a consequence of aiming at the truth (Maritain, Art & Scholasticism 58-59, 
                                                   
8 Maritain, Langer, and Cassirer wrote key works that influenced Percy between 1920 and 1950, making these 
thinkers contemporaries. Percy seems to have concentrated his attention on Langer’s and Maritain’s insights, 
especially in his first published essay “Symbol as Need,” which appeared in print in 1954. However, Cassirer 
published his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms: Volume One in 1923. Thus, both Langer and Maritain were 
responding, at least in part, to Cassirer. As mentioned above, Langer acknowledged her debt to Cassirer in the 
Preface to the First Edition of Philosophy in a New Key, written in 1941 (Langer, Preface to the First Edition xv; see 
also Langer, Philosophy 21). In his introduction to “Sign and Symbol,” Maritain suggested that someone should 
write a treatise linking medieval theories on the sign and symbol with contemporary developments of his time, 
including the insights of the Warburg school of thought (Maritain, “Sign and Symbol” [Ransoming the Time] 217). 
“Sign and Symbol,” which later appeared in Maritain’s (1948) Ransoming the Time, was published in the inaugural 
July 1937 issue of the Journal of the Warburg Institute (see Maritain, “Sign and Symbol” [Journal of the Warburg 
Institute]). Cassirer presented studies and lectures on symbolic forms in the early 1920s at the Warburg Library in 
Hamburg, Germany (“Ernst Cassirer”). Roughly twenty years later, Cassirer wrote An Essay on Man in 1944 to 
make his writings on symbolic forms more accessible to a wider audience (Cassirer, Preface). Thus, Maritain, 
Langer, and Cassirer prepared the way for Percy’s work on the relationship between symbol and existence, which 
began in the 1950s (Ketner et al. vii).  
9 Percy cites a number of Maritain’s works, including Ransoming the Time, A Preface to Metaphysics, Creative 
Intuition in Art and Poetry, and Art & Scholasticism (Percy, “Symbol as Need”; Percy, Symbol & Existence). Tolson 
also identifies Maritain’s The Dream of Descartes as an important book for Percy (Tolson 237). 
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65, 97n4-98n4, 128, 171-173). In like manner, Percy argued for art as a form of making and 
appreciation as a form of knowing, “intellectual but peculiarly distinct from discursive knowing” 
(Percy, “Symbol as Need” 384). Maritain taught Percy that true art does not neglect the intellect 
but in fact relies upon it (Percy, “Symbol as Need” 383). Percy even used Maritain’s Thomistic 
categories in Art & Scholasticism to critique the second novel of his friend Shelby Foote (Tolson 
216). After publishing “Symbol as Need,” Percy wrote another philosophical essay utilizing 
Maritain’s ideas, which did not seem to find its way into print until the publication of Symbol & 
Existence. Percy sent his essay, which concerned the relationship between the symbol and 
“magic cognition,” to Maritain, who gave a favorable response to Percy (Tolson 244). If the 
original essay appeared anything like the two chapters on “magic cognition” found in Symbol & 
Existence, then the essay that Percy sent to Maritain likely included insights derived from 
Maritain’s essay “Sign and Symbol.” 
In his essay “Sign and Symbol,” Maritain highlights the importance of signs and symbols 
in the process of knowing anything at all. Importantly, Maritain does not draw upon Langer or 
use the language of dyadic and triadic to distinguish signs from symbols.10 Rather, Maritain 
follows the scholastics in defining the “sign” as “that which makes present for knowledge 
something which is other than itself” (Maritain, “Sign and Symbol” [Ransoming the Time] 
218).11 A sign operates as a “substitute or a vicar” to make something else known: “it takes the 
place” of something else (Maritain, “Sign and Symbol” [Ransoming the Time] 218). Further, 
Maritain distinguishes between “instrumental signs” and “formal signs.” An instrumental sign is 
                                                   
10 Maritain defines the symbol as “being a sign-image (at once Bild [image] and Bedeutung [meaning]): something 
sensible signifying an object by reason of a presupposed relationship of analogy” (Maritain, “Sign and Symbol” 
[Ransoming the Time] 219).  
11 For Maritain, the speculative sign “makes manifest something other than it is,” while the practical sign 
“communicates a stimulation, an appeal” (Maritain, “Sign and Symbol” [Ransoming the Time] 253). Unlike 
speculative signs, practical signs do not make known an object but signify “an intention and a direction of the 
practical intellect” (Maritain, “Sign and Symbol” [Ransoming the Time] 224). 
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that which is known “beforehand” and leads to knowledge of something else (Maritain, “Sign 
and Symbol” [Ransoming the Time] 222). Take the example of smoke and fire. Smoke stands for 
fire and functions as a “vicar” for the fire. In this instance of a “natural sign,” smoke signifies 
fire and not water because a real relationship (as opposed to an ideal relationship) exists between 
the sign and the signified (Maritain, “Sign and Symbol” [Ransoming the Time] 218-219). As 
another example, the instrumental sign of an orange sky on the horizon heralds the coming of the 
sun and the disappearance of night. A formal sign, on the other hand, is that by which something 
else is known (Maritain, “Sign and Symbol” [Ransoming the Time] 223). Formal signs still 
function as “vicars” for their objects, but they themselves “disappear” as intentional objects and 
thereby make knowledge of other things possible (Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge 119; 
Maritain, “Sign and Symbol” [Ransoming the Time] 223). In The Degrees of Knowledge, 
Maritain writes,  
A formal sign is a sign whose whole essence is to signify. It is not an object which, 
having, first, its proper value for us as an object, is found, besides, to signify another 
object. Rather, it is anything that makes known, before being itself a known object. More 
exactly, let us say it is something that, before being known as object by a reflective act, is 
known only by the very knowledge that brings the mind to the object through its 
mediation.12 (Maritain, Degrees 119) 
An understanding of mediation stands at the heart of how formal signs function. In this case, 
formal signs function as mental entities that mediate knowledge of existence: Concepts in the 
memory and images in the imagination operate as formal signs (Maritain, “Sign and Symbol” 
[Ransoming the Time] 222). My memories of my wedding, for example, function as formal 
                                                   
12 Maritain uses the term “presentative form” and the Scholastic term “species” to refer to “formal signs” (Maritain, 
Degrees 119).  
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signs. I do not know my memory itself. Rather, I know the past itself through the mediation of 
memories (Maritain, Degrees 120). Thus, the use of signs does not imply mere “inference and 
comparison” but rather the real “presence” of the signified in the sign (Maritain, “Sign and 
Symbol” [Ransoming the Time] 220). To repeat, the signified is in the sign in alio esse (Maritain, 
“Sign and Symbol” [Ransoming the Time] 220). The intentional object of thought present to the 
mind and the actual, existing object intended by the sign do not result in two separate entities but 
rather one and the same entity in two different modes of existence (Maritain, Degrees 121-123). 
The knower is really and truly united to the known not on a material plane but on an immaterial 
plane thanks to the mediation of formal signs (Maritain, Degrees 117-118).  
Importantly, signs operate on the level of formal causality as opposed to efficient 
causality. The terms “formal cause” and “efficient cause” derive from the Aristotelian and later 
Thomistic vocabulary for making sense out of how something comes to be what it is.13 At basic, 
when Maritain states that the sign operates on the level of formal cause as opposed to efficient 
cause, he means that the form of the object intended by the sign takes its place in the intellect of 
the knower, which yields real knowledge of the thing itself (because the thing itself is present to 
the mind in alio esse) (Maritain, “Sign and Symbol” [Ransoming the Time] 219). Maritain 
writes, “The sign does not even produce as an efficient cause the knowing of the signified ….” 
(Maritain, “Sign and Symbol” [Ransoming the Time] 219). Rather, according to formal causality, 
the sign “takes the place of the object” signified in the cognitive faculty (Maritain, “Sign and 
Symbol” [Ransoming the Time] 219). Formal causality facilitates the simultaneous, immaterial 
union of knower and known incomprehensible in terms of efficient causality, stimulus and 
response, antecedent cause and subsequent effect. On this point, Percy writes, “Knowing is not a 
                                                   
13 For more on Aristotle’s four causes, including formal and efficient cause, please see Adler, Aristotle for 
Everybody: Difficult Thought Made Easy Ch. 6.  
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causal sequence but an immaterial union. It is a union, however, which is mediated through 
material entities, the symbol and its object” (Percy, The Message 263-264). Here, Percy skips 
over the idea of formal signs as purely mental entities and instead emphasizes the sensuous, 
material nature of symbols and objects capable of mediating immaterial knowledge. 
Nevertheless, the difference between formal causality and efficient causality remains important 
here because Percy does not believe that symbols operate in a dyadic manner (i.e., according to 
the order of efficient causality). What happens if humans understand symbols solely in terms of 
efficient causality instead of formal causality? Instead of instruments of knowledge, symbols 
become mere efficient causes, the means for making things be at the exclusion of making things 
known (Maritain, “Sign and Symbol” [Ransoming the Time] 233-234). Undoubtedly, signs can 
function in a practical manner to exhort, tell, command, request, and even bring about certain 
social arrangements (Maritain, “Sign and Symbol” [Ransoming the Time] 224). Yet, signs do not 
and cannot remain merely on the level of efficient causality because they belong to a different 
ontological plane (Maritain, “Sign and Symbol” [Ransoming the Time] 234-235). This confusion 
between efficient causality and formal causality, Maritain thinks, helps to explain “sympathetic 
magic” in primitive peoples, the use of spells, incantations, and rites as causes to bring about 
desired effects (Maritain, “Sign and Symbol” [Ransoming the Time] 233-234). Maritain believes 
such a confusion occurred because the imagination played the primary role in the primitive’s 
experience of reality as opposed to the intelligence (Maritain, “Sign and Symbol” [Ransoming 
the Time] 229).  
Thus, Maritain influenced Percy’s understanding of “magic,” as well as how words come 
to contain things in alio esse. All throughout his essay “Sign and Symbol,” Maritain stresses the 
utmost respect for primitive man, emphasizing that our intelligence does not differ in “nature” 
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but rather in “state” from the primitive (Maritain, “Sign and Symbol” [Ransoming the Time] 236-
237, 252). In primitive cultures, the signified becomes totally and absolutely interpenetrated with 
the sign on the physical level (Maritain, “Sign and Symbol” [Ransoming the Time] 232). 
Maritain writes,  
In the formal-objective order the sign is thus something most astonishing, whereat the 
routine of culture alone prevents our wonder. And this marvelous function of containing 
the object—with respect to the mind—of having present in itself the thing itself in alio 
esse, is fully exercised in primitive man. Words are not anemic or colorless, they are 
overflowing with life—with their life as signs—for primitive man. (Maritain, “Sign and 
Symbol” [Ransoming the Time] 232) 
And yet, the glory of such a lived participation in existence belies a danger (Maritain, “Sign and 
Symbol” [Ransoming the Time] 232). The primitive does not readily distinguish between sign 
and signified; rather, these two become one, “a physical interchangeability, a physical fusion, 
and a physical equivalence….” (Maritain, “Sign and Symbol” [Ransoming the Time] 232). 
Magic appears when the imagination usurps the proper “function of the sign,” and “formal 
causality” becomes “denatured by the imagination” (Maritain, “Sign and Symbol” [Ransoming 
the Time] 235, 251). Above all, magic signs operate as “practical signs,” which signify “an 
intention and a direction of the practical intellect” (Maritain, “Sign and Symbol” [Ransoming the 
Time] 224). Maritain acknowledges the dangers of magic signs, while admitting that “poetic 
thought,” “poetic creation,” and works of art imply “a kind of magical sign” (Maritain, “Sign and 
Symbol” [Ransoming the Time] 252-253).   
Thus, the imagination plays a crucial role in the acquisition of knowledge, which 
children, primitives, and poets all bear witness to. Aristotle and Aquinas agreed that, without the 
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imagination, knowledge is not possible (Percy, Symbol & Existence 96). In De Anima, Aristotle 
writes, “The soul never thinks without an image” (Aristotle De Anima 431a15-20). Aristotle does 
not mean that humans know images themselves. Rather, humans know by means of images 
(Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I.Q85.a2). Commenting on Aristotle’s De Anima, Aquinas writes, 
“In the present state of life in which the soul is united to a passible body, it is impossible for our 
intellect to understand anything actually, except by turning to the phantasms [images]” (Aquinas, 
Summa I.Q84.a7). Phantasms reside in the imagination, and the intellect abstracts forms from 
these phantasms (Adler, Aristotle for Everybody 134). Idealism has no place in this realist 
epistemology because the intellect thinks the immaterial thing itself in alio esse with the help of 
the phantasm (Aristotle, De Anima 431b5; Aquinas, Summa I.Q85.a1). Frederick Wilhelmsen, 
whom Percy relies upon in Symbol & Existence, writes, “The philosopher must go through the 
phantasm to reach being” (Wilhelmsen 40; Wilhelmsen as qtd. in Percy, Symbol & Existence 
96). Wilhelmsen continues,  
To say this is to say, in effect, that being is usually approached indirectly. We do not, as a 
matter of fact, directly plunge into an intuition of metaphysical truth simply by being 
confronted with an existing reality. We sidle up to being, as it were, and approach the 
terrain of metaphysics by way of a long ride through back country trails. (Wilhelmsen 40) 
Poetically speaking, these “back country trails” are paved with symbols. Wilhelmsen understood 
a symbol as “a phantasm intending or representing intelligibility” (Wilhelmsen 40n3). For 
Maritain, a phantasm functions as a “formal sign,” not “that which is known” but rather “the 
means by which” we know something (Maritain, “Sign and Symbol” [Ransoming the Time] 
223). And yet, despite his appreciation of both Wilhelmsen and Maritain, Percy appears to have 
considered the symbol as distinct from but related to the phantasm (Percy, The Message 263; 
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Percy, Symbol & Existence 96, 185). While other scholastics and Thomists might focus on the 
phantasm as a mental entity, Percy wanted to investigate the symbol in its sensuous, empirical 
existence. While “formal signs” contain their objects in alio esse, in an intentional mode of 
existence, so do sensuous symbols, Percy argued (Percy, Symbol & Existence 185). Recalling the 
earlier discussion of intentionality in the section on Cassirer and Langer, like Maritain’s “formal 
sign,” the sensible symbol itself “disappears” and allows the object intended to appear (Percy, 
Symbol & Existence 236). Altogether, humans conceive the world by means of phantasms, 
concepts, and symbols, which mediate all existing intelligible forms.14 Knowledge knows no 
other route.  
In the end, call Percy what you will but do not call him a rationalist. In the primitive just 
as in modern man, the symbolic imagination takes its place not as a “crutch” in the act of 
knowing but as “the very soul and life of the human way of knowing” (Percy, Symbol & 
Existence 96). The symbol, which enters the imagination laden with form, makes both truth and 
error possible (Percy, Symbol & Existence 96). As with all things, moderation is key. The 
imagination must not usurp the dominion of the intellect any more than the intellect can bypass 
the imagination in seeking direct contact with reality. Throughout Symbol & Existence, Percy 
makes clear that humans do not have direct knowledge of essences. Rather, humans know 
                                                   
14 At least one question in particular emerges from this paragraph: “Is every phantasm necessarily symbolic?” 
Wilhelmsen does not appear to think so. Wilhelmsen writes, “Existence is attained immediately in the judgment; but 
judgments necessarily entail the use of phantasms, and, except in direct judgments of existing material things, the 
phantasms employed are symbolic” (Wilhelmsen 40; Wilhelmsen as qtd. in Percy, Symbol & Existence 96; emphasis 
mine). Thus, whereas the large majority of phantasms may be symbolic, the “direct judgments of existing material 
things” do not appear to require symbols to know them. In other words, standing before a cup, Wilhelmsen might 
suggest that I do not need a symbol of that cup to know it. My intellect can abstract the form from the phantasm 
delivered by way of my senses. Percy appears to suggest otherwise, arguing that symbolization involves the 
application of one sensuous thing to another, not the application of a phantasm to an existing thing (Percy, The 
Message 263). Even in the presence of a cup, a child cannot know what it is until someone else names it for them 
and calls it a “cup” (Percy, The Message 42-44).  
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through the mediation of something else: the sensible symbol. Contemporary man faces two 
temptations, then: the return to a primitive mindset governed by the rule of the imagination alone 
and the equally deleterious prospect of a mindset with no imagination whatsoever (Percy, Symbol 
& Existence 126-127; Langer, Philosophy 290-294). The latter of these temptations, what 
Maritain called “angelism,” afflicts all epistemologists, whether scientific or artistic, who try to 
acquire knowledge without the mediation of sensible symbols or phantasms (Maritain, The 
Dream of Descartes 183). Angelic intelligences do not require the mediation of sensible things, 
symbols or phantasms. As Maritain remarked concerning Descartes’ “angelic self”: “Its 
substance is the very act of thinking” (Maritain, The Dream of Descartes 183). In his critique of 
the Catholic art of his time, the literary critic Allen Tate explains that even the Catholic artist has 
fallen prey to abstract modes of thought, forsaking the concrete for the angelic (Tate, “The 
Symbolic Imagination” 261-262). Percy, who had read Tate’s essay, would have realized the 
implications of Tate’s insight. Indeed, Percy’s novels seek to convey the intelligibility of 
existence through the mediation of sensible symbols. 
 Up to this point, I have said nothing about that curious sign, the “reverse sign,” which 
reveals something about its user. I have tried to stress the role of the formal sign and the symbol 
in making an object known to the intellect—in Helen Keller, children, primitives, all people 
acquiring language. Maritain writes, “But even in normal thought the signs of which a man 
makes use to signify things (direct signs) also signify him (reverse signs)” (Maritain, “Sign and 
Symbol” [Ransoming the Time] 254). Direct signs indicate objects, whereas reverse signs reveal 
the subject, or sign user (Maritain, “Sign and Symbol” [Ransoming the Time] 253). Contrasting 
his position with Freud’s, Maritain suggests that Freud considered all symbols in this “reverse” 
aspect (Maritain, “Sign and Symbol” [Ransoming the Time] 253). Psychology replaces 
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metaphysics when all symbols simply and only reflect the subjectivity of their users. Recall here 
the whole host of studies that link together the use of language, power, and subjectivity—letting 
go of the fact that symbols can in fact signify realities external to the self. Both “direct” and 
“reverse” symbols matter, of course. C1 consciousness deals in “direct” symbols, but C2 
consciousness becomes curiously enrapt by symbols in their “reverse” function alone, seeking to 
get at the hidden core of the self behind the words. And yet, does such a hidden core really exist? 
And can the symbol formulate its essence? Such questions will have to remain for the following 
chapter to take up. For now it is enough to recall with both Percy and Maritain that the symbol 
can signify objects and the symbol user, too. Symbols can reveal something about the inner life, 
the subjectivity, of a person (Maritain, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry 128; Percy, “Symbol 
as Need” 383). Christ Himself put the matter quite directly when he said: “For out of the 
abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh” (Lk 6:45 DRA). Words carry within them the reality 
of a living, breathing person, an immaterial soul. Is it any wonder, then, that incongruities 
between speech and action, between saying and doing, activate our moral sense? For when 
people say that which is not true, their “direct signs” emphatically become “reverse signs.” Liars 
attempt to make known that which is not the case and, in the process, make themselves into what 
they are not by saying what is not. Their speech betrays their corruption, if only indirectly. 
Before moving onto a discussion of how symbols can make us liars, the epitomes of C2 
consciousness, I offer some implications from this chapter for rhetoric, philosophy of 
communication, and media ecology.  
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Implications for Rhetoric, Philosophy of Communication, and Media Ecology 
In this section, I briefly build out some implications of the aforementioned discussion for 
rhetoric, philosophy of communication, and media ecology. First, I begin with implications for 
rhetoric. As mentioned in the first chapter, scholars of rhetoric considered Percy’s ideas about 
metaphor (e.g., Campbell; Caraher; Cleary; Engnell; Lessl; Osborn and Ehninger). However, if 
scholars of rhetoric returned to Percy’s ideas as expressed here, in the least the rhetorical canon 
of invention might return to realist roots. The etymological root of “invention” is the Latin 
invenire, which means “to find” or “to discover” (Gilson, Methodical Realism 97; “Invention”). 
In addition to commonplaces, where might rhetoricians look to find or discover arguments? 
“Existence,” Percy might respond. Thus, I emphasize here the importance of moving from things 
to thought as opposed to moving from thought to things during rhetorical invention. As Percy has 
shown through his critique of Cassirer’s work, humans do more than simply impose symbols 
upon an unknowable reality; rather, symbol and existence mutually interpenetrate in the moment 
of articulation. Further, I explain how rhetoricians might use Langer’s and Percy’s insights into 
analogy to invent compelling metaphors that discover existence. Second, I offer a reflection on 
analogy important to both philosophy of communication and media ecology. As mentioned in the 
first chapter, Anton thought that Percy’s philosophy of communication failed to account for 
alphabetic literacy in his account of denotative utterance (Anton, “On the Nonlinearity of Human 
Communication” 84). Yet, the aforementioned discussion on the role of analogy in symbolic 
transformation makes clear that Percy did have a sense for how both spoken and written words 
serve as media of communication. Third, I relate how Percy’s ideas on analogy compare with 
those put forward by Marshall McLuhan, another media ecologist informed by the Catholic 
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intellectual tradition whose understanding of analogy shaped his own epistemological 
presuppositions.  
To begin, the aforementioned discussion of how symbolic transformation occurs yields 
practical insight into the art of symbolic mediation, which teachers and students of rhetoric 
should appreciate. Humans do not merely impose a priori symbols onto existence. The art of 
symbolic mediation, of naming appropriately, demands a consideration of existence. Take, for 
example, the problem of naming a new business. Suppose that I want to start a used bookstore. I 
could begin by thinking about the right name for the business and cycle through a logical list of 
names to impose on the reality that I want to create. Such an approach treats the name, whether 
consciously or not, as a quasi-magical, efficient cause. Through the name, I attempt to bring a 
new reality into existence. But suppose that instead of beginning with a name, I focus my 
attention on capturing some aspect of existence to represent (or re-present) my business. If I want 
to name a bookstore, I want to somehow capture the reality of reading good books, the thrill of 
discovering another’s ideas, the smell of the pages and the feel of the covers, quiet mornings and 
the taste of coffee. I want to somehow translate this real experience of reading good books into a 
name, a sensuous “word-thing” that I can then share with others (Percy, Symbol & Existence 
227). I begin with reality instead of thought, with things instead of words (Gilson, Methodical 
Realism 84-92, 94-95). In the act of predication, the word and thing interpenetrate (Ong, The 
Presence of the Word 151-159; Percy, Symbol & Existence 162-163). Importantly and above all, 
I begin the naming process by looking first to the world beyond my head (Crawford). True art, 
art that tells the truth, discovers the forms in things, not the forms of thought (Maritain, Art & 
Scholasticism 58-59, 65, 97n4-98n4, 128, 171-173; Percy, Signposts 140). As another example, 
consider the monumental task of naming a child (cf. Percy, Lost 237, 249). More recently, 
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historically speaking, many parents begin this naming process by starting with the name, 
especially the novel name, to see what sticks. Like the idealist, these parents attempt to go from 
thought to things (Gilson, Methodical Realism 84-92, 94-95). Parents place emphasis on picking 
a name that will allow their son or daughter to be a true individual, completely unlike the others. 
Contrast this approach to naming with an older approach that would look to tradition for 
examples of virtuous ancestors (e.g., saints). Certain proper names undoubtedly appear stronger 
than others, but only because those who bore these names in the past really and truly embodied 
desirable characteristics. These latter parents begin with reality, real people, and then search for a 
name to represent that reality.  
As realists, good rhetoricians and poets begin with existence and use analogical 
metaphors to convey meaning. Percy reveals why logicians and surrealists alike make for bad 
rhetoricians and poets. Logicians stress univocity, whereas surrealists emphasize equivocity. In 
his essay “Metaphor as Mistake,” Percy discusses what makes for a good metaphor. Percy tells a 
story about a time when he went hunting as a boy with his father and an African American guide. 
Percy writes, “At the edge of some woods we saw a wonderful bird. He flew as straight and swift 
as an arrow, then all of a sudden folded his wings and dropped like a stone into the woods” 
(Percy, Symbol & Existence 109). Percy asked the guide what the bird was. The guide replied 
that the bird was a “Blue Dollar Hawk” (Percy, Symbol & Existence 109). Later, Percy’s father 
offered a correction and stated that the bird was actually a “Blue Darter Hawk” (Percy, Symbol & 
Existence 109). Percy writes, “I can still remember my disappointment at the correction” (Percy, 
Symbol & Existence 109). The correction disappointed the young Percy because “Blue Darter” 
was too univocally alike that which it modified (Percy, Symbol & Existence 212). In like manner, 
bad poets call clouds “fleecy” or “white.” Percy writes, “You have told me nothing. Fleecy 
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cloud, leg of a table, are tautologies, a regurgitation of something long since digested” (Percy, 
Symbol & Existence 221). Having identified that univocal metaphors do not reveal anything new, 
some go to the opposite extreme and stress equivocity. Percy equates the equivocal with the 
obscure and ambiguous (Percy, Symbol & Existence 216-217). The surrealists often attempted to 
yield meaning through bizarre associations (Percy, Symbol & Existence 217). A surrealist poet 
might associate a rifle with a stick of gum or a Billy goat with earwax. None of these 
associations readily make sense. The symbol and thing represented are too equivocal, too unlike, 
and too ambiguous (Percy, Symbol & Existence 87). The paintings of Salvador Dalí exemplify 
the wholly strange tactics that the surrealists employed. Why is this clock melting? Why does 
this elephant have such long legs? The surrealist might get away with their exercise in equivocity 
for a period of time; after a while, however, Percy writes, “[T]he jig is up” (Percy, Symbol & 
Existence 217). The surrealist poet relies upon the “stored up energies of words” to achieve their 
effects (Percy, Symbol & Existence 217). Yet, if the poet does not know what he or she means, or 
if the audience does not think that the poet knows what he or she means, then intersubjective 
communion cannot succeed (Percy, Symbol & Existence 217).  
Thus, good metaphors involve “unlike-but-analogous” symbols (Percy, Symbol & 
Existence 84, 120). Analogical metaphors reveal something about existence. But why? Because 
analogies inhere in the things themselves. As Langer herself suggested, true propositions express 
real relations (Langer, Philosophy 68). Consider for a moment the example of classical music. 
Romantic theories of inspiration notwithstanding, Bach did not invent or create music ex nihilo 
but rather discovered scales and melodies in reality. Real proportions hold between notes on a 
scale. The third and the fifth note do in fact relate to the root note in a pleasing, harmonious way. 
On this point, Percy cites Allen Tate who wrote, “Nature offers the symbolic poet clearly 
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denotable objects in depth and in the round, which yield the analogies to higher syntheses” (Tate, 
“The Symbolic Imagination” 262; Tate as qtd. in Percy, Symbol & Existence 206). The mind 
delights in analogies because, through analogy, humans discover new facets of existence (Percy, 
Symbol & Existence 85, 222). In the opening passage of his Metaphysics, Aristotle writes, “All 
men by nature desire to know” (Aristotle, Metaphysica 980a). Analogies consummate this desire 
to know, which amounts to nothing less than a desire for contact with reality itself (Weil 250-
251).  
 In addition to rhetoric, the preceding discussion on analogy opens up new ways to 
appreciate the implications of Percy’s work for philosophy of communication and media 
ecology. Recalling the influence of Langer on Percy, especially in terms of analogy, allows us to 
revisit Anton’s contention that Percy did not adequately account for alphabetic literacy in his 
philosophy of denotation (Anton, “On the Nonlinearity of Human Communication” 84). In 
Anton’s defense, Percy does not offer an extended meditation on the alphabet in Symbolic & 
Existence. Furthermore, Anton did not likely have access to Percy’s Symbol & Existence when 
writing “On the Nonlinearity of Human Communication.” Nevertheless, Percy’s insights into the 
nature of analogy and symbolic transformation in Symbol & Existence apply across different 
media. Media ecologists, especially Havelock and Ong, have marveled at the extraordinary 
influence of the alphabet, the great translator from sound into sight, to shape perception and 
culture (Havelock, The Muse Learns to Write; Ong, Orality and Literacy). Percy’s insights into 
the analogical nature of the symbol, however, reveal the inverse process experienced by all 
children learning to speak: the translation of sight (and the other senses) into sound. Near the end 
of Symbol & Existence, Percy describes the magic transformation of a word into a thing. If words 
in their usual usage intend objects in existence, then the poetic usage of words invites the 
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audience to marvel at the symbolic transformation itself, the transformation of a word into a 
thing (Percy, Symbol & Existence 225-227). Percy writes,  
What I see when the poet salvages the word from its utility context and holds it up for my 
gaze is the thing in the word in another mode of existence, in alio esse. I look at instead 
of through the miraculous transformation by which the poor naked vocable ‘becomes’ the 
thing, is intentionally transformed into the thing. What I perceive in all its intricate and 
iridescent reality is the thing itself as it has formed itself within the web of sound. (Percy, 
Symbol & Existence 227) 
The pleasure of the poet in his or her poetry reflects the primordial wonder evoked in children 
and primitives alike at the prospect of the thing itself packaged in a “web of sound.” At this 
point, Percy’s interest in the transformation of experience into one sense modality or another, a 
characteristic of technology, becomes clear. A good piece of communication technology is a 
good metaphor: It translates experience into one or more sense modalities (McLuhan, 
Understanding Media 88-89). In this case, the spoken word offers itself as an “unlike-but-
analogous” symbol for re-presenting experience, including visual experience. The written word, 
in a similar manner, invites the re-presentation of oral-aural experience. Both spoken and written 
words undergo symbolic transformation, a subtle but important event analyzed by Percy.  
With regard to media ecology, Percy’s work intersects with the work of Marshall 
McLuhan, an English scholar interested in media and the classical trivium. Instead of spelling 
out the many parallels between these two thinkers, including their common intellectual ground in 
Aquinas and I.A. Richards, I only want to briefly highlight their mutual interest in analogy. Like 
other media ecologists, McLuhan warned about the widespread effects of alphabetic literacy on 
consciousness. For McLuhan, thinkers over the centuries had confused syllogistic reasoning 
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“with rationality itself” (McLuhan and Parker 239). The alphabet imposes an implicit “grammar” 
on an entire culture that begins to confuse truth, knowledge, and rationality with the 
characteristics of the alphabetic medium itself. In other words, at least in the Western world, the 
visual and linear form of the alphabet shaped cultures in its image (McLuhan, Understanding 
117-124). Over time, truth became almost exclusively associated with the visual sense (Ong, The 
Presence 73-74). Dialectic, too, with its emphasis on syllogistic reasoning, came to crowd out 
the other arts of rhetoric and grammar in the classical trivium (McLuhan and McLuhan 229-
233). The syllogism, with its connecting middle term, followed from the visual stress unleashed 
by alphabetic literacy (McLuhan and McLuhan 19-20). But why did the alphabet cause such a 
massive shift in our understanding of rationality itself? Simply put, the alphabet repeatedly 
transformed sound (and all other senses, for that matter) into sight on an extraordinary scale. The 
other senses began to play second fiddle to sight after the advent of the alphabet.  
Part of McLuhan’s project is to restore the “non-discursive” (i.e., non-syllogistic) forms 
of reasoning to their proper place, especially analogy, which his and Eric McLuhan’s famous 
“tetrad” is based on (McLuhan and McLuhan 224; McLuhan and Powers 3-4). Gilson, whom 
McLuhan and McLuhan cite in their Laws of Media, explains how the syllogism is a process of 
exposition rather than discovery (Gilson, The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure 229; McLuhan and 
McLuhan 218). According to Gilson, Aristotle’s syllogism is powerless to explore the Book of 
Nature (Gilson, The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure 230). Gilson argues, “The only method which 
can be at all fruitful in such a case is reasoning by analogy and especially the reasoning of 
proportion” (Gilson, The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure 230). Following Vico, McLuhan’s 
rhetorical and grammatical metaphysics stresses discovery over exposition and thereby differs 
from other dialectical, rationalistic approaches to metaphysics (McLuhan “Introduction,” xvii-
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xviii; Vico sec. 374-375). How does this relate to Percy? In the least, Percy was no dialectician, 
but he was a metaphysician. As noted above, the dialectician does not discover anything new 
because he or she deals in univocal predications. Percy likewise stresses that the symbol offers a 
non-discursive form of reasoning that nonetheless may convey real knowledge (Percy, “Symbol 
as Need” 384). Undoubtedly, Percy took a great interest in language, a linguistic, discursive 
form. But Percy also wrote novels that did not follow rigorous plot outlines but rather put 
characters in open-ended situations (Percy as qtd. in Holditch 17-19). Percy’s interest in analogy, 
non-discursive symbols that discover existence, and formal cause rank him among the great 
“grammarians” of the twentieth century. While McLuhan stated, “The medium is the message,” 
Percy might have suggested, “The symbol is the message”; the symbol is, in Langer’s terms, the 
“new key” (Langer, Philosophy Ch. 1). The resonances between Percy’s “symbol” and 
McLuhan’s “medium” deserve far more attention than I can devote here, but it is perhaps enough 
to suggest that both Percy and McLuhan took a keen interest in discovering existence on its own 
terms rather than imposing their own symbols upon it.  
Indeed, there is no need to impose symbols upon existence. A reading of Alain de Lille’s 
poetic verse, which attests to the importance of analogy in the cognitive process and in creation, 
helps to explain why:    
Omnis mundi creatura   All of the world a creature 
quasi liber & pictura   like a book and a picture 
nobis est & speculum;   and a mirror, it is for us; 
nostrae vitae, nostrae mortis, our life, our death 
nostri status, nostrae sortis  for us having been set, our lot 
fidele signaculum.   a trustworthy sign.  
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(Lille as qtd. in E. McLuhan, “Francis Bacon’s Theory of Communication and Media” 
22; translation mine) 
To scholars of old and those of a medieval mindset not tempted by modern angelism, the world 
itself stands as a fidele signaculum, a trustworthy sign filled with patterns and forms open to the 
discerning mind. Recognition of such patterns tempers the impulse for humanity to make and re-
make itself in its own image. Humans do not know existence directly but “mediately, through the 
very thing the world is made of” (Percy, Symbol & Existence 236-237). Humans know through 
sensuous media: “the sensuous symbol, the sound, the gesture, the icon” (Percy, Symbol & 
Existence 236). Humans know existence through existence. C1 consciousness peers outward, 
bearing witness to and concelebrating the splendor of being with other selves, not having yet 
been lured by the seductions of the autonomous self. 
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Chapter 3: C2 Consciousness, The “Pit” of the Self 
Have you ever listened to yourself on a video or audio recording and wondered why your 
recorded voice sounded so strange (Percy, Lost in the Cosmos 7)? Perhaps, you might even go so 
far as to suggest that the sound of your voice made you cringe. My recorded voice does, at least. 
But does your recorded voice sound like you? If not, why not? A standard scientific answer 
might suggest that your recorded voice sounds different because you usually hear your voice 
from both the inside and the outside rather than simply from the outside, as in a recording 
(Hullar). Physics and physiology seem to explain the matter in a relatively satisfactory way, no? 
It makes perfect sense that the vibrations from the inside—the rattling of the vocal cords, the 
trembling of the skull, the movements of the delicate mechanisms within the ear, etc.—change 
the perception of the sound. However, how do you account for the relative dissatisfaction that 
you experience when you hear your recorded voice? Is it simply because your recorded voice 
does not conform with your expectations of how you should sound (Jaekl)? Anyway, for that 
matter, how should you sound? Why does it make a difference whether you speak in a high-
pitched voice or low-pitched voice? There must be some evolutionary explanation here (e.g., 
lower-pitched voices attract mates, threaten rivals, warn predators, etc.) to account for this, no? 
As it turns out, I suspect that my voice has something to do with my identity, who I think that I 
am, and how I conceive myself. And as I hope to show in this chapter, science can only take us 
so far in investigating this question of the self (not to mention the other and God). In this case, 
then, I need help not from a scientist, per se, but from someone interested in semiotics and 
existentialism: Walker Percy. 
In the previous chapter, I discussed how C1 consciousness may symbolize everything 
except for the “self.” Symbols function as vehicles for the conception of objects and yield 
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knowledge of the real world. In this chapter, however, I seek to explore the dark side of symbol 
use. In C2 consciousness, symbols fail to mediate knowledge of existence. Passive, a priori 
symbolic constructions of the world dominate C2 consciousness (Percy, Symbol & Existence 
131). For C2 consciousness, the novelty and joy of naming have worn off. Furthermore, C2 
consciousness faces the predicament of having to find an adequate symbol to construe the “self,” 
an impossible task. Thus, I first review some of the primary characteristics of C2 consciousness. 
Second, I discuss how certain ideas of Jean-Paul Sartre and Gabriel Marcel informed Percy’s 
understanding of C2 consciousness. Third, I dedicate a section to Heidegger’s influence on 
Percy’s thinking. Reviewing the thought of these existentialists will lead to a better appreciation 
of Percy’s resistance to scientism. The so-called objective, scientific worldview tends to conceal 
existence, especially one’s own subjective existence (Percy, Symbol & Existence 7). Certain 
existentialists, on the other hand, sought to give existence and subjectivity their proper due 
(Percy, Symbol & Existence 6-8). As the chapter comes to a close, I stress how C2 consciousness 
escapes its predicament through intersubjective communion with the other. Finally, like the 
previous chapter, I conclude with implications for rhetoric, philosophy of communication, and 
media ecology.  
 
C2 Consciousness and the “Pit” of the Self  
 In this section, I begin by outlining some of the essential characteristics of C2 
consciousness. Above all, C2 consciousness is self-consciousness. Just as C1 consciousness 
looks outward, having things other than itself as intentional objects, C2 consciousness peers 
inward in an attempt to construe itself “as” one thing or another. Remarkably, unlike everything 
else in the cosmos, C2 consciousness cannot formulate itself through the mediation of the 
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symbol. The unformulability (and unknowability) of the self to itself is its primary predicament. 
In ages past, C2 consciousness may have had recourse to narratives beyond the self to explain 
the self’s place within the world. However, postmodernity affords no such security to C2 
consciousness, which tries to escape its predicament through other means. In a postreligious, 
technological society, the self might identify itself with occupational positions, the myths of 
technics and state, or even consumer goods (Percy, Lost 20-26; Percy, Symbol & Existence 126). 
Despair follows from not recognizing the predicament of the self and from the ultimate futility of 
these alternative means for informing the self. Those fortunate enough to realize their 
predicament and to seek help beyond themselves, on the other hand, enter C3 consciousness, 
which I will describe in the next chapter.  
 To begin, C2 consciousness has several characteristics that set it apart from C1 
consciousness, including the inability to appreciate existence through the mediation of the 
symbol. If the joyful concelebration of existence with others characterizes C1 consciousness, 
then boredom, anxiety, shame, and alienation belong to C2 consciousness, a falling into the “pit” 
of the self (Percy, Lost 34-35, 70-72, 78, 108, 209-213). In Biblical terms, C2 consciousness 
corresponds with the Fall and expulsion from the “semiotic” Garden of Eden (Percy, Lost 106). 
If a four-year-old child exemplifies C1 consciousness, then a seven-year-old child exemplifies 
C2 consciousness. Why? Because seven-year-old children experience shame and radical self-
consciousness in a manner completely foreign to four-year-old children (Ames et al. 38-39; 
Gesell and Ilg 320-321; Percy, Lost 107n-108n). Boredom ensues when everything already has a 
name (Percy, Symbol & Existence 100). That is just a “dissertation,” a “university,” a “bed,” a 
“desk,” a “Doctor,” etc. “Habitualization” strips away the magnificent particularity of existence 
and impedes thought (Percy, Symbol & Existence 105; Shklovsky 12). C2 consciousness 
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experiences a “thingification of all reality,” the “reification” of existence into “simulacra,” mere 
instances of things already known (Percy, Symbol & Existence 104-105). Percy writes, “The very 
means by which we know are the same means by which we fall prey to ignorance” (Percy, 
Symbol & Existence 105). Humans know through the mediation of symbols, but these same 
symbols can also obscure existence and prevent new insights from coming to light. As discussed 
in Chapter 1, sensible words become things in alio esse and mediate knowledge of existence; 
however, when the novelty of naming fades, paradoxically, things appear as mere instances of 
their respective symbols (Percy, Lost 104-105). Through “usage” and “familiarity,” a symbol 
may become a “semantic husk serving rather to conceal than to disclose what it designates” 
(Percy, The Message in the Bottle 206). In semiotic terms, the signifier comes to carry more 
ontological weight and appears more real than the signified (Percy, Lost 105). Since everything 
already has a name, anxiety follows when something truly strange appears that resists being 
construed “as” an instance of this thing or that thing previously known (Percy, Symbol & 
Existence 101). For Percy, the only alien in the cosmos is the self who uses symbols, the true 
stranger and anxiety-inducing existent that resists symbolic formulation (Percy, Lost 164, 253). 
Percy writes, “The self perceives itself as naked. Every self is ashamed of itself” (Percy, Lost 
108). Why? Because the self seeks relief in the shade of various symbols. The self, uncertain of 
how to place itself in the world, longs for a permanent “semiotic habiliment for itself” (Percy, 
Lost 108). But symbols offer no such enduring respite.  
 Thus, Percy does not think that it is possible to know one’s “self” through the mediation 
of the symbol (Percy, Lost 211n, 248). Percy’s stance on the unknowability of the self follows 
from his philosophy of communication and his religious sensibilities. Percy writes, 
“Semiotically, the self is literally unspeakable to itself. One cannot speak or hear a word which 
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signifies oneself, as one can speak or hear a word signifying anything else, e.g., apple, Canada, 
7-Up” (Percy, Lost 106-107). The unknowability of the self follows from its unspeakability. The 
self cannot render itself presentable, formulable, or “darstellbar” through the mediation of the 
symbol (Percy, The Message 283, 286; Percy, Symbol & Existence 75).1 Percy writes, “[T]he self 
is literally inconceivable—unlike a tree or a star or you, it cannot be conceived under the 
auspices of a symbol—and is referentially mobile” (Percy, Lost 211n-212n). By “referentially 
mobile,” Percy means that the self sucks in any possible symbolic materials in order to 
understand itself “as” something, in one way or another (Percy, Symbol & Existence 106-109). 
Paradoxically, the self resists conceivability not because no symbol applies but because all 
symbols may apply. Percy writes, “[O]ne’s self exists for oneself on a semantic ∝ to — ∝ axis, 
the best and the worst, the blessed and the damned, and is capable of temporary fixation on any 
position on this axis” (Percy, Lost 212). When it comes to the self, the signified always remains 
as a leftover in the symbolic process. Percy writes, “For me, all signifiers fit me, one as well as 
another. I am rascal, hero, craven, brave, treacherous, loyal, at once the secret hero and asshole 
of the Cosmos” (Percy, Lost 107). Everything from personality tests to self-help books attest to 
the self’s attempt to place itself in the world “as” something: as a go-getter, as timid, as self-
confident, as an INFJ-T personality type, etc. (“Introduction | Advocate (INFJ) Personality | 
16Personalities”). In previous centuries, the self might identify “as” an animal (in a totemistic 
sense), “as” Nature (in a pantheistic sense), or even “as” under God (in a Judeo-Christian sense) 
(Percy, Lost 109-112). In the current historical moment, however, conventional wisdom may 
invite you to invent yourself “as” whatever you like, to embark on a causa sui, or self-caused, 
project (Anton, Sources of Significance 19-28; Becker, The Denial of Death). Percy illustrates 
                                                   
1 The Freudian term “darstellbar” appears in Langer’s Feeling and Form, which Percy references in Symbol & 
Existence (Langer, Feeling and Form 241; Percy, Symbol & Existence 75).  
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how the self may identify with many different, even contradictory, symbols in Lost in the 
Cosmos. For example, Percy begins Lost in the Cosmos with a satirical critique of astrology. 
Percy invites you, the reader, to imagine reading a horoscope for your particular astrological sign 
(e.g., Cancer, Gemini, Taurus, etc.). As you read, imagine that you identify with what the 
horoscope has to say about you. “Hm, you say, quite true. I’m like that” (Percy, Lost 6). 
However, later you realize that you had read the wrong horoscope, one for a different 
astrological sign. You go on to read the horoscope for your actual astrological sign, but this 
horoscope, too, seems to describe you (Percy, Lost 5-6). Why, Percy asks, do people consider 
both the first and the second horoscope as accurately describing themselves (Percy, Lost 6)? The 
reason lies in the referential mobility of the self and its capacity to function like a “vacuole,” an 
“amoeba,” or a “nought,” which desperately tries to place itself in the world “as” something and 
inform the “pit” of its own nothingness (Percy, Lost 20-26, 210). Ultimately, to know yourself 
through symbolic mediation like everything else in the cosmos would mean knowing what you 
are. Thus, C2 consciousness faces the predicament of finding an adequate symbol for itself in a 
world already populated with symbols.  
 The term “predicament” frequently turns up across Percy’s writings. Percy writes, “The 
motto of the symbolic (and existential) predicament is: This is a chair for you and me, that is a 
tree, everything is something, you are what you are, but what am I?” (Percy, The Message 284). 
Every individual self must answer this question: “[B]ut what am I?” The sciences may attempt to 
get a grasp on the nature of the human self and answer this question. Indeed, the sciences may 
catalogue a list of needs that each and every self must have satisfied, such as food, water, sex, 
companionship, interpersonal relationships, self-actualization, etc. Recall here Maslow and his 
hierarchy of needs (Arnett and Arneson Ch. 6). But the predicament of a human being in a world 
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is not the same as the predicament of an animal in an environment. Even after having satisfied all 
the various needs delineated by modern science, the self may still experience “dislocation” 
(Percy Lost 80-82, 122; Percy, The Message 111). The sciences cannot speak to an individual’s 
predicament because the sciences understand particulars in terms of general theories or laws 
(Percy, The Message 22; Percy, Symbol & Existence 7). Those who abstract themselves from 
their concrete circumstances in the name of “objectivity” (e.g., “the scientist”) fail to recognize 
their predicament, perhaps the direst situation of all (Percy, The Message 111, 130). Thus, C2 
consciousness finds itself in a predicament, not knowing who or what it is, which it may or may 
not recognize (Percy, Lost 215). Related to this point, a passage from Kierkegaard’s The Sickness 
Unto Death, which appears as the opening epigraph to Percy’s The Moviegoer, reads: “… [T]he 
specific character of despair is precisely this: it is unaware of being despair.”2 Percy writes, “The 
worst of all despairs is to imagine one is at home when one is really homeless” (Percy, The 
Message 144). A castaway should recognize his or her “grave predicament” and “not pretend to 
be at home on the island” (Percy, The Message 144). Following Kierkegaard, Percy suggests that 
only those who recognize their despair can hope (Percy, The Message 115). On the other hand, 
content consumers who amuse and distract themselves with endless rounds of entertainment 
cannot hope (Percy, The Message 115; Postman, Amusing Ourselves to Death). Without 
knowing their predicament, or their inability to understand their place in the cosmos, C2 
consciousnesses cannot seek a remedy (Percy, Lost 215). Percy defines a “consumer” as 
precisely that sort of passive entity in a highly technological society who consumes experiences 
without pausing to question his or her very existence (Percy, The Message 61, 115). A traveler 
                                                   
2 The 1946 edition of Walter Lowrie’s translation of The Sickness Unto Death appears in Percy’s library at UNC 
Chapel Hill. In the 1941 edition, this passage reads: “[T]he specific character of despair is precisely this: it is 
unconscious of being despair” (Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death 71).   
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unaware that she has lost her bearings will not strive to put herself back on course. The modern 
self, or C2 consciousness, does not know that he or she is truly lost in the cosmos (Percy, Lost). 
If C2 consciousnesses knew their predicament, they might await “news from across the seas,” a 
message in a bottle, a sign of deliverance (Percy, The Message 139-149; see also Percy, The 
Message 119-149). In order to return home, C2 consciousnesses must begin to read the signs and 
symbols along the way without falling prey to idolatry—the worship and adoration of something 
on the merely immanent plane (Percy, Symbol & Existence 118). 
 Despite the inability to know itself through the mediation of the symbol, C2 
consciousness nevertheless strives to do so. Indeed, C2 consciousness may adopt a consumptive 
orientation toward the symbols of technics and state. In Symbol & Existence, Percy explains how 
an individual in a technical society can thoroughly identify with his profession (Percy, Symbol & 
Existence 127-129). For example, someone who has become a medical doctor has undergone a 
type of transformation and “has participated in another identity” (Percy, Symbol & Existence 
128). After graduating from medical school, a “roentgenologist,” or a specialist in radiology, 
may seem to possess magical powers, such as the ability to cure a patient by making “a scientific 
pass with his paraphernalia and his ray” (Percy, The Message 206). The self may attempt to find 
a “permanent semiotic habiliment for itself—often by identifying itself with other creatures in its 
world” (Percy, Lost 108). In primitive tribes, this attempt may have taken the form of totemism, 
the identification of the self with something in the surrounding milieu, such as an animal, 
whereas in the contemporary world it appears as role-modeling, the identification of the self with 
an exemplary individual or professional (Percy, Lost 109).3 Complete participation in a technical 
                                                   
3 Compare the primitive who says “I am a parakeet” with the modern autonomous self who says “I am a doctor.” 
Both the primitive’s utterance and the autonomous self’s utterance rely upon a coupling of the self with some other 
immanent entity within the cosmos (parakeet, doctor, etc.) (Percy, Lost 110-111; Percy, Symbol & Existence 128). 
The symbol makes such an ontological coupling possible.    
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identity may blind the self from knowing the true nature of its predicament and the ultimate 
incapacity of that technical identity to fulfill its deepest desires (e.g., an answer to the question of 
its existence, etc.). Beyond identification with technical identities, the autonomous self, not 
believing in anything beyond its “self,” can fall prey to and identify with the myths of the state 
(Percy, Lost 157, 189-191; Percy, Symbol & Existence 126-217). Totalitarian states in the 
twentieth century provided all-encompassing worldviews that clearly delineated the place of the 
self in society. Whatever he or she may have had, the Nazi did not have an identity crisis. The 
heinous Nazi narrative provided a symbolic reservoir that individuals could draw upon to 
alleviate the anxiety of their predicament, much to the detriment of others. 
 Beyond the myths of technics and state, C2 consciousness may attempt to remedy its 
semiotic predicament by consuming goods, too. The desire to have a particular consumer good 
may easily become idolatrous: “If I can have that car, my life will be different, for my 
nothingness will be informed by the having of it” (Percy, The Message 284). Percy writes, “The 
proper conjuration of technical man is not Tiger! Tiger! But Jaguar! Jaguar!” (Percy,  Symbol & 
Existence 126). For Percy, the totemism of primitive tribes has much in common with 
consumption in a technical society. The modern, immanent consumer may identify with his new 
car like a primitive may have identified with a particular animal in the world. Both the primitive 
and the modern consumer operate on an “immanent” plane (Percy, Symbol & Existence 124, 129, 
133). As Percy has noted, Levy-Brühl explained how the primitives that he studied did not have 
an awareness of the supernatural or the transcendent (Percy, Symbol & Existence 122). In like 
manner, the modern consumer lives in the immanent realm of sheer human “fulfillment” (Taylor, 
A Secular Age 18-20, 142-145, 623). Ironically, the attempt to inform one’s own nothingness 
through the consumption of goods only ends up emptying those same goods of their significance 
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(Percy, The Message 284). Percy explains, “[W]hat paradoxically characterizes the zone of 
having is the progressive annihilation of forms, an emptying out and a rendering nought by the 
very act of having” (Percy, The Message 284). In Lost in the Cosmos, Percy reviews the 
“emptying out” of various consumer goods and experiences, including antiques, fashionable 
clothing, and travel (Percy, Lost 20-26, 183). Yet, like participation in a technical identity or the 
myths of the state, such immanent consumption also fails to inform the self (Percy, The Message 
284).  
 Before transitioning into the next section, I would like to give two caveats that apply to 
Percy’s hypothesis on the unknowability and unspeakability of the self. First, as mentioned in the 
previous chapter, “reverse signs” can reveal something about one’s inner life, a particular aspect 
of the self. For example, someone looking to advance in the spiritual life must know her 
dominant faults and weaknesses. Individuals have particular habits and dispositions built up over 
time that make them more or less likely to act virtuously (Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics 
1103a-1103b). However, even knowing one’s habits and dispositions calls for the presence of 
another. Others can recognize particular blind spots in your character that you may fail to notice. 
Second, Percy does believe that symbols can reveal something about another. Percy writes, “You 
are Ralph to me and I am Walker to you, but you are not Ralph to you and I am not Walker to 
me” (Percy, Lost 107). Symbols allow us to size each other up and to know at least some aspects 
about each other, to know each other “as” friendly, offensive, kind, generous, mean, nice, 
dogmatic, open-minded, etc. (Percy, Lost 7-8). Martin Buber, whom Percy cites, might describe 
this sort of sizing up as a degeneration from an “I-Thou” relation to an “I-It” relation (Buber, I 
and Thou; Percy, Symbol & Existence 164). Percy, of course, recognized the dangers of relating 
to others in this manner. A doctor may see her patient merely “as” an instance of a certain 
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disease; a “reification” occurs wherein the patient disappears, and the disease comes to the 
forefront of the doctor’s attention (Percy, Symbol & Existence 103-104).4 In other words, the 
theory of the disease comes to take on a higher degree of reality than the existent person standing 
before the doctor. The great physician, according to Percy, can focus on both the disease and the 
patient in his or her unique particularity (Percy, Symbol & Existence 104).5 Percy writes, “What 
is almost impossible of human achievement is to see something strange as what it is in itself” 
(Percy, Symbol & Existence 100). In lieu of allowing something truly novel to appear, the 
symbol will work to construe the other “as” one thing or another. To do otherwise would result 
in an intolerable anxiety, an inability to place the other in the world (Percy, Symbol & Existence 
101, 195-196). Thus, while recognizing the capacity of the symbol to yield knowledge, Percy’s 
philosophy of communication remains attuned to the mystery of the other. The other’s gaze, 
especially, escapes symbolization and stands over against the self: “It [the other’s gaze] is not 
formulable. In the exchange of stares, everything is at stake” (Percy, The Message 285). The 
other’s gaze may reveal to the self its own unformulability as well as the self’s dependence on 
the other for a world (Percy, Lost 101; Percy, The Message 285-286).  
 Thus, in this section I have reviewed some basic characteristics of C2 consciousness. I 
began by describing how C2 consciousness ceases to encounter existence and instead encounters 
symbols and representations (Percy, “Loss of the Creature”). Boredom follows from everything 
already having a name. No longer content to name things in the world, C2 consciousness turns 
                                                   
4 Alfred North Whitehead’s “fallacy of misplaced concreteness” relates to the problem of reification (Whitehead 51-
59). Whitehead’s “fallacy of misplaced concreteness” refers to “mistaking the abstract for the concrete” (Whitehead 
51). Percy writes, “It [the ‘fallacy of misplaced concreteness’] is the mistaking of an idea, a principle, an abstraction, 
for the real. As a consequence of the shift, the ‘specimen’ is seen as less real than the theory of the specimen” 
(Percy, The Message 58).  
5 It goes without saying that not only the doctor but also the patient runs the risk of giving the disease more reality 
than it deserves, identifying with their disease and letting it obscure their very own existence (Elliott, “A New Way 
to Be Mad”; Percy, The Message 185). 
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attention toward formulating the self through symbolic means. In Percy’s and our historical 
moment, these symbolic means include the myths of technics and state as well as consumption. 
In the next section, I will uncover some influences behind Percy’s understanding of the self as 
“nought” as well as the formulation of “simulacra”: Jean-Paul Sartre and Gabriel Marcel. If the 
previous chapter revealed the merits of science by arguing for a realist epistemology, then this 
chapter, and especially the next two sections, seeks to give the existentialists their due for 
recognizing the importance of subjective existence. Among other things, the existentialists 
described the predicament faced by the self with no name for itself. In order to support his 
position about the unspeakability of the self, Percy used the phenomenological descriptions of 
Sartre and Marcel, which I now turn to consider. 
 
Sartre and Marcel: From Self as “Nought” to Homo Viator 
 In this section, I outline some existentialist influences behind Percy’s understanding of 
C2 consciousness. In particular, I describe how the symbol can lead to a reification or 
hypostatization of the “self.” In C1 consciousness, symbols mediate existence. In C2 
consciousness, however, symbols conceal existence, especially the existence of the self. Thus, I 
will first review the influence of Jean-Paul Sartre on Percy. Despite their different religious 
presuppositions, both Sartre and Percy could agree upon the danger of psychological 
determinism, which strips away free will from the individual. Further, although Percy rejects 
Sartre’s ontology of “being-in-itself” and “being-for-itself,” which I unpack below, Percy still 
drew upon Sartre’s notion of the self “as” a “nothing” (Sartre, Being and Nothingness 79). Percy 
also appreciates Sartre’s account of “bad faith,” or the reification of the self that occurs when the 
self attempts to grasp itself through symbolic means. When acting in “bad faith,” the self 
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understands itself “as” any other thing in the world (e.g., as a waiter, as a soldier, etc.) (Percy, 
Lost 106; Sartre, Being 59). In reality, however, such reifications obscure the existence of the 
self and its freedom. In the final analysis, Percy accuses Sartre himself of “bad faith” because 
Sartre ironically reifies the self into a “nothing.” Moving beyond Sartre, I review Marcel’s 
influence on Percy, especially Marcel’s notions of the “simulacrum” and homo viator. 
Ultimately, symbolic simulacra can cover over not only the mystery of the self but also the 
mystery of the other and God (cf. Marcel, The Mystery of Being: I. Reflection & Mystery 54). 
Marcel describes homo viator, or man the traveler, as a creature oriented toward transcendence 
and contact with the Divine. This section traces out similarities as well as differences between 
Sartre and Marcel. The conversation here concerning the existentialists and the question of the 
self continues in the following section on Heidegger.  
 To begin, Percy both disagreed and agreed with certain ideas put forward by Jean-Paul 
Sartre (1905-1980), a French existential phenomenologist and atheist. At first glance, Percy and 
Sartre may seem to have little in common. Percy committed himself to Catholicism, whereas 
Sartre held fast to atheism. In his systematic review of Sartre’s philosophy, Collins suggests that 
Sartre presupposes atheism from the onset of his philosophy (Collins Ch. 2). In other words, 
Collins understands Sartre’s account of “being in-itself” and the absurdity of existence as 
inextricably bound to Sartre’s “postulatory” atheism (Collins 46-47, 60, 87). Moreover, as a 
believing Catholic, Percy would have been obliged to believe in the goodness of creation, while 
Sartre saw “being-in-itself” as fundamentally chaotic, absurd, and irrational (Sartre, Introduction 
to Being and Nothingness lxvi).6 Nonetheless, despite their different religious presuppositions, 
                                                   
6 In Lost in the Cosmos, Percy hints at the awe-inspiring wonder of the cosmos (Percy, Lost 89). And, in the preface 
to Symbol & Existence, Percy extolls the beauty of practicing real science as opposed to scientism (Percy, Preface to 
Symbol & Existence 1-2).  
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Percy would have found much to agree with in Sartre’s philosophy. In particular, Sartre takes 
issue with psychological determinism, which Sartre dismisses as an “attitude of excuse” (Sartre, 
Being 40). The individual who believes in psychological determinism attempts to flee from the 
“anguish” of freedom (Sartre, Being 28-40).7 A dyadic, entirely immanent science (e.g., 
behaviorism) could explain away human freedom and thereby dispense an individual from taking 
responsibility for his or her actions. Thus, both Sartre and Percy rejected psychological 
determinism. Moreover, like Percy, Sartre aimed to describe the nature of human being. Sartre 
asks, “What must man be in his being in order that through him nothingness may come to 
being?” (Sartre, Being 24). Sartre suggests that man must be “freedom,” which perpetually 
negates “being-in-itself” (Sartre, Being 24-25). An existentialist par excellence, Sartre placed 
existence before essence (Barrett 244; Sartre, Being 25). Instead of conceiving of man in terms 
of an essence, Sartre sought to understand man in terms of the “nothing.”   
 Indeed, Sartre describes the self as a type of “nothing,” or what Percy calls the “nought.”8 
Understanding the self as “nought” requires a brief review of Sartre’s ontological distinction 
between “being-in-itself” and “being-for-itself.” Sartre divided reality into “being-in-itself 
(l’être-en-soi)” and “being-for-itself (l’être-pour-soi)” (Sartre, Intro to Being lxiii). Sartre 
describes “being-in-itself” with the following terms: “thing-like,” “blind,” “opaque,” and “filled 
with itself” (Sartre, Being 73; Sartre, Intro to Being lxv-lxvi). Sartre writes, “Being is. Being is 
                                                   
7 For Sartre, “fear” differs from “anguish” insofar as the latter concerns human freedom (Sartre, Being 29). Sartre 
gives the example of someone walking along a precipice. This person might feel fear at what might happen to him 
(e.g., slipping on a rock), but he also might feel anguish at what he might do (e.g., throwing himself off the edge) 
(Sartre Being 29-30). Sartre writes, “Vertigo is anguish to the extent that I am afraid not of falling over the precipice, 
but of throwing myself over” (Sartre, Being 29). As it pertains to fear, Sartre writes, “…I am given to myself as a 
thing, I am passive in relation to these possibilities; they come to me from without; in so far as I am also an object in 
the world, subject to gravitation, they are my possibilities” (Sartre, Being 30). Fear relates to a dyadic universe, 
whereas anguish pertains to the properly human. 
8 So far as I can tell, the word “nought” does not appear in Sartre’s Being and Nothingness. However, Percy seems 
to use the term “nought” as a synonym for Sartre’s “nothing” in Hazel Barnes’ translation of Being and Nothingness. 
Thus, I use “nought” and “nothing” synonymously here and elsewhere throughout this chapter.  
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in-itself. Being is what it is” (Sartre, Intro to Being lxvi). Nothing exists beyond being as it 
appears (Sartre, Intro to Being xlvi, xlviii, lxi). In Sartre’s novel Nausea, the main character, 
Roquentin, encounters the absurdity of “being-in-itself.” Roquentin describes the surrounding 
milieu and himself as “de trop,” or “superfluous” (Sartre as qtd. and translated by Barnes, see 
Barnes, Translator’s Introduction to Being and Nothingness xvi-xvii; Sartre, La Nausée 180-181; 
cf. Sartre, Intro to Being lxvi).9 Roquentin states, “We were a heap of living creatures, irritated, 
embarrassed at ourselves, we hadn’t the slightest reason to be here, none of us; each one, 
confused, vaguely alarmed, felt de trop [superfluous] in relation to the others” (Sartre as qtd. and 
translated by Barnes, see Barnes, Trans. Introduction to Being xvi-xvii).10 In Being and 
Nothingness, Sartre writes, “Uncreated, without reason for being, without any connection with 
another being, being-in-itself is de trop [superfluous] for eternity” (Sartre, Intro to Being lxvi). 
“Being-for-itself,” on the other hand, refers to human consciousness. For Sartre, human 
consciousness exists by negating “being-in-itself.” Human consciousness, or “being-for-itself,” 
can exist precisely by not being “being-in-itself” (Collins 62). Consciousness thus appears 
amidst “being-in-itself” as a “decompression of being” (Sartre, Being 74). Sartre writes, “Thus 
nothingness is this hole of being, this fall of the in-itself toward the self, the fall by which the 
for-itself is constituted” (Sartre, Being 79). Human consciousness emerges as a “nothing” within 
“being-in-itself” (Sartre, Being 79). As Sartre writes, “Nothingness lies coiled in the heart of 
                                                   
9 Interestingly, Flynn translates the French “de trop” as “excessive” (“Jean-Paul Sartre”).  
10 In her translator’s introduction to Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, Barnes explains how she translated this passage 
from Sartre’s Nausea, which includes the use of the phrase “de trop.” In making her translation, Barnes used Sartre’s 
(1938) La Nausée in addition to another English translation of the novel by Lloyd Alexander. Barnes writes, “I have 
used with some changes the English translation [of Nausea] by Lloyd Alexander: Nausea. London: New Directions. 
1949” (Barnes, Trans. Introduction to Being xvi n.7). In the 1964 New Directions Paperback edition of Sartre’s 
Nausea translated by Lloyd Alexander, this passage reads, “We were a heap of living creatures, irritated, 
embarrassed at ourselves, we hadn’t the slightest reason to be there, none of us, each one, confused, vaguely 
alarmed, felt in the way in relation to the others” (Sartre, Nausea [trans. Lloyd Alexander] 128). Note that the phrase 
“de trop” does not appear here. Nevertheless, Sartre himself uses the phrase “de trop” in La Nausée, which Barnes 
simply leaves untranslated in her translation (Sartre, La Nausée 180-181).  
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being—like a worm” (Sartre, Being 21). Collins, who Percy used as an entrance into the work of 
the existentialists, does a fine job unpacking the oftentimes difficult terminology that Sartre 
employs. Collins explains,  
It is only by not being the being of the In-itself that consciousness can give rise to the 
world we experience. This process of ‘nothing-ing’ is required because of the nature of 
being in-itself. The latter is a dense, viscous, cohesive mass which enjoys the self-identity 
of opaque and sunless matter. (Collins 62)  
Here, Collins use of the term “nothing-ing” captures the ongoing process whereby 
consciousness, or “being-for-itself,” emerges within the darkness of “being-in-itself.” Sartre 
considers “being-for-itself” as the “nihilation” of “being-in-itself” (Sartre, Being 96, 617-618). 
Like “nothing-ing,” the term “nihilation” implies the perpetual negating of “being-in-itself” by 
“being-for-itself.” Of course, human experience involves both “being-in-itself” and “being-for-
itself,” being and nothingness; though the body exists as the seat of consciousness, it 
nevertheless may be treated like an object or thing (Barnes, Trans. Introduction to Being xviii; 
Sartre, Being 262, 288, 302). Despite rejecting Sartre’s ontology, Percy still appreciated Sartre’s 
phenomenological description of the “deterioration” that occurs when C1 consciousness falls 
into C2 consciousness (Percy, Symbol & Existence 111). Percy writes, “Sartre’s dichotomy of 
being, the being-for-itself, the Nought, the passion inutile, and the Being-in-itself, the sodden 
passivity of things, is thus not really an ontology but a masterly analysis of a term of 
deterioration” (Percy, Symbol & Existence 111). In other words, for Percy, Sartre’s 
phenomenological description of “being-for-itself” amidst “being-in-itself” adequately captures 
what happens when the symbol fails to mediate existence. Elsewhere, Percy states, “I exist as a 
nought in the center of the picture-book world of the en soi” (Percy, Symbol & Existence 194). 
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The self encounters a “picture-book world” because everything has already been named by 
“them” (Percy, Lost 119). Provided that the self exists as a “nought,” trouble ensues when the 
self tries to conceive itself “as” something like anything else in the world (or, “as” the “they” 
would have it), which results in “bad faith” (Heidegger, Being and Time 164; Percy, Lost 119-
124; Percy, The Message 54).  
Like Sartre’s notion of the self as a “nothing,” Percy appreciated Sartre’s description of 
“bad faith.” People act in “bad faith” when they attempt to escape their predicament by treating 
themselves like any other thing in the world (Sartre, Being 44, 47-70). Acting in “bad faith” 
means fleeing from “anguish,” or the responsibility that freedom imposes on being human 
(Sartre, Being 44). Those who act in “bad faith” attempt to merge themselves with “being-in-
itself” by becoming “thing-like” (Sartre, Being 60, 64-65, 73). Sartre gives the example of a 
waiter who plays at “being a waiter in a café” (Sartre, Being 59). The waiter carries the tray, 
makes gestures, and attends to patrons in such a way that betrays his role-playing (Sartre, Being 
59). Sartre writes, “We need not watch long before we can explain it: he [the waiter] is playing at 
being a waiter in a café” (Sartre, Being 59). The waiter pretends to be a waiter. The waiter takes 
his place in a world of meaning as a thing among other things, a name among other names. As 
another example, Sartre describes a soldier who stands at attention and “makes himself into a 
solider-thing” (Sartre, Being 59). The expectations of others would seem to necessitate acting in 
“bad faith” (Sartre, Being 59). How strange it would be for a waiter to abandon his role, curse 
out the customers, and begin dancing on a table! Yet, such a possibility always exists. The waiter 
could choose to not come into work the next day (Sartre, Being 60). The soldier could vacate his 
post. Sartre writes, “The goal of bad faith, as we said, is to put oneself out of reach; it is an 
escape” (Sartre, Being 65). In short, “bad faith” means hypostatizing one’s essence and 
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eschewing freedom. People engage in “bad faith” to assuage the anxiety that follows from the 
unspeakability of the self and, as Percy might suggest, when trying to find a permanent semiotic 
habiliment (Percy, Lost 106-109; Percy, Symbol & Existence 101, 195-196). Consider here the 
difference between wanting to be a writer and the oftentimes grueling, humiliating, and painful 
process of writing good prose. The person who seeks the former without doing the work of the 
latter falls prey to “bad faith” and idolatry, a symbolic construction lacking existential ground. 
Percy writes, “Sartre’s various descriptions of bad faith in role-playing are marvelous 
phenomenological renderings of this quest of the self for some, any, kind of habiliment” (Percy, 
Signposts in a Strange Land 390). Despite Sartre’s descriptions of others’ “bad faith,” however, 
Percy claims that Sartre, too, engaged in “bad faith.” Percy thinks that Sartre himself succumbs 
to “bad faith” by describing the self as “nothing” (Percy, The Message 286). Ironically, by 
labeling the inconceivable self as “nothing,” Sartre still identifies it as something. Thus, Percy 
accuses Sartre of “hypostatizing the unformulability of [the] self” (Percy, The Message 286). 
Percy finds clear evidence of Sartre’s hypocrisy in Sartre’s novel The Reprieve, in which the 
main character discovers that nothing lies within himself (Sartre, The Reprieve 280). Percy 
writes,  
The telltale sign is his [Matthieu, one Sartre’s characters] elation, his sense of having at 
last discovered his identity. He is something after all—Nothing! And in so doing, is he 
not committing the same impersonation which Sartre so severely condemns in others? If 
the structure of consciousness is intentional, to be of its essence directed toward the other, 
as being-towards, then the ontologizing of this self-unformulability as Nought is as 
perverse as any other impersonation—really a kind of inferior totemism. (Percy, The 
Message 286) 
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Here, Percy underscores the other directedness of consciousness, which will become more 
important in discussions below concerning authenticity and the importance of intersubjectivity to 
Percy. For now, it is perhaps enough to suggest that the self cannot escape its predicament by 
identifying itself as a “nothing,” which, ironically, makes the self into a something. Instead of 
settling on the notion of self as “nought,” Percy turned instead to Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973), 
the Catholic philosopher and playwright, to further draw out how symbols may conceal the 
existence of the self, the other, and God in C2 consciousness. 
 Sartre’s philosophy and Marcel’s philosophy had much in common; though, Marcel took 
issue with Sartre’s immanentism, materialism, and atheism. Like Sartre’s notion of the self as 
“nothing,” Marcel thought of the self as a type of “wound,” an “empty void,” a “vulnerable” and 
“highly sensitive enclosure” (Marcel, Homo Viator 16; Percy, Message 283-284;). According to 
Marcel, the self always turns to the other for its “final investiture” and confirmation (Marcel, 
Homo Viator 16; Percy, Symbol & Existence 19). Marcel writes, “I can affirm nothing about 
myself which would be really myself; nothing, either, which would be permanent; nothing which 
would be secure against criticism and the passage of time” (Marcel, Homo Viator 16). The self 
that exists in time remains incomplete and capable of change. No reification of the self “as” one 
thing or another can last forever. Percy acknowledges the affinity between Sartre and Marcel 
regarding the self’s unformulability. As Percy writes, “That which symbolizes remains at the 
center of things as a gaping hole among forms: the aching wound of self (Marcel), the Nought 
(Sartre)” (Percy, Symbol & Existence 111). Both Sartre and Marcel seemed to have intuited 
something about the semiotic, existential predicament of the self. Yet, Sartre and Marcel differ in 
many important respects, too. In Homo Viator, Marcel provides a direct reply to Sartre’s Being 
and Nothingness. Marcel begins by admitting the “incontestable” importance of Sartre’s book 
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(Marcel, Homo Viator 166). Further, Marcel acknowledges the “admirable analysis of bad faith” 
in Being and Nothingness, an analysis that reveals “the existence of a being so constituted that it 
is not exactly or fully what it is ….” (Marcel, Homo Viator 167). Nonetheless, Marcel considers 
Sartre as trapped in a web of immanence (Marcel, Homo Viator 178-180, 183-184). Sartre 
reduces the soul to the body (Marcel, Homo Viator 178; Sartre, Being and Nothingness 310). 
Moreover, Sartre explains how the absence of another can still appear as a presence except in the 
case of death (Sartre, Being 278-279). According to Marcel, Sartre thus denies the “communion” 
of the living and the dead, even from a “phenomenological point of view” (Marcel, Homo Viator 
178). Thus, Marcel refers to “the en-soi,” or “being-in-itself,” as “grossly materialistic” (Marcel, 
Homo Viator 178). Despite Sartre’s affirmation of the importance of freedom, Marcel still finds 
parallels between Sartre’s ontology and the ontology of the “epiphenomenist” school, which 
considered the mind as a byproduct of material causes (Marcel, Homo Viator 179; Marcel, I. 
Reflection & Mystery 52; “Philosophy of Mind” 598; cf. Collins 74). Perhaps it is enough to say 
that, like Percy, Marcel could momentarily set aside his philosophical and religious differences 
with Sartre to appreciate Sartre’s phenomenological descriptions, especially his account of “bad 
faith.” Indeed, Sartre’s “bad faith” complements Marcel’s account of the “simulacrum.”   
 Marcel describes how simulacra, or representations of reality, threaten to conceal the 
existence of the self to itself as well as the existence of the other to the self (Marcel, I. Reflection 
& Mystery 53). What does Marcel mean by “simulacrum”? In the first volume of The Mystery of 
Being, Marcel explains a simulacrum as an “illumination” of reality that has hardened over and 
taken the place of the original experience (Marcel, I. Reflection & Mystery 53). A simulacrum 
appears as a “shell” of reality that threatens to usurp reality’s place (Marcel, I. Reflection & 
Mystery 53). Anything that reveals existence—from a “work of art” to a “landscape”—threatens 
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to deteriorate into a mere simulacrum (Marcel, I. Reflection & Mystery 53). Marcel describes a 
simulacrum as a “locum tenens,” or a holding place meant to temporarily take the place of 
existence, which always threatens “to free itself from its proper subordinate position and to claim 
a kind of independence to which it has no right ….” (Marcel, I. Reflection & Mystery 53). As 
Percy might suggest, the symbol necessarily mediates knowledge of existence in C1 
consciousness. But a symbol can also devolve into a simulacrum and lead to error, ignorance, 
and idolatry in C2 consciousness (Percy, Symbol & Existence). Consider Percy’s example of the 
young child naming a sparrow, which over time becomes merely an instance or a “husk” of a 
sparrow (Percy, Lost 104-105; Percy, The Message 206; Percy, Symbol & Existence 103). 
Through the repeated use of language, the symbol “sparrow” degenerates into a mere 
simulacrum that no longer inspires wonder. The particularity of the bird vanishes, and boredom 
ensues, which involves a “weakening of the sense of being” and the “disappearance of joy” 
(Marcel, I. Reflection & Mystery 38). Whereas Marcel does not necessarily use Percy’s language 
of the symbol, Marcel nevertheless describes what happens when someone encounters reality at 
one remove in the simulacrum. Marcel suggests that bad philosophers in the past have dealt with 
“a waste product of experience that had taken experience’s name” (Marcel, I. Reflection & 
Mystery 54). Such a “waste product” is nothing less than a simulacrum, which may obscure the 
existence of the self or the other. Marcel explains “how difficult it is to succeed in getting a 
direct glimpse of whatever it is that we mean by self” (Marcel, I. Reflection & Mystery 52). Even 
when we ask another person for an adequate appraisal of who we are, he or she might reply with 
a mere simulacrum, a reification of our personality. Furthermore, it is oftentimes the case that we 
have chosen this other person to judge us, who may love us or hate us, and thus we cannot 
escape the quandary of having a say in our own appraisal (Marcel, I. Reflection & Mystery 148-
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149). With regard to the simulacrum obscuring the other’s existence, Marcel gives the scenario 
of having to provide a character testimony for an acquaintance (Marcel, I. Reflection & Mystery 
54). The simulacrum that we possess of our friend may alter our attitude or behavior toward him 
or her for the worse (Marcel, I. Reflection & Mystery 54). Thus, it becomes necessary to consider 
whether we are dealing with a mere phantasm of the other or whether we are dealing with the 
other in his or her existential particularity. Altogether, Marcel’s religious background and his 
position on the difficulty of knowing the self led him to consider the human being not as a 
“nought” but rather as homo viator.  
 Indeed, Marcel thought of the human being as a traveler, or homo viator. Marcel did not 
think that the question “Who am I?” admitted of an easy answer. Marcel writes, “‘Who am I?’ … 
is a riddle that, at the human level, simply cannot be solved: it is a question that does not imply, 
and cannot imply, any plain answer” (Marcel, I. Reflection & Mystery 149). Many might balk at 
the idea that the self cannot know itself or that science cannot answer this question (Percy,  
Symbol & Existence 18). Yet, so long as an individual lives, he or she might become something 
more or something less. Further, the words “at the human level” in Marcel’s quote above suggest 
that only God can truly know the answer to this question. According to Marcel, a human being is 
a “‘being on the way’ (en route)” with an “exigence” for transcendence (Marcel, The Mystery of 
Being: II. Faith & Reality 3; Marcel, Preface to Homo Viator 11; Marcel, I. Reflection & Mystery 
39n). Contrasting his definition of “transcendence” with Sartre’s, which involves “transcendence 
in immanence” on a “horizontal” plane, Marcel writes, “I would rather cling to the traditional 
antithesis between the immanent and the transcendent as it is presented to us in textbooks of 
metaphysics and theology” (Marcel, I. Reflection & Mystery 39; Sartre, Being 34).11 Unlike 
                                                   
11 While Marcel acknowledges how one might consider “transcendence” in terms of both space and time, Marcel 
seems to associate Sartre’s understanding of “transcendence” with “projects” oriented toward a future time (Marcel, 
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Sartre, Marcel did not find being to be “de trop.” Instead, mystery permeates existence and calls 
out for participation (Collins Ch. 4; Marcel, I. Reflection & Mystery 111, 125, 211-219). Who or 
what does the traveling in this life? For Marcel, the soul—neither mere mind nor brain—does the 
journeying (Marcel, Preface to Homo Viator 10-11). The soul journeys through life, seeking 
signs of deliverance from his or her predicament. Further, the soul never travels alone. Life 
implies “fellow-travelers” (Marcel, II. Faith & Reality 17). For Marcel, egotism cuts the self off 
from communion with others (Marcel, II. Faith & Reality 7-8). The self can only understand 
itself by “starting from the other, or from others, and only by starting from them….” (Marcel, II. 
Faith & Reality 8). The other does not stand over against the self as an obstacle in the way of the 
self’s freedom (Marcel, II. Faith & Reality 9). Rather, the other makes love possible, including 
agape (self-sacrificing love) and philia (friendship) (Marcel, II. Faith & Reality 9; Lewis, The 
Four Loves 57-90, 116-141). The more that the self turns inward on itself, the more that the self 
loses contact with being (Marcel, II. Faith & Reality 16-17). Thus, Percy formulated his 
anthropology with the help of Marcel’s homo viator. Percy could have settled on a scientific or 
even Marxist description of the human being either as a locus of various immanent “needs” or as 
a byproduct of history (Percy as qtd. in Carr 63-64; Percy, Lost 81). Instead, however, Percy 
preferred to describe the human being as “born to trouble as the sparks fly up” (Percy, Signposts 
375). In addition to homo viator, Percy used the terms “seeker,” “wayfarer,” and “pilgrim” when 
describing the human being (Percy, Signposts 290-291). Percy found Marcel’s homo viator to be 
especially congenial to his vocation as a novelist. The novelist must consider his or her main 
characters “in transit,” “in a fix,” in a predicament, or on a journey (Percy as qtd. in Carr 64; 
                                                   
I. Reflection & Mystery 39). Thus, Marcel’s “transcendence” invites consideration of the “vertical,” theological, 
timeless plane—whereas Sartre’s remains focused on various “projects” that relate to the future (Marcel, I. 
Reflection & Mystery 39). Nevertheless, Marcel insists that, in his understanding of “transcendence,” transcendence 
does not occur “beyond all experience” (Marcel, I. Reflection & Mystery 47-48).  
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Percy as qtd. in Forkner and Kennedy 231-232). The main character in Percy’s The Last 
Gentleman, for example, journeys throughout the United States on a quest for meaning (Percy as 
qtd. in Cremeens 29; Percy, The Last Gentleman). The character’s geographical movements 
parallel his spiritual development. For Marcel, life itself appears as a drama, a story that 
presupposes both exile and redemption, the latter of which homo viator must await with an 
“availability of soul” and openness toward transcendence otherwise known as “hope” (Marcel, 
Preface to Homo Viator 10, 67).  
 In this section, I compared and contrasted some of Sartre’s and Marcel’s ideas to better 
understand what Percy means by C2 consciousness. As I sought to demonstrate above, both 
Sartre and Marcel influenced Percy. Sartre’s descriptions of the self as “nothing” and “bad faith” 
inform Percy’s understanding of the unspeakability of the self as well as the self’s quest for a 
permanent semiotic habiliment. Percy drew upon Marcel’s account of simulacrum when 
accounting for the degeneration of C1 consciousness, the loss of joy, and the advent of boredom. 
Individuals no longer encounter existence but rather existence at one remove. Further, Marcel’s 
homo viator inspired Percy’s anthropology. Rather than reifying the self, homo viator makes 
room for a self “en route” toward something greater (Marcel, Preface to Homo Viator 11). In 
both Percy’s and Marcel’s case, homo viator searches for an encounter with the living God. 
Transcendence does not move away from experience and into a mere simulacrum (Marcel, I. 
Reflection & Mystery 53-54). Rather, transcendence implies intersubjective communion and 
movement away from the self (Percy, Lost 121, 124). Thus, the prospect of symbolically induced 
ignorance described in this section means that homo viator needs something (or, more precisely, 
someone) beyond itself to help shatter the symbolic reifications, recover existence, and 
experience transcendence once more. In the next chapter, I will review various means for 
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breaking through symbolic reifications. Before moving onto that, however, I first need to account 
for the role of Heidegger in Percy’s thought. Anyone seeking to further understand C2 
consciousness would do well to consider what Percy learned from Heidegger, who, like Sartre 
and Marcel, oftentimes received the label “existentialist.” 
 
Heidegger: Everydayness as the “Reverse Phenomenon” 
 Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), a German existential phenomenologist, exerted a notable 
influence on Percy’s thought. Like Sartre and Marcel and unlike most empirical scientists, 
Heidegger sought to describe the experience of the self, or “Dasein,” in the world. In this section, 
I briefly review the importance of Heidegger to Percy’s thought. I begin first by summarizing 
some of the main ideas in Heidegger’s Being and Time. Second, I work through the specific 
ways that Percy utilized Heidegger’s thought to understand C2 consciousness. Percy drew upon 
Heidegger’s account of Dasein’s “fall” into the “they” when critiquing the lay/consumer 
distinction that the immanent self can surrender to. Further, Heidegger’s account of 
“everydayness” in Being and Time relates directly to C2 consciousness. Indeed, Percy calls 
“everydayness” the “reverse phenomenon” of the “Helen Keller phenomenon” (Percy, Signposts 
353). Recall that the “Helen Keller phenomenon” refers to C1 consciousness’ joyful 
concelebration of the world with others, which the mediation of the symbol makes possible. 
Thus, “everydayness” has little in common with joy, concelebration, or others. Percy associated 
Heidegger’s account of Dasein’s “fall” into the “they” with Sartre’s “nothing” and Marcel’s 
“wound” (Percy, Symbol & Existence 111). Third, I outline a key difference between Percy and 
Heidegger concerning the meaning of “authenticity,” which merits special attention. Many 
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rightly reject the term “authenticity” for its individualistic overtones. Percy, however, 
understands authenticity in a manner that implies the intersubjective concelebration of being.  
 Percy drew largely upon Heidegger’s famous Being and Time, which first appeared in 
1927. Being and Time contains a number of novel phrases and philosophical ideas that I must 
first unpack here before moving onto a discussion of how Percy appropriated Heidegger’s ideas. 
In Being and Time, Heidegger questions the meaning of Being. Some consider the meaning of 
“Being” as self-evident, indefinable, or universal (Heidegger, Being and Time 21). Yet, for 
Heidegger, the question of the meaning of Being merits attention because, among other things, it 
lacks an answer and because philosophers have forgotten about the question (Heidegger, Being 
and Time 21-24). Since “Being” is not an entity in the world like other entities, “Being” cannot 
be defined like other entities within the world (Heidegger, Being and Time 23). Thus, Heidegger 
proposes to investigate the question of the meaning of Being by analyzing “Dasein,” or the 
“being-there” otherwise known as the human being (Heidegger, Being and Time 21-67, 227). 
Heidegger writes, “We are ourselves the entities to be analyzed” (Heidegger, Being and Time 
67). According to Heidegger, Dasein finds itself “thrown” (Geworfenheit) into a world of 
meaning (Heidegger, Being and Time 174, 174n1). The world appears laden with meaning, and 
Dasein “comports itself understandingly” towards entities in the world (Heidegger, Being and 
Time 78, 182-195). Even before conscious reflection takes place, Dasein always already 
understands the world and its possibilities within it in a given way (Heidegger, Being and Time 
185; cf. Anton, Selfhood and Authenticity 24-36).12 Further, things appear in the world “as” one 
                                                   
12 The distinction between environment and world, Umwelt and Welt, appears in Being and Time (Heidegger, Being 
and Time 83-84, 92-95). Nevertheless, Percy suggests that his own understanding of “world” does not necessarily 
rely “on Heidegger or any other philosophical anthropology” (Percy, The Message 203n). Percy suggests that, while 
his understanding of “environment” and “world” relates most closely to Ludwig Binswanger’s account of Umwelt 
and Welt, the empirical event of naming, as evidenced by children learning to speak and the “Helen Keller 
phenomenon,” provided enough evidence that humans inhabit a “world” substantially different from an animal’s 
“environment” (Percy, The Message 203n). 
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thing or another. A hammer, for example, appears “as” a manipulatable something to hammer 
with (Heidegger, Being and Time 98, 189). Heidegger writes, “What we ‘first’ hear is never 
noises or complexes of sounds, but the creaking waggon [sic], the motor-cycle. We hear the 
column on the march, the north wind, the woodpecker tapping, the fire crackling” (Heidegger, 
Being and Time 207). Heidegger preoccupies himself with the way Being conceals or reveals 
itself to Dasein, as well as how Dasein comports itself towards its possibilities in the world. With 
regard to the concealment of Being, Heidegger thought of truth as “aletheia,” an unconcealment 
of Being wherein entities reveal themselves “as” one thing or another to Dasein (Heidegger, 
Being and Time 56-60). Heidegger writes, “Truth (uncoveredness) is something that must always 
first be wrested from entities. Entities get snatched out of their hiddenness” (Heidegger, Being 
and Time 265). Elsewhere, Heidegger states, “Once entities have been uncovered, they show 
themselves precisely as entities which beforehand already were” (Heidegger, Being and Time 
269). Such disclosed entities might include anything from Newton’s laws to the “principle of 
contradiction” (Heidegger, Being and Time 269). By implication, Dasein discovers entities in the 
sciences and arts alike. Importantly, these uncovered entities need Dasein to come to light 
(Heidegger, Being and Time 269). Discourse, or Rede, a characteristic mode of Dasein’s Being-
in-the-world, uncovers entities in the world and allows them to be seen as what they are 
(Heidegger, Being and Time 56, 203-210). Heidegger seems to reject an overly rationalistic 
interpretation of the ζῷον λόγον ἔχον (zoon logon echon), Aristotle’s “rational animal” or 
“animal with logos,” and instead prefers a description of the human being as simply the “entity 
which talks” (Heidegger, Being and Time 47, 47n, 74, 208). “Authenticity” figures as a key term 
for Heidegger because Dasein may talk and comport itself either in an authentic or inauthentic 
manner. In the existentialist tradition of giving freedom priority over a priori essences, 
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Heidegger believes that authenticity presupposes Dasein’s openness to its own possibilities for 
Being (Heidegger, Being and Time 67-68, 232). Inauthenticity, on the other hand, presupposes a 
fall into the world of the “they,” or “Das Man” (Heidegger, Being and Time 164, 220, 220n1).  
 Thus, the “they” conceal Being from Dasein and contribute to Dasein’s inauthenticity. 
Note that Heidegger uses the “they” in a singular sense to indicate a sort of monolithic, 
irresponsible, anonymous mass. The “they” demands “averageness” of interpretation and a type 
of “‘levelling down’ [Einebnung] of all possibilities of Being” (Heidegger, Being and Time 164-
165). The “they” refuses to make distinctions: “[I]t [the ‘they’] is insensitive to every difference 
of level and of genuineness” (Heidegger, Being and Time 165). The average understanding of the 
“they” does not like distinctions because the “they” already “understands everything” 
(Heidegger, Being and Time 212). The fall into “everydayness” involves the consumption of 
judgments prescribed by the “they.” In his description of the consumptive attitude that Dasein 
may take toward the “they,” Heidegger writes,  
We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they [man] take pleasure; we read, see, and 
judge about literature and art as they see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the 
‘great mass’ as they shrink back; we find ‘shocking’ what they find shocking. The ‘they,’ 
which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of 
being of everydayness. (Heidegger, Being and Time 164)  
Heidegger’s description of how the “they” informs Dasein’s understanding reminds one of the 
mass media today, wherein the continuous news cycle on TV and websites, among other things, 
dictate the proper judgments for Dasein to assume. Thus, Dasein consumes interpretations and 
construes its own possibilities for Being in an inauthentic manner when it succumbs to the 
“they.” Being cannot reveal itself in its full plenitude and inexhaustibility to a Dasein bewitched 
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by the “publicly interpreted” meanings of the “they” (Heidegger, Being and Time 264). When 
Dasein falls into the world of the “they,” Dasein accepts the various interpretations of its world 
as coming from the “they” (Heidegger, Being and Time 167). Heidegger suggests that the “they” 
deprives Dasein of its “answerability,” its responsibility for its own decisions (Heidegger, Being 
and Time 165). The “they” is a “no one” or a “nobody” (Heidegger, Being and Time 165-166). 
Recall here, too, how the logos in discourse reveals entities “as” one thing or another for Dasein. 
When Dasein comports itself authentically, discourse snatches entities from out of their 
hiddenness in accordance with truth, or aletheia. However, discourse has its own inauthentic 
modes, including “idle talk,” “curiosity,” and “ambiguity” (Heidegger, Being and Time 211-
220). Idle talk, or Gerede, a type of superficial understanding, does not admit of any inquiry or 
disputation but instead appears as gossiping, “passing along,” and unreflectively consuming 
“average” interpretations (Heidegger, Being and Time 211-214, 217). Curiosity, a type of 
concupiscent desire to know, seeks “novelty,” “distraction,” and knowledge of things “just in 
order to have known” them (Heidegger, Being and Time 214-217). The proliferation of the 
average, public interpretations of the “they” leads to ambiguity, wherein it “becomes impossible 
to decide what is disclosed in a genuine understanding and what is not” (Heidegger, Being and 
Time 217). Rather than considering the fall into the “they” as something that only uncultivated 
dupes suffer from, inauthenticity remains possible for each and every Dasein (Heidegger, Being 
and Time 223-224). In fact, Heidegger writes, “The Self, however, is proximally and for the most 
part inauthentic, the they-self” (Heidegger, Being and Time 225). Heidegger also states, “Far 
from determining its nocturnal side, it [falling into the “they”] constitutes all Dasein’s days in 
their everydayness” (Heidegger, Being and Time 224). Inauthenticity and everydayness appear 
more like the rule rather than the exception. Finally, the phenomenon of anxiety appears as a 
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summons rooted in the structure of Being that calls Dasein out of its familiarity, everydayness, 
and inauthenticity. Like Being, anxiety is not simply one more entity in the world (Heidegger, 
Being and Time 231). Heidegger explains, “[T]he publicness of the ‘they’ suppresses everything 
unfamiliar” (Heidegger, Being and Time 237). Yet, anxiety involves an “uncanniness” and 
unfamiliarity that presses in upon Dasein in such a way that it cannot “flee into the ‘at-home’ of 
publicness” (Heidegger, Being and Time 233-234). Thus, the “they” seeks to conceal perhaps the 
most anxiety inducing event that Dasein can (and will) experience: death (Heidegger, Being and 
Time 296-304). The “they” conceals the “certainty” of death from Dasein and instead invites 
distraction (Heidegger, Being and Time 302-303). Altogether, rather than a mere psychological 
phenomena requiring suppression and eradication, anxiety may be a call for Dasein to 
authentically realize its own possibilities (Heidegger, Being and Time 228-235). Having 
summarized some key ideas contained in Heidegger’s Being and Time, I turn to consider how 
Percy drew upon Heidegger.  
 Percy appreciated several ideas in Heidegger’s philosophy, which contributed to Percy’s 
description of C2 consciousness and its attendant alienation. To begin, Percy considered 
Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein as an alternative approach to anthropology, much like Marcel’s 
homo viator (Percy as qtd. in Samway, Thief 114). Whether or not you agree with or even like 
Heidegger, Heidegger provided an alternative way for considering the human being outside of 
naturalistic, scientific categories. Humans do not simply exist like animals in an environment but 
rather live and move and have their being in a world of meaning. Percy thus expresses the 
usefulness of Heidegger’s term “Dasein,” which Percy seems to have considered as roughly 
equivalent to the “self” (Percy, Lost 86n). In a manuscript that he sent to Kenneth Laine Ketner, 
Percy explains that Heidegger’s term “Dasein”  
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bears no semantic freight; it simply signifies what it says; a being there, and better still, as 
Heidegger explicates it, a being there in the world—and by the world he means Welt, all 
that is out there and that we name, and not Umwelt, the environment. (Percy as qtd. in  
Samway, Thief 113)  
Percy knew that words can become charged with meaning over time, especially the “self,” and so 
“Dasein” “bears no semantic freight.” In other words, the term “Dasein” may in fact subvert the 
psychological connotations usually associated with the term “self.” Indeed, Dasein does not 
appear as some sort of isolated entity in the void. Instead, every Dasein has a world. Human 
beings find themselves cast into a world not of their own making and inherit names for entities 
given long before their arrival. Indeed, humans find themselves “thrown” into such a world 
(Percy, Lost 86n). Percy’s metaphor of the human being as a “castaway” in a predicament thus 
relates to Heidegger’s “thrownness” (Percy, The Message 146).13 Like Sartre and Marcel, 
Heidegger provided Percy with a description of a distinctly human predicament otherwise 
inarticulable in purely scientific terms (Percy as qtd. in Gulledge 300). The human predicament 
implies a world of meaning thanks to the symbol, which opens up the “as-structure of 
interpretation” (Heidegger, Being and Time 200-201). Percy writes, “To amend the 
phenomenologist: It is not enough to say that one is conscious of something; one is also 
conscious of something as being something” (Percy, The Message 272-273). However, only 
some phenomenologists stop at the “of” structure of consciousness. Percy perhaps did not give 
enough credit to Heidegger on this point, because Heidegger repeatedly describes Dasein’s 
                                                   
13 Some have noted the similarities between Heidegger’s “thrownness” and the Gnostic understanding of the human 
being as violently cast into an evil, material world (Jonas, “Gnosticism, Existentialism, and Nihilism” 211-213, 229, 
Voegelin, Science, Politics and Gnosticism 7-8). While I see no reason to defend Heidegger as a Gnostic in one way 
or another, I would insist on Percy’s anti-Gnosticism. As his letters to Kenneth Laine Ketner attest, Percy was no 
Gnostic (see Ketner and Percy’s exchange in Samway, A Thief of Peirce 20-25; Brooks, “Walker Percy and Modern 
Gnosticism”).  
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encounter of entities in the world “as” one thing or another (Heidegger, Being and Time 189, 
200-202, 207, 266). Percy’s understanding of the role of the symbol in mediating consciousness 
“of” reality “as” one thing or another eventually helped him to identify the ultimate semiotic 
predicament: the struggle of the self to conceive itself through symbolic means.  
 Perhaps above all, Heidegger’s description of the “they” remains absolutely central to 
Percy’s understanding of C2 consciousness. Heidegger describes the “falling,” or Verfallen, of 
Dasein into the “everydayness” of the “they” (Heidegger, Being and Time 219-220). In Symbol 
& Existence, Percy discusses Heidegger’s Verfallen alongside Sartre’s “Nought” and Marcel’s 
“wound” (Percy, Symbol & Existence 111). Percy writes,  
In what can only be described as a fall, a falling prey to (Heidegger’s Verfallen), I, who 
in my most authentic relation to the world, am a co-celebrant of being, become a 
despairing specter, a that-which-does-not-know-what-it-is, an emptiness amid a world of 
replete entities. (Percy, Symbol & Existence 111) 
In this quote, Percy suggests that Heidegger, like Sartre and Marcel, captures the symbolically 
induced alienation that characterizes C2 consciousness. The fall into the “they” involves a falling 
prey to a priori symbolic constructions, or the “publicly interpreted” world so well described by 
Heidegger (Heidegger, Being and Time 264; Percy, Symbol & Existence 131). The “they-self” 
takes comfort in what the experts have to say about his or her predicament (Heidegger, Being 
and Time 225; Percy, “The Loss of the Creature”). Indeed, the “they” often consider the human 
being as no more than an animal in an environment with a discrete set of needs. Conversations in 
everyday life attest to the reign of the “they” anytime someone appeals to what “they” say. 
“They” say this, or “they” say that. Who are “they,” after all? Who is this anonymous, shadowy 
group of elite knowers that you or I may appeal to at any time and in any place? Heidegger might 
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reply: “no one,” “nobody” (Heidegger, Being and Time 165-166). The “they” seek to heal the 
“wound” described by Marcel and to fill the “nothing” described by Sartre. But can they? 
Ultimate questions about the meaning of life, the meaning of death, and even the meaning of 
Being (Heidegger’s favorite question) get swept away by the current of the “they.” When the self 
falls prey to the “they,” the self ceases to take joy in actively naming existence and settles into a 
passive habit of preferring representations over reality. The “they-self” understands the world 
according to the dictates of established opinion (Heidegger, Being and Time 225). The “they” 
“prescribes” interpretations for Dasein (Heidegger, Being and Time 167). Such prescriptions may 
inform the self’s scientific, artistic, or even religious judgments. In Lost in the Cosmos, Percy 
describes both the immanent self and the transcendent self in relation to the “they.” On one hand, 
the immanent consumer self absorbs the interpretations prescribed by the “they” (Percy, Lost 
113). Percy describes both the “beer-drinking TV-watcher” and the “backfence gossip” as 
surrendering to the “they” (Percy, Lost 113). Percy suggests that Heidegger’s other 
“existentialia” such as Gerede and “curiosity” also pertain to the immanent self (Percy, Lost 
113n). On the other hand, the transcendent self joins the “they,” or those who know, by 
becoming a scientist or an artist (Percy, Lost 113-126). Percy spells out the danger faced by both 
the immanent self and the transcendent self: Neither actually escapes the semiotic predicament of 
having to answer the question “[B]ut what am I?” (Percy, The Message 284). The transcendent 
self may temporarily forget the question in an act of intersubjective communion, but such 
transcendence cannot endure forever (Percy, Lost 114-126). Even the autonomous self, a creature 
trapped in immanence, struggles to extricate himself or herself from the semiotic predicament via 
self-realization (Percy, Lost 113). But everydayness and semiotic devaluation always creep back 
in for both the immanent and the transcendent self. Percy’s Lost in the Cosmos appears as 
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perhaps the most direct and humorous application of Heidegger’s philosophy. Indeed, Percy 
suggests that in Lost in the Cosmos, he had sought to give “some semiotic grounding” to 
Heidegger’s “existentialia,” or “Dasein’s characters of Being” (Percy as qtd. in Abádi-Nagy 145; 
Heidegger, Being and Time 70). In addition to Lost in the Cosmos, Heidegger influenced Percy’s 
approach to novel writing in general. Percy claimed that his novels were a way of exploring 
Heidegger’s “existentialia” such as “everydayness” (“alltäglichkeit”), albeit in a more accessible 
form than Heidegger had provided (Percy as qtd. in Gulledge 300; Percy as qtd. in Richard et al. 
165). In The Thanatos Syndrome, Percy describes a woman lacking nothing in the way of 
material comforts who nevertheless has fallen into the “they” and adopted an inauthentic manner 
of being (Percy, Signposts 390; Percy, The Thanatos Syndrome 5-10, 370-372). With the help of 
Heidegger, Percy reminds us that a semiotically devalued world always remains a possibility, 
especially to the unsuspecting consumer in a mass society.  
 Even still, the fall into inauthenticity implies its dialectical counterpart: authenticity, a 
much-contested term that for Percy means nothing less than the restoration of intersubjective 
communion. Thus, I begin here to move beyond the darkness of C2 consciousness and turn to 
briefly consider truth in Percy’s thought as the disclosure of existence for the self and the other. 
For Percy, the authentic self paradoxically loses itself in the act of naming (Percy, Lost 124). 
Recall that the understanding of truth as a type of revelation appears in Heidegger. Heidegger 
calls truth aletheia, a type of uncovering of existence where entities show themselves “as entities 
which beforehand already were” (Heidegger, Being and Time 269). For Percy, true scientists and 
artists reveal truth and once again experience a taste of C1 consciousness. The good scientist and 
the good artist name for both the self and the other and thereby accomplish intersubjective 
communion, a “partial recovery of Eden, the semiotic Eden” (Percy, Lost 124). Percy uses Kafka 
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as an example of an artist who reveals truth by naming a pre-existing predicament that others 
recognize (Percy, Lost 120-121). Percy explains how Kafka escapes the predicament of C2 
consciousness “by seeing and naming what had heretofore been unspeakable, the predicament of 
the self in the modern world” (Percy, Lost 120). In other words, naming the alienation of C2 
consciousness leads to its reversal (Percy, The Message 5). Why? Because true naming, naming 
that results in the disclosure of existence, results in intersubjective communion, too. Kafka’s 
readers can truly exclaim, “Yes! that [sic] is how it is! ….” (Percy, The Message 83). The ability 
to name in an authentic manner, which the good artist exemplifies, is a distinctly human 
capacity. Percy writes,  
Man is not merely a higher organism responding to and controlling his environment. He 
is, in Heidegger’s words, that being in the world whose calling it is to find a name for 
Being, to give testimony to it, and to provide for it a clearing. (Percy, The Message 158)  
According to Jay Tolson, one of Percy’s biographers, this particular passage from The Message 
in the Bottle “could not have come much closer to an explicit statement of the metaphysical and 
even religious direction of his language philosophy” (Tolson, Pilgrim in the Ruins 266). Despite 
Percy’s understanding of the importance of finding “a name for Being,” however, and contrary to 
Tolson’s statement here, Percy and Heidegger had very different metaphysical and religious 
presuppositions.14 Perhaps more so than anything else, Percy and Heidegger disagreed on the 
ultimate meaning of the term “authenticity,” which I now turn to consider.  
                                                   
14 For instance, Percy appreciated Scholastics like Aquinas as well as John of St. Thomas and did not eschew the 
religious implications of the human predicament, whereas Heidegger sought to destroy the “history of ontology” and 
to avoid any considerations about the Fall of Man (Collins 168-210; Heidegger, Being and Time 44, 74, 126, 224, 
272). Clearly, these two thinkers had different metaphysical and religious presuppositions. Though, Percy certainly 
learned a great deal from Heidegger’s writings.  
 
146 
For Percy, authenticity has more to do with the restoration of intersubjectivity and an 
openness to the Thou than with individual self-realization (Percy, Symbol & Existence 161). 
Without question, the term “authenticity” comes with significant philosophical baggage. Some 
have seriously and rightfully criticized authenticity as an ideal to aim for (Lasch, The Culture of 
Narcissism 166-167; Potter, The Authenticity Hoax). Oftentimes, people will speak about the 
individualistic pursuit of becoming your “authentic” and “true” self. However, even without 
considering Percy’s religious presuppositions, the aforementioned discussion of C2 
consciousness clearly indicates that Percy would not advocate for such an individualistic ideal. 
How can a self that cannot know itself become its “true” and “authentic” self? It would not make 
any sense. Like Percy’s treatment of Sartre, Percy takes what he likes in Heidegger’s philosophy, 
especially Heidegger’s phenomenological descriptions, and leaves the rest, especially 
Heidegger’s ontology. Indeed, Percy holds out hope that someone who has fallen into the “they” 
can begin to live “authentically” as a seeker and wayfarer, much like Marcel’s homo viator in 
communion with “fellow-travelers” (Marcel, II. Faith & Reality 17; Percy, Signposts 290). But 
Percy’s understanding of authenticity does not necessarily agree with Heidegger’s individualistic 
understanding of authenticity as the openness of Dasein to its “ownmost” possibilities for Being 
(Heidegger, Being and Time 308). Following Sartre, Percy did not think that Heidegger escaped 
the “spectre of solipsism” (Percy, Symbol & Existence 148; Sartre, Being 246-248). If Being 
discloses itself through Dasein, then what becomes of the Other? Does the Other need Dasein in 
order to be? If so, how can the Other be anything but a figment of Dasein’s imagination (Percy, 
Symbol & Existence 148; Sartre, Being 246-248)?15 Thus, instead of echoing Heidegger’s 
                                                   
15 Further, like Sartre, Percy did not think that Heidegger’s ontological notion of “Mitsein,” or “Being-with,” 
adequately accounted for what Percy called the “concrete empirical encounter” with the other (Heidegger, Being and 
Time 149-168; Percy, Symbol & Existence 148; Sartre, Being 248-249). 
 
147 
individualistic impulses, Percy leans more on Buber and Marcel. Percy uses the term “authentic” 
to describe Buber’s I-Thou relationship, which Percy contrasts to the “deteriorated” I-It 
relationship (Buber, I and Thou; Percy, Symbol & Existence 161). For Buber, Heidegger’s 
analytic of Dasein abstracted the human being from all of its essential relations with others and 
made solitariness the rule rather than the exception (Buber, Between Man and Man 200, 215). 
Percy would likely agree with Buber’s statement that “Man can become whole not in virtue of a 
relation to himself but only in virtue of a relation to another self” (Buber, Between 199). Marcel, 
too, acknowledges the primacy of the intersubjective relationship and the metaphysic of “we are” 
over and above the solitary “I think” (Marcel, II. Faith & Reality 9). Ego consciousness thus 
appears as a “myth” or “deterioration” of intersubjectivity for Percy (Percy, Symbol & Existence 
164, 237). Thus, both Chapter 2 and this chapter (Chapter 3) support the notion that 
intersubjectivity necessarily precedes the isolated experience of the “self.” In this section, then, I 
have sought to give Heidegger his due without remaining mired in the “pit” of the self. 
 Although Percy and Heidegger had very different metaphysical and religious 
presuppositions, both recognized the importance of the logos in human experience. The logos, 
humanity’s unique possession, discloses existence. Thus, I began this section by reviewing some 
key ideas in Heidegger’s Being and Time. Next, I discussed how Heidegger’s ideas have 
appeared in Percy’s writings, including his non-fiction and fiction works. I sought to emphasize 
especially how the self may fall prey to the “they.” I concluded this section with a discussion of 
“authenticity,” a term rightfully contested for its individualistic connotations. However, I insisted 
that Percy thought of Buber’s I-Thou relation as “authentic.” Percy considered intersubjectivity 
as desirable and even normative (Percy, Symbol & Existence 161, 193).16 The importance given 
                                                   
16 Compare Percy’s stance on normative evaluations with the position of Heidegger, who sought to avoid normative 
evaluations when discussing Dasein’s “falling” into the “they” (Heidegger, Being and Time 219-220, 264-265). 
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to intersubjectivity, then, becomes one way of separating Percy’s thought from other 
existentialists, especially Sartre and Heidegger. Sartre considered other people in terms of “hell.” 
In his play No Exit, Sartre wrote, “[L]’enfer c’est les autres,” or “Hell is other people” (Percy, 
Signposts 290; Sartre, Huis Clos 91). And, as mentioned above, Heidegger thought of 
authenticity as an individual’s realization of his or her own possibilities.17 Buber, Marcel, and 
Percy, on the other hand, esteem intersubjectivity. For Marcel, hope goes beyond the solitary self 
and seeks the good of the other (Marcel, Preface to Homo Viator 10). Marcel also calls despair a 
type of “spiritual autophagy” wherein the self collapses in on itself and makes itself “the centre” 
(Marcel, Homo Viator 44). Percy writes, “In the joy of naming, one lives authentically” (Percy, 
Symbol & Existence 193). Of course, joy follows from naming for another who recognizes the 
name as revelatory. I have spent enough time wading through the darkness of C2 consciousness, 
and thus I would like to now pivot into the lighter, more transcendent C3 consciousness. Before 
moving onto a discussion of C3 consciousness, however, I must first recount some implications 
that follow from the aforementioned for rhetoric, philosophy of communication, and media 
ecology.  
 
Implications for Rhetoric, Philosophy of Communication, and Media Ecology 
Scholars of rhetoric, philosophy of communication, and media ecology could benefit 
from Percy’s insights into C2 consciousness. In this section, then, I first review why Marcel and 
Percy’s account of the simulacrum matters for an ethics of rhetoric. Second, I explain the 
                                                   
17 In Collins’ generous interpretation of Heidegger, Collins explains that, unlike Sartre, Heidegger does not believe 
in the absurdity of “being-in-itself.” Rather, Heidegger understands Dasein as “there” for being to disclose itself 
through (Collins 201). Further, Collins suggests that Heidegger’s understanding of the role of the philosopher has 
much in common with Marcel’s homo viator. Collins writes, “The philosopher’s function as a ‘wanderer,’ a homo 
viator (in Marcel’s terms), is both to respect the incomprehensibility of being and to offer guidance to his fellow 
men” (Collins 195).  
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significance of C2 consciousness for philosophy of communication. As it pertains to metaphors 
for describing the self, I consider some implications of Percy’s thought for the “situated” and 
“embedded” self. Further, therapeutic approaches to communication, which prioritize the self, 
fail to acknowledge the primacy of intersubjectivity. Finally, with regard to media ecology, I 
discuss how the self attempts to fix itself in mediated forms. The self experiences delight at both 
mediating itself and piercing through the mediations to encounter existence once more. Percy 
himself speculates as to whether the difficulty of knowing the self stems from the primacy given 
to the sense of vision. Thus, I expand upon Percy’s insights about ocularcentrism and relate these 
insights to the thought of Ong.   
To begin, Percy’s ideas about C2 consciousness can inform an ethics of rhetoric. As a 
“wound” or a “nought,” the self remains easy prey for political ideologies in this historical 
moment (Ellul, Propaganda 6, 61). As noted in Chapter 1, Engnell put Marcel and Percy into 
conversation to formulate an ethics of using holocaust-related language (Engnell). However, 
Engnell does not appear to have related Marcel and Percy to the thought of Richard Weaver or 
Kenneth Burke. Here, I would like stress that Marcel and Percy’s “simulacra” relate to Weaver’s 
“ultimate terms” and Burke’s “term[s]” with a “god-function,” which short-circuit thought and 
induce magical thinking (Burke, Philosophy of Literary Form 448; Percy, Symbol & Existence 
131; Weaver, “Ultimate Terms in Contemporary Rhetoric”).18 According to Percy, words that 
symbolize “remote,” “obscure,” “complex,” “abstract,” or “nonexistent” referents threaten to 
become mere simulacra (Percy, Symbol & Existence 92). For example, words like “democracy” 
and “Christianity” may lack immediate referents and thereby may “operate not as miraculous 
                                                   
18 I leave unaddressed the question concerning whether Burke or Weaver formulated the notion of “ultimate” or 
“god” terms first. Burke writes, “In a work of metaphysics, there is some term that has a ‘god-function.’ That is: its 
meaning derives from its rôle as a summation of all the other terms” (Burke, Philosophy 448; see also Johanneson as 
well as Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives 183-189, 298-301).  
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vehicles of meaning but as dense impenetrable husks ….” (Percy, Symbol & Existence 92). In his 
essay “Ultimate Terms in Contemporary Rhetoric,” Weaver defines a “god term” as “an 
expression about which all other expressions are ranked as subordinate and serving dominations 
and powers” (Weaver, “Ultimate” 212). Weaver suggests that certain taken-for-granted terms 
like “progress” stand atop a hierarchy of other terms and invite thoughtlessness as well as 
sacrifice (Weaver, “Ultimate” 212-214, 232). For Weaver, the word “modern” functions as an 
“epithet of approval,” while words such as “Nazi” and “Fascist” operate as “terms of repulsion,” 
or “devil term[s]” (Weaver, “Ultimate” 217, 222-223). Even today, the word “Fascist” still has a 
certain rhetorical effect. Someone who receives the label “Fascist” will undoubtedly lose 
credibility, at least in the public sphere.19 Individuals or groups can use “terms of repulsion” in 
order to scapegoat others and advance their own political projects. For example, Burke indicated 
how Hitler used the Jews as a type of “symbolic vessel” to unify Germany (Burke, The 
Philosophy of Literary Form 27, 194-198, 202-203). Weaver also warns against the 
hypostatization of certain terms (e.g., “science”) and the exaltation of terms that may lack any 
immediate reference (e.g., “efficient”) (Weaver, “Ultimate” 216). Due to the rhetorical potency 
of “ultimate terms,” political hucksters and charlatans can advance their own political projects 
simply by invoking “ultimate terms” (Weaver, “Ultimate” 290). The immanent consumer self, 
spellbound by ideological appeals, thus identifies with the symbols of technics and state (Burke, 
Philosophy 195n1; Burke, Rhetoric of Motives 20-25). Politicians and even those in the business 
world can justify expensive and malign activities “in the name of” “freedom,” “democracy,” 
“progress,” etc. (Weaver, “Ultimate” 290). Burke notes that Hitler justified his murderous 
campaign “in the name of” “humility, love, and peace” (Burke, Philosophy 199). As Burke knew 
                                                   
19 The term “bigot” works in a similar manner to set apart “true believers” from less “radical,” more “balanced” 
individuals. 
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well, justifying actions “in the name of” one thing or another has definite magical connotations 
(Burke, Philosophy 3-4). Ask yourself: What cannot be justified “in the name of” “security,” 
“safety,” or “survival” today (Bonanno, “An Essential Business: Satisfying the Needs of the 
Soul”)? Ultimately, Weaver explains how subjecting “ultimate terms” to a dialectic could help to 
counteract their ill effects (Weaver, “Ultimate” 232). As noted above, drawing upon Sartre, 
Percy suggests that the gaze of the other could puncture the symbolic veil concealing the other. 
Percy gestures toward additional means for shattering symbolic simulacra, which I explore in 
depth in the following chapter. For now, it is perhaps enough to sketch out some similarities 
between Marcel, Percy, Weaver, and Burke. As it pertains to an ethics of rhetoric, a priori 
symbolic reifications can seduce an individual or collective to engage in unethical actions. Thus, 
the task of the critic is to counter symbolic reifications with a searching dialectic and sharp 
rhetorical criticism.  
Furthermore, Percy recognized the dangers of the autonomous self, which certain 
philosophers, including philosophers of communication, have also realized. In lieu of calling the 
self “autonomous,” some scholars have put forward alternative qualifiers for the self such as 
“situated” and “embedded” (e.g., Arnett and Holba 88, 155, 204-205; Benhabib 6, 212-213; 
Taylor, A Secular Age Ch. 3). Heidegger’s “thrownness” and Gadamer’s insistence on 
“tradition” played at least some part in attempts to dethrone the autonomous self (Arnett and 
Holba 80, 88). The self finds itself in a world of meaning informed by historical events and 
concrete happenings. Individuals deceive themselves when they believe in their absolute 
independence from others (Anton, Sources of Significance 16-21). As Alasdair MacIntyre writes, 
“For the story of my life is always embedded in the story of those communities from which I 
derive my identity” (MacIntyre, After Virtue 221; emphasis mine). The so-called autonomous 
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self always already finds itself within a narrative charged with value (Arnett and Arneson Ch. 4). 
Percy, who referred to the “expanding nought of the autonomous self” and who recognized the 
“deracination of Western culture,” would likely have appreciated the qualifiers “situated” and 
“embedded” (Percy, Lost 81, 181). As Percy knew, the self inhabits a world populated with 
meaning. The child learns to speak at a young age and along with learning to speak also learns 
values and value-laden expressions, including the hortatory “No!” (Burke, Language as 
Symbolic Action 9-13). The self does not simply find itself “embedded,” however; it finds itself 
embedded in a predicament and in need of an answer. What is the predicament? The self faces 
the question, “[B]ut what am I?” (Percy, The Message 284). In my estimation, then, Percy would 
not only recognize the “situated” self but also stress the continual uprooting and dislocating of 
the self (Percy, The Message 111). Influenced by Marcel’s homo viator, Percy might thus insist 
on the self as “situating” in addition to “situated.”20 The present participle, “situating,” differs 
from the past participle, “situated.” The former indicates an ongoing process, a happening, 
whereas the latter denotes a finished product. Recall here that, for Marcel and Percy, homo viator 
remains a “‘being on the way’ (en route)” (Marcel, Preface to Homo Viator 11).21 Like a 
character in a novel, a human being is “on the move” (Percy as qtd. in Cremeens 29; see also 
Percy as qtd. in Abádi-Nagy 143). The self not only finds itself in a narrative but may even 
switch to a different narrative, akin to a sort of symbolic migration. Atheists convert. Believers 
lose their faith. Republicans leave for the Democratic Party and vice-versa. Such conversions 
and exoduses from one narrative to another may not happen often, but they do in fact occur. The 
                                                   
20 To her credit, Benhabib’s book Situating the Self obviously contains the term “situating” in the title. 
21 Interestingly, wary of reifying “communication” into some sort of static entity, Klyukanov understands 
communication as a type of “being-on-the-way” (see Klyukanov Ch. 2). Heidegger’s influence appears in 
Klyukanov, too. Reflecting on Heidegger’s etymology of the word “method,” Klyukanov seems to refer to human 
being as “being-the-way-itself” (Klyukanov 31-32). 
 
153 
self may wind up “situated,” but the question becomes, “For how long?” Novel and nostalgic 
experiences alike promise transcendence and an escape from the self (Percy, Lost 180-181; 
Percy, The Message Ch. 4). The situating self has an itch that needs scratched and a vague 
inkling of the transcendent. All too often, of course, it searches in all the wrong places for some 
transcendent remedy to fill the void and “inform its own nothingness” (Percy, Lost 21). Marcel 
once described “metaphysical unease” in the following way: it “is like the bodily state of a man 
in a fever who will not lie still but keeps shifting around in his bed looking for the right position” 
(Marcel, I. Reflection & Mystery 7). And so it goes with the situating self. In this life, C2 
consciousness experiences periodic, aggravated restlessness.22 Percy writes, “modern man has 
lost his way, has not the faintest notion who he is or what he is doing, and nothing short of 
catastrophe will bring him to his senses” (Percy, Lost 44). Ultimately, Marcel suggests that a 
stable political order in this world can only occur after having considered the human being as a 
traveler on a journey (Marcel, Homo Viator 153-154; Marcel, Preface to Homo Viator 7). Other 
approaches to the human being—which consider the human being as a mere animal, angel, or 
even robot—cannot but end in dehumanization (cf. Marcel, I. Reflection & Mystery Chs. 2-3).  
 The critique of the autonomous self complements the rejection of therapeutic approaches 
to communication as well as emotivism. Some communication scholars have rejected therapeutic 
approaches to communication, which overemphasize the role of the self in the communicative 
act (Arnett, “A Dialogic Ethic ‘Between’ Buber and Levinas: A Responsive Ethical ‘I’”; Arnett 
and Arneson). The therapeutic culture thrives upon a cult of the self and emotivism, or decision-
making by personal preference (Arnett and Arneson 62-67). In a therapeutic culture, individuals 
air their grievances and avoid being “judgy”; they emote (Arnett and Arneson 65; Fritz, 
                                                   
22 Perhaps it is the case that the self only ends up truly “situated” once and for all after death.  
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Professional Civility: Communicative Virtue at Work 144). Troup and Marinchak describe one 
particular communicative manifestation of the therapeutic culture—niceness, a quasi-virtue 
parading around as the real thing (Troup and Marinchak). Fritz’s work distances “professional 
civility,” a real virtue, from a “therapeutic approach to discourse” (Fritz, Professional Civility 
142). The notion of the “therapeutic” stems from Philip Rieff’s work The Triumph of the 
Therapeutic, wherein Rieff explains how, in a postreligious age, psychology usurps the place 
previously held by religion in prescribing what to do and what not to do. The quest for health and 
normalcy in the immanent world replaces the transcendent journey towards salvation (Han 18, 
50-51; Lasch, The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy 217; Rieff 43). Rieff 
provides a succinct description of “therapeutic” in The Triumph of the Therapeutic. Rieff writes,  
By this time men may have gone too far, beyond the old deception of good and evil, to 
specialize at last, wittingly, in techniques that are to be called, in the present volume, 
‘therapeutic,’ with nothing at stake beyond a manipulatable sense of well-being. This is 
the unreligion of the age, and its master science.23 (Rieff 10) 
Thus, Rieff suggests that comfort rather than “the old deception of good and evil” takes center 
stage in a therapeutic culture, where individuals employ techniques put forward by experts, 
especially psychologists, to manipulate their “sense of well-being” (Rieff 10, 19). Elsewhere, 
Rieff writes, “Well-being is a delicate personal achievement ….” (Rieff 41; emphasis mine). 
Attending to one’s own sense of “well-being” takes precedence over communal concerns (Rieff 
15-16, 43, 55-65). Thus, given his suspicion of experts, psychology, and the autonomous self, 
Percy would likely have appreciated the ideas put forward by the aforementioned thinkers 
regarding the pitfalls of therapeutic communication and the therapeutic culture, especially Rieff’s 
                                                   
23 Rieff describes “therapeutic” in adjectival terms here. Later in The Triumph of the Therapeutic, Rieff also 
describes the “therapeutic” as a “character type” (Rieff 202).  
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ideas. But Percy’s work also extends the critique of emotivism and the therapeutic culture.24 To 
begin with, when individuals in a therapeutic culture make decisions based on personal 
preference, they may neglect to attend to where these preferences come from. Preferences do not 
emerge without precedent, and individuals do not make them up on their own. Where do such 
preferences hail from, then? The “they” prescribes them, of course. Experts shower down 
information on the masses so that the latter might live more enriching, immanent lives (Taylor, A 
Secular Age 18-20, 142-145, 623). Psychologists play the role of transcendent expert, but other 
social scientists, too, assume the posture of knower and priest (Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism 
154-186; Lasch, The Minimal Self 29). The news media creates the time and space necessary for 
experts to hawk their wares. In his essay “The Coming Crisis in Psychiatry,” Percy explains how 
psychiatry does not account for the human desire for transcendence as some existentialists do 
(Percy, Signposts 251-262). Moreover, Rieff’s description of “therapeutic” techniques enabling a 
“manipulatable sense of well-being” relates directly to Percy’s thoughts on the human being as 
more than an animal in an environment. Scientific and artistic techniques can only do so much 
for an individual. Science and art cannot answer the question of the self because it is the question 
of questions, which presupposes a religious answer—whether theistic (Marcel) or not (Sartre). 
Nevertheless, experts, social engineers, and laymen of all stripes rely upon not only techniques 
but also technology to foster a “manipulatable sense of well-being.”  
 In addition to rhetoric and philosophy of communication, Percy’s insights about C2 
consciousness have interesting implications for media ecology. Percy knew that people delight in 
encountering themselves in various media. Why? Perhaps because technology allows the self to 
                                                   
24 The genius of Percy’s attack on the therapeutic culture lies in his satirical approach, which I will review further in 
the following chapter. While Rieff eventually stopped writing later in his career, Percy kept attacking the therapeutic 
mentality through indirect routes (for more on Rieff’s silence, see Lasch, The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of 
Democracy 220).  
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fix itself (and the other) into a relatively static entity, a thing among other things. Percy asks why 
individuals search for themselves first when viewing a photograph (Percy, Lost 7). Arguably, the 
photograph reifies the self into a fixed form, something conceivable. As shown above, the self 
searches for any sort of semiotic habiliment, and technology provides the illusion of such a 
habiliment. Consider Instagram and Facebook profiles today. Individuals post pictures of 
themselves and others. However, the question arises while one carefully selects which images to 
display and what to write: Is this my true, real self? After posting the perfect image, someone 
might exclaim, “Now I am being true to myself!” Further, having another confirm the mediated 
self elicits joy (Percy, Lost 120-121). Someone “likes” your picture or comments on your post. 
And if nobody “likes” or comments, then what? Thus, recalling Sartre and Marcel, technology 
can enable “bad faith” and facilitate simulacra formulation. However, paradoxically, technology 
can also shatter the simulacra of oneself and the other. Percy questions why people gaze at 
themselves in the reflections of shop mirrors when walking down the street (Percy, Lost 7). For 
Percy, the encounter with oneself in the immediacy of a mirror seems to break through the 
symbolic simulacra covering over the self’s existential particularity. Relatedly, people seek to 
destroy previous mediations of themselves online. Past Facebook or Instagram posts may conjure 
up a feeling of disgust. Who is this person? Was that me? Did I write that? Nowadays, 
individuals can pay someone to scour the Internet to delete instances of their previous selves. 
Consider also the examples given by Percy of the phenomenon of celebrity, which helps to 
reveal Percy’s insights into the relationship between technology, symbols, and existence (Percy, 
“The Decline of the Western”; Percy, Lost 37-40; Percy, The Moviegoer 11-17). Most people 
know celebrities through various media, especially images, TV shows, YouTube channels, 
movies, etc. Celebrities become symbols (Percy, Lost 40). Pleasure results in seeing celebrities 
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measure up to their mediated symbols (Percy, Lost 40). However, pleasure also follows from 
encountering celebrities in their existential particularity, seeing them in person, which tends to 
pierce through the a priori symbolic simulacra (Percy, Lost 40; Percy, Symbol & Existence 131). 
Altogether, technology can facilitate the dialectic of simulacra formulation and self-
forgetfulness, immanence and transcendence.  
Moreover, with regard to implications for media ecology, Percy also subtly hints that the 
primacy of sight may have something to do with the inability to know oneself (Percy, Lost 211). 
In Lost in the Cosmos, Percy puts the following into the mouth of the alien questioning the 
astronaut about his state of consciousness: “C2 selves don’t know who they are.* Perhaps your 
difficulty comes from the sensory mode which you call ‘seeing.’ You ‘see’ things. But can you 
‘see’ yourself? Who are you?” (Percy, Lost 211). Of course, the self can see itself in visual 
forms: mirrors, photographs, videos, etc. But, by default, the eyes face outward, not inward. 
Brain scans, for all of their usefulness, do not reveal the self qua self. Relatedly, Ong discusses 
how the various senses relate to self perception in The Presence of the Word.25 Touch gives a 
“sense of oneself as sensing” (Ong, The Presence of the Word 169-173). Ong writes, “Each time 
I feel something, I also feel myself feeling what I feel” (Ong, The Presence 170). The sense of 
touch registers how objects in actuality resist the self (Ong, The Presence 171-172). Ong writes, 
“[T]he sense [of touch] which involves me most intimately also involves what is not me most 
inescapably” (Ong, The Presence 172).26 The self can also register itself in the sense of taste, 
which Ong considers as “close to touch” (Ong, The Presence 170-171). However, sight 
                                                   
25 Ong cites Percy in Hopkins, the Self, and God while discussing names and the pronoun “I” (Ong, Hopkins, the 
Self, and God 33-34). Ong suggests that although the self cannot have a name, it can have a pronoun: “I” (Ong, 
Hopkins 33-37).  
26 Unlike sound, touch can only get at innerness by prying, and touch can easily “degenerate into object-like control 
(manipulation) of another” (Ong, The Presence 117-118, 169).  
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objectifies things, dissects them, reveals only surfaces, and understands events in sequence (Ong, 
The Presence 74, 128-130, 288-289). Ong writes, “Sight registers the stars, billions of light-years 
away. What could be less myself, more ‘other’?” (Ong, The Presence 171). Compare Ong’s 
question with Percy’s satirical subtitle for Lost in the Cosmos: “Why is it possible to learn more 
in ten minutes about the Crab Nebula in Taurus, which is 6,000 light-years away, than you 
presently know about yourself, even though you’ve been stuck with yourself all your life” 
(Percy, Lost 1). The eye thingifies the self and the other. Voice, on the other hand, registers the 
“actuality” and presence of the self and the other perhaps like no other sense (Ong, The Presence 
174). Voice manifests the interiority and mystery of a person (Ong, The Presence 163). Ong cites 
Buber to suggest that an overemphasis on the visual sense, thanks to the advent and domination 
of the written word, tends to favor the I-It relationship over the I-Thou relationship (Ong, The 
Presence 289). Thus, certain parallels begin to emerge between Percy’s thought and Ong’s, 
which I can only begin to sketch out here. Importantly, I would like to acknowledge that just 
because the self cannot know itself through the mediation of the symbol, it does not follow that 
the self does not exist like some postmodernists would have us believe. I noted this in Chapter 1, 
but it bears repeating here. 
 Clearly, Percy’s work on C2 consciousness has significant implications for rhetoric, 
philosophy of communication, and media ecology. In this final section, I began by explaining 
how rhetoricians could use Percy’s ideas about simulacra to formulate an ethics of rhetoric. Next, 
I discussed how Percy contributes to the idea of a “situating self” and to critiques of the 
therapeutic culture. I also considered certain implications of C2 consciousness for media 
ecology. The self delights in symbolic mediations of itself. Further, the primacy of sight plays a 
role in thingifying the self and the other. In the previous two chapters, I considered Anton’s 
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critique of Percy. Anton claims that Percy did not consider the influence of the alphabet on 
denotative utterance (Anton, “On the Nonlinearity of Human Communication,” 84). Indeed, 
Percy might not have explicitly considered the influence of alphabetic literacy on denotative 
utterance; however, Percy nevertheless associated the primacy of sight with the pitfalls of C2 
consciousness. As media ecologists teach us, the alphabet creates a visual bias, translating all of 
the other senses into sight (Havelock, Preface to Plato; McLuhan and McLuhan, The Laws of 
Media; Ong, Orality and Literacy; Ong, The Presence).27 Putting Percy into an extended 
conversation with Ong promises to yield more connections between Percy’s semiotic and the 
media ecology tradition. Altogether, this chapter has sought to underscore that the self longs for 
the embodied encounter with the real presence of the other and God in their existential fullness, 
where phantoms of simulacra cannot intervene. Indeed, the thrust toward transcendence involves 
intersubjective communion with other human beings and with God Himself. All idealists, social 
constructionists, and constructivists who hold more esteem for the symbol than for reality deal in 
a “waste product of experience” (Marcel, I. Reflection & Mystery 54).28 By focusing on the ego, 
idealists tend to exacerbate the solipsism of C2 consciousness. Escaping the vortex of C2 
consciousness requires something more than the self, which the next chapter on C3 
consciousness will explore.  
                                                   
27 Percy explicitly recognizes how the left-brained exercise of writing leads to higher degrees of abstraction and 
radical self-consciousness, which would be interesting to compare with McLuhan’s comments on left-brained, 
alphabet-induced angelism (Percy, Lost 147-148; McLuhan and McLuhan, The Laws of Media Ch. 2; McLuhan and 
Powers 3-4). McLuhan and Ong might also suggest that the advent of print helped to foster the “picture-book world 
of the en-soi” described above (McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy, 273-274; Ong, The Presence of the Word 288-
289; Percy, Symbol and Existence 194; cf. McLuhan and McLuhan, Media and Formal Cause 53-54; cf. McLuhan, 
Understanding Media 70). 
28 As a corollary to the aforementioned discussion of simulacra, realists deal with existence instead of its paltry 
substitute, a “waste product of experience” (Marcel, I. Reflection & Mystery 54). 
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Chapter 4: C3 Consciousness, Redemption 
The painter Caravaggio’s (1571-1610) The Calling of St. Matthew depicts the moment 
when Christ calls Matthew, the tax collector. In the painting, five men gather around a small 
table. Three sit, while an older man and a boy stand. All five look well dressed. Christ appears in 
the doorway with an outstretched hand pointing in the direction of someone in the room. Who is 
he pointing at? A bearded man, perhaps Peter, stands by Christ’s side, pointing in the same 
direction, imitating Christ. The two men furthest away from Christ keep their heads down, 
engrossed by counting the money that lies before them on the table; these two do not even see 
the shadowy figure at the door. Perhaps they heard someone enter, but the coins soak up their 
attention. An open window above Christ’s faintly haloed head lets in a cone-shaped beam of 
light that brightens the upper half of the wall behind the group. A shutter hanging on the adjacent 
wall blocks part of the beam, allowing only a small stream of light to land squarely on the face of 
one man, who looks wide-eyed in the direction of Christ. The wide-eyed man holds up his own 
index finger, ambiguously pointing either at himself or at the man next to him.1 That leaves three 
fingers hanging in midair—Christ’s, Peter’s, and the wide-eyed man’s. If paintings could speak, 
this painting might ask, “Who is Christ calling here? Who is being pointed at? Is it the wide-eyed 
man? Is it the man counting coins? Is it you?” 
In this chapter, I review C3 consciousness, or the redemption from the predicament of C2 
consciousness. At the very heart of C3 consciousness lies the solemn fact that Christ is calling 
you, you the individual person living in a particular historical moment, much like a St. Matthew 
and any of the other saints. Of course, Percy mostly sought to avoid making any such direct 
assertions in his fiction and non-fiction about the Good News of eternal salvation. Percy 
                                                   
1 Arguably, The Calling of St. Matthew admits of multiple interpretations regarding precisely who Matthew is in the 
painting, whether the wide-eyed man or the man counting coins at the end of the table (Varriano 111).  
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preferred to take an indirect route. Why? Because most everyone knows God loves them. 
Everyone has heard the Good News, and having heard it, they have turned on the television to 
find an enthralling series on Netflix to cure their boredom (cf. Percy, Signposts 322-323). As 
Percy suggests, nowadays there is “an indifference more subversive than hostility” (Percy, 
Signposts 322). Perhaps above all, the simulacra that cloud C2 consciousness and the general 
cheapening of the vocabulary of Christendom make it difficult to recognize the shadowy figure 
on the other side of the room, the God-Man. All too often, symbolic simulacra relegate the 
crucifix or the Caravaggio painting to the realm of the merely “religious,” a deadly realm where 
it wanes in significance (Percy, Symbol & Existence 108-109). And so, Percy sought to cloak his 
project in a subtle guise. Today, everyone calls out “Come!” (Percy, The Message 148). How, 
then, do you decide which voice to heed? When seemingly everyone points at you and calls out 
your name with a promise of a remedy for your predicament, how do you separate the wheat 
from the chaff? And, if you truly have a message to deliver that has eternal significance, how do 
you get others to listen? Thus, the first major section of this chapter defines C3 consciousness. In 
its true form, C3 consciousness implies conversion. Nevertheless, Percy discusses several 
variants of pseudo C3 consciousness, which I also review below, that allow temporary reprieve 
from the stifling condition of C2 consciousness.  In the next section, I review how 
defamiliarization, which I define further below, clears away the simulacra, or the a priori 
symbolic reifications, that hinder the way to C3 consciousness. In the third main section, I 
review how Kierkegaard and Aquinas shaped Percy’s understanding of key components of C3 
consciousness, including the relationship between faith and reason, the Church, and the 
sacraments. Finally, I conclude by reviewing the implications of this chapter for rhetoric, 
philosophy of communication, and media ecology.  
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Defining C3 Consciousness 
 In this section, I begin to unpack what Percy means by C3 consciousness. Among other 
things, Percy describes C3 consciousness as a modification of C2 consciousness. Percy puts the 
following into the mouth of the alien in Lost in the Cosmos: “A C3 consciousness is a C2 
consciousness which has become aware of its predicament, sought help, and received it” (Percy, 
Lost 212). Recall here again the semiotic, existential “predicament” of trying to find an adequate 
symbol for oneself, which I reviewed in the previous chapter. The temptation faced by C2 
consciousness to choose one symbol or another to prop oneself up on remains an enduring 
temptation for C3 consciousness. Yet, C3 consciousness has somehow come to the realization 
that no symbol can adequately capture who or what it is. If C2 consciousness involves a solitary 
self trying in vain to find an adequate symbol for itself, then C3 consciousness implies a 
“redemption” from this state (Percy as qtd. in Hobson, “Interview with Walker Percy” 90-92). 
Ultimately, Percy believes that only religion, Christianity in particular, can provide the complete 
answer to the question “[B]ut what am I?” (Percy, The Message 284). However, Percy also 
outlines other secular avenues for momentarily forgetting the predicament of the self and for 
achieving temporary intersubjective communion (Percy as qtd. in Hobson, “Interview with 
Walker Percy” 90-93). The problem with these secular avenues lies in their relative transience 
and lack of duration, which leads to what Percy calls “reentry problems.” Below, I first review 
true C3 consciousness, wherein the self heeds a transcendent message of salvation. Next, I 
describe some secular, pseudo attempts to escape the predicament of C2 consciousness. Third, I 
discuss the primary drawbacks of these secular attempts to escape the solitary predicament of the 
self, which Percy called “reentry problems.” This section lays the groundwork for the following 
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section, which reviews several tactics of defamiliarization that facilitate the movement toward 
C3 consciousness. 
 To begin, Percy believed that C3 consciousness escapes the maddening solipsism of C2 
consciousness with the help of an apostle, or messenger. Someone arrives with “news from 
across the seas” bearing upon the semiotic existential predicament (Percy, The Message 119-
149). Note well that, as a believer, Percy considers this type of religious C3 consciousness as the 
true answer to C2 consciousness’ predicament (Percy as qtd. in Hobson, “Interview with Walker 
Percy” 91). Percy writes, “C3 is redemption—it’s the Good News” (Percy as qtd. in Hobson, 
“Interview with Walker Percy” 90). Who or what are you? According to Marcel, a believer in the 
Good News, you are a traveler heading back to your transcendent home (Percy, The Message 
111; Marcel, Homo Viator 153; Marcel, Preface to Homo Viator). The apostle answers the 
semiotic, existential question—“[B]ut what am I?”—and the Church transmits the answer 
throughout the ages via apostolic succession (Percy, The Message 140, 149, 284). Intervention 
into the predicament of C2 consciousness comes from without, from a transcendent source. The 
apostle and the Church carry the transcendent message across space and time, to the ends of the 
earth and to future generations. Historically, members of the Church have used a catechism such 
as the Baltimore Catechism, a text filled with brief questions and answers, to help hand down the 
faith and instruct believers in its teachings. Question 126 in the Baltimore Catechism plainly 
states that the “end of man,” or the “purpose for which he was created,” is “to know, love, and 
serve God” (“Baltimore Catechism #3: Lesson 1”). Unlike C2 consciousness, which does not 
know what to do with itself, C3 consciousness has an answer: know, love, and serve God (Percy, 
Lost 211). Question 127 explains, “he [man] was created for something outside this world ….” 
(“Baltimore Catechism #3: Lesson 1”). The Catechism adequately addresses the human being’s 
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orientation towards transcendence. No matter how many immanent needs C2 consciousness has 
had satisfied, the itch for transcendence remains. C2 consciousness ends in a static reification of 
the self into one thing or another, while C3 consciousness acknowledges the centrality of 
relationship and communion with the Divine. Despite Percy’s Catholicism, Percy identifies even 
a Baptist as having entered C3 consciousness (Percy, Lost 218). Why? Because C3 
consciousness receives “news from across the seas” from a transcendent source beyond the 
immanent plane, too, which Christians of various denominations admit (Percy, The Message 
119-149). The importance lies in the recognition of a timeless God entering into time, the eternal 
becoming historical, which Kierkegaard understood as the absurd (Kierkegaard, Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript 188). Before reviewing Percy’s reading of Kierkegaard and Aquinas, 
which yields more insight into true, religious C3 consciousness, I must first characterize other, 
secular attempts to escape C2 consciousness. 
 In addition to religious (and true) C3 consciousness, Percy describes several types of 
secular, “quasi-C3” consciousness (Percy as qtd. in Hobson, “Interview with Walker Percy” 90-
91). These secular attempts to remedy the alienation of C2 consciousness either reestablish 
intersubjective communion through naming or otherwise shift the focus of attention away from 
the self. For example, scientists act in a manner that presupposes a community of other scientists, 
whom they hope will understand and confirm their work (Percy, The Message 210). Scientific 
discoveries imply intersubjective communion and revelatory insight. Good scientists such as the 
physicist Albert Einstein or Karl von Frisch, the famous scientist who studied bees, may get so 
lost in their studies as to forget the predicament of C2 consciousness (Percy, Lost 13, 143). In 
addition to scientific practice, Percy explains how good art can name alienation and by so doing 
lead to the reversal of alienation (Percy, Lost 120-121; Percy, The Message 97). As Percy 
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suggests, the alienated commuter reading a novel about an alienated commuter is in better shape 
than his non-reading comrade (Percy, The Message Ch. 4). Why? Because the reading commuter 
has someone to share his predicament with (Percy, Lost 121). Percy writes, “Art reestablishes 
community, even if you’re reading a book alone. If it’s a great book, there is a community 
established between you, the writer, and the words he’s using” (Percy as qtd. in Hobson, 
“Interview with Walker Percy” 91). A great book can articulate something hitherto unarticulated 
about existence (Percy, Lost 120). In the previous chapter, I discussed Franz Kafka’s ability to 
authentically name a predicament for others. Kafka could point out the alienation of living in an 
impersonal and frightening society, and Kafka’s readers could recognize their own plight in 
Kafka’s fiction. A simple one-to-one correspondence does not need to exist between a novel and 
a reader’s life for such a reversal to take place. Obviously, Kafka’s readers did not themselves 
turn into giant cockroaches like Gregor Samsa in Kafka’s Metamorphosis (Kafka, 
“Metamorphosis”). Perhaps you can identify with Samsa simply because others have treated you 
like an insect for one reason or another. Thus, the best stories operate as analogies, or symbols, 
that articulate a situation held in common. Through the mediation of poetry, fiction, music, and 
other forms of art, an alienated individual may come to recognize his or her predicament through 
another’s portrayal of it (Percy as qtd. in Hobson, “Interview with Walker Percy” 90-91). For 
example, consider The Shawshank Redemption, a classic movie, which some consider as one of 
the greatest of all time, about a man wrongly incarcerated for the murder of his wife. Life admits 
of varying degrees of imprisonment and punishment that someone watching the film could 
identify with, even if he or she has never spent a day in prison. Even music without any lyrics 
can symbolize a predicament and express something about the inner life that the musician and 
listener share in common (Langer, Philosophy in a New Key 204-245; Percy, “Symbol as Need” 
 
174 
381-382). However, like other secular types of “quasi-C3” consciousness, the “salvific effect of 
art” does not endure (Percy, Lost 121).  
 In addition to the creation and reception of art, Percy highlights sports, media, 
recreational sex, drugs, and travel as activities for escaping the solitary predicament of C2 
consciousness (Percy, Lost 180-181). These “modes of recreation” afford varying degrees of 
communion, transcendence, and self-forgetfulness in a secular age (Percy, Lost 180). Such 
“quasi-C3” alternatives lead to secular diversion rather than religious conversion (Percy as qtd. 
in Hobson, “Interview with Walker Percy” 91).2 With the possible exceptions of doing drugs and 
travelling, the self finds temporary respite from its isolation and once again encounters others in 
these activities. For example, the identification among others on a sports team and the agonism 
inherent to athletic contests leads one to temporarily forget the predicament of the self (Percy, 
Lost 180). For better or for worse, players and spectators alike can lose themselves in a given 
contest. Percy writes, “Ask a Bororo tribesman: Who are you? He may reply: I am a parakeet. 
(Ask an L.S.U. fan at a football game: Who are you? He may reply: I am a tiger.)” (Percy, Lost 
11). The identification between self and other may become complete at a sporting event. The 
media also facilitate intersubjective transactions between otherwise isolated selves (Percy, Lost 
180-181). Of course, some media may serve artistic ends, such as novels, albums, and the like. 
Other forms of media such as TV and the news, however, traffic largely in entertainment 
(Postman, Amusing Ourselves to Death). In this historical moment, some people watch CNN, 
while others watch Fox News. The identification between members of the same media tribe and 
the antagonism toward those of a different persuasion oftentimes resembles a sporting contest, an 
agonistic conflict with winners and losers (Strate, Amazing Ourselves to Death 94-95). Percy 
                                                   
2 Speaking of conversion to an ethical life oriented toward real standards, Irving Babbitt once wrote, “The whole of 
life may, indeed, be summed up in the words diversion and conversion” (Babbitt, Democracy and Leadership 268). 
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never lived to see the advent of social media, but if he had, he likely would have considered it as 
another form of “quasi-C3” consciousness insofar as it, like other forms of media, enables the 
momentary establishment of intersubjective communion. Recreational sex, too, offers 
autonomous selves in a postreligious and therapeutic age yet another avenue for intersubjective 
communion. Percy writes, “A further possibility, too, for temporary redemption is making love. 
That provides a real, concrete, human C3 community—but again a temporary one” (Percy as qtd. 
in Hobson, “Interview with Walker Percy” 91). By “community,” Percy means in this case the 
encounter of one isolated self with another. Percy describes sex as “the cheapest, most readily 
available and pleasurable mode of intercourse with other selves and the only mode of intercourse 
by which the self can be certain of its relationship with other selves ….” (Percy, Lost 181). Yet, 
Percy parodies the futility of recreational sex to inform the nothingness of C2 consciousness 
(Percy, Lost 44, 189; Percy, The Message 100). Like the other alternative means of escaping the 
predicament of the self, the transcendence experienced in recreational sex does not last. Finally, 
autonomous selves may do drugs or travel to find release from their alienation. The self does not 
necessarily escape its isolation when doing drugs but rather forgets its isolation. Drug users such 
as alcoholics, for example, do drugs to lose themselves (Percy as qtd. in Hobson, “Interview with 
Walker Percy” 91). Partying today has more to do with annihilating the self and less to do with 
festival and the celebration of community (Percy, Lost 180-185). Further, Percy believes that 
people may travel to a new location after their current location has been devalued, used up, or 
consumed by the commonplace (Percy, Lost 148, 181, 183; Percy, Signposts 5). Familiarity 
breeds contempt, and one’s own home is no exception. All too often, new places promise new 
identities (Percy, Lost 181, 183). But, again, the exciting novelty of a new place may always 
wear off. Percy writes, “After a sojourn in the desert, memories of Louisiana green become 
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irresistible” (Percy, Signposts 5). Altogether, all these secular attempts to escape the predicament 
of C2 consciousness do not last.  
 The trouble with the aforementioned secular alternatives to religious C3 consciousness 
lies in the transience of the transcendence that they afford, which leads to what Percy calls 
“reentry problems” (Percy, Lost 121-124, 142, 146-159). The intersubjective communion 
achieved by scientists and artists implies “the spectacular miseries of reentry” (Percy, Lost 124).3 
What does Percy mean by “reentry problems”? Essentially, the lows of self-consciousness and 
alienation follow after the highs of self-forgetfulness and intersubjective communion. 
Everydayness sets in. Consider the case of the talented artist. Percy writes, “How do you go 
about living in the world when you are not working at your art, yet still find yourself having to 
get through a Wednesday afternoon?” (Percy, Lost 145). A good novelist spends several months 
and maybe even years working on a book, says something real and true about the human 
condition that others can recognize, and then perhaps wins an award for their art. But then what? 
What does that novelist do afterward? Similarly, someone who reads a novel or even a poem 
enjoys momentary transcendence (Percy, Lost 121). Reading a good book can alter your 
perception in a near miraculous way. But what next? What can compare to the exhilarating “taste 
of transcendence and community” experienced when creating or enjoying a work of art (Percy, 
Lost 121)? Thus, a novelist might drink to soften the blow of an ordinary Wednesday afternoon 
(Percy, Lost 123, 147-148). Altogether, scientists and artists experience intense pleasure from 
acquiring and conveying knowledge to others through the mediation of symbols (Percy, Lost 
143). The quotidian nature of everyday life does not compare with the exaltation of naming and 
                                                   
3 Percy suggests that good scientists do not experience quite the same “reentry problems” as bad scientists (Percy, 
Lost 115). Good scientists typically appear as “absentminded” and potentially out of touch with everyday affairs in a 
benign sort of way, whereas bad scientists tend to oscillate more violently between scientific abstraction and 
embodied, communal life (Percy, Lost 115-119).  
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knowing in scientific and artistic modes (Percy, Lost 143). If scientists, artists, and their 
audiences face “reentry problems,” then, rest assured, the other ways of achieving pseudo C3 
consciousness mentioned above involve “reentry problems,” albeit in a perhaps more intense, 
unconscious way. People develop a hunger, an addiction, even, for sports, media consumption, 
recreational sex, drugs, and travel. The self may turn to these activities more and more to assuage 
the unspeakability of the self. But the self always remains as a leftover following each 
transcendent episode. All attempts to escape the predicament of the self by secular means cannot 
but end in despair, whether the self becomes conscious of his or her despair or not. Thus, Percy 
suggests only one “viable mode of reentry”: religious conversion (Percy, Lost 156-157, 159). 
Percy suggests in Lost in the Cosmos that Kierkegaard and Pascal recognized religious 
conversion as the only possible way to escape C2 consciousness and to reenter the concrete 
world of place and time despite the “strange abstractions of the twentieth century” (Percy, Lost 
156-157). In The Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard writes, “Faith is: that the self in being itself 
and in willing to be itself is grounded transparently in God” (Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto 
Death 132). The word “transparently” is a key word for Percy here (Percy, Lost 156-157). Percy 
describes Simone Weil, Martin Buber, and Dietrich Bonhoeffer as exemplary souls who “have 
become themselves transparently before God and managed to live intact through difficult lives” 
(Percy, Lost 157). This does not necessarily mean that those who live “transparently before God” 
live sinless lives. Only, such souls have no need to resort to semiotic disguises to cover over their 
own nothingness (Percy, Lost 152-154). Such individuals have established their integrity in God. 
Percy does not appear to cite any particular passage from Pascal when Percy mentions Pascal 
alongside Kierkegaard in Lost in the Cosmos (Percy, Lost 156-157). Nevertheless, Pascal in his 
Pensées identifies the futility of all attempts to find happiness outside of God. Even the suicide 
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desires happiness when taking his own life (Pascal 45; Percy, Lost 155-156). Pascal writes, 
“[T]his infinite abyss [in man] can be filled only with an infinite and immutable object; in other 
words by God himself [sic]” (Pascal 45). Nothing can satisfy the longing for the eternal in the 
human heart save for the eternal itself.  
 Thus, in this section, I have provided a basic description of C3 consciousness. I began by 
suggesting that C3 consciousness recognizes its predicament and seeks help from beyond itself. 
In religious terms, C3 consciousness heeds the Good News of a messenger, or apostle. Next, I 
reviewed some secular ways that the self momentarily escapes the predicament of C2 
consciousness: science, art, sports, media, recreational sex, drugs, and travel. Please note that 
these secular avenues of transcendence do not constitute an exhaustive list of options open to C2 
consciousness for trying to escape its predicament. Violence and war offer a perverse kind of 
community and self-forgetfulness (Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives 22; Percy, Lost 157, 191-192; 
Percy as qtd. in Hobson, “Interview with Walker Percy” 97). Percy also thought of 
psychoanalysis as a secular avenue for escaping the predicament of the self, “a kind of 
redemption” that can lead to a “quasi-community” between the patient and analyst (Percy as qtd. 
in Hobson, “Interview with Walker Percy” 93-94). Nevertheless, I insisted upon the transience of 
these secular attempts at C3 consciousness, which lead to “reentry problems.” Ultimately, Percy 
understands true C3 consciousness as religious in nature. Someone who has moved on to C3 
consciousness has recognized that something has gone awry in the human condition, indeed, in 
his or her very own life, and thus admits that he or she requires help (Percy, Lost 215, 262). At 
least two difficulties stand in the way of going the religious route in this historical moment 
(Percy, Lost 156-157). First, the obnoxiousness of some religious believers turns others away 
from conversion (Percy, Lost 156-157). Percy has no sympathy for “media preachers” or 
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televangelists with “blown-dry hairdos” (Percy, Lost 157, 180). The irony of certain religious 
appeals lies in the fact that they all too often accomplish the opposite of their intended effects. 
The billboard on the side of the road threatening Hell perhaps makes more unbelievers than 
believers (Percy, Signposts 180). Second, scientists often posit God as simply one more entity 
among entities immanent within the cosmos (Percy, Lost 156). Yet, God is not a being immanent 
within the cosmos but rather existence itself (Aquinas, Summa I. Q4. Ad. 2; Exodus 3:14 DRA). 
God is not a being but rather the perfect and subsistent ground upon which everything else 
depends upon in order to be. Despite its manifold usefulness in other spheres of life, the 
objective and empirical scientific method cannot grasp this notion of God as the ground of all 
existence. Above all, then, C3 consciousness implies the recovery of existence from symbolic 
simulacra, which I discussed in the previous chapter as sealing off the splendor of the other and 
of God from the solitary self. Indeed, symbols often intervene, blocking the path to religious 
conversion and C3 consciousness. In the following section, I outline some of the ways that Percy 
hints at for shattering the veil of symbolically induced ignorance and thus encountering existence 
once more.  
 
Defamiliarization and the Recovery of Existence: Shattering the Symbolic Simulacra 
 In this section, I describe several ways of overcoming the symbolic roadblocks that bar 
the way to religious C3 consciousness. In particular, I review several tactics of 
“defamiliarization,” which help to constitute Percy’s art of symbolic mediation, or his theory of 
rhetoric. Percy lays out several tactics for piercing through a priori symbolic reifications, or 
simulacra, which prevent existence from appearing to the solitary self. First, I begin by tracing 
the term “defamiliarization” to Victor Shklovsky, a Russian literary theorist that influenced 
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Percy. Second, I discuss several tactics that Percy discusses and employs for defamiliarizing: art 
and ordeal. Paradoxically, art uses symbols to undermine already calcified symbolic 
constructions. During an ordeal, on the other hand, the “recalcitrance” of reality itself impinges 
upon a priori symbolic reifications (Burke, Permanence and Change 255-261). Third, I suggest 
here that Percy used defamiliarization for religious ends. Percy did not create “art for art’s sake” 
(Tolson, Pilgrim in the Ruins 85, 233-234, 300, 464-465; Tolson, Introduction to The 
Correspondence of Shelby Foote & Walker Percy 3). Rather, in my estimation, Percy wrote as a 
moralist, a propagandist, and above all a rhetorician intent on concealing his artifice (Aristotle, 
Rhetoric 1404b36, 1417b8; Percy as qtd. in Bunting 41; Percy as qtd. in King 89; Percy, The 
Message 118; Percy, Signposts 181). In a 1962 letter to Caroline Gordon, a fellow novelist who 
advised Percy about the writing process, Percy states, “Actually I do not consider myself a 
novelist but a moralist or a propagandist” (Percy as qtd. in Tolson, Pilgrim 300).4 In a 1974 
interview with Barbara King, Percy says, “I’ve always been a polemicist and a moralist. I mean 
moralist in a large sense, of saying this is the way the world ought to be and not the way it is” 
(Percy as qtd. in King 89). True, Percy once denied having a “vocation” to “preach the Christian 
faith in a novel” (Percy, The Message 111). But Percy qualified this denial of a religious 
“vocation” by insisting on how his Christian worldview, with its assumptions about human 
nature and human destiny, remained central to the novels that he wrote (Percy, The Message 
111). Above all, Percy seems to have shuddered at the thought of writing something overtly 
preachy (Tolson, Pilgrim 464-465). Instead, Percy wrote his novels and Lost in the Cosmos in a 
way that hinted at the sublime, transcendent truth of C3 consciousness. As I show below, many 
of Percy’s novels end by gesturing toward the importance of the sacraments, outward signs 
                                                   
4 For more on Gordon’s role as a sounding board for Percy’s fiction, see Tolson, Pilgrim 219-222.  
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instituted by Christ that give grace (“Baltimore Catechism #3: Lesson 13”). Like a good 
rhetorician aware of his audience’s presuppositions, Percy went to great lengths to take an 
indirect approach, using subtle tactics of defamiliarization to move his audience toward C3 
consciousness (cf. Lawson, “Walker Percy’s Indirect Communications”).5 Despite the religious 
motivations behind Percy’s work, secular readers may nevertheless find Percy’s tactics of 
defamiliarization of interest. These tactics of defamiliarization may contribute to the temporary 
amelioration of the existential states mentioned in the previous chapter, including boredom, 
“everydayness,” and alienation. Nevertheless, it is incumbent upon the reader to remember that, 
for Percy, such amelioration does not last and eventually leads to “reentry problems,” which I 
describe further below. The discussion of defamiliarization here lays the groundwork for the 
following section that compares Kierkegaard and Aquinas, wherein I round out the discussion of 
C3 consciousness.  
 “Defamiliarization” refers to the process of recovering existence from the veil of 
simulacra, the symbolic reifications at one remove from reality.6 I use the term broadly here to 
describe both the symbolic and non-symbolic means for accomplishing such a recovery. Percy 
                                                   
5 After noting the tension between Percy the artist and Percy the propagandist, Quinlan adds, “My argument is that 
[Percy] the propagandist is present more than has been generally acknowledged to date and that what Lewis Lawson 
has referred to as his [Percy’s] ‘indirect communications’ are, in fact, relatively ‘direct,’ at least in the years after 
Percy has become successful and is no longer under the exacting editorial eye of Stanley Kauffman (see Lawson, 
Following Percy: Essays on Walker Percy’s Work [Troy, N.Y., 1988], 4-40)” (Quinlan 86n3). Quinlan rightfully 
acknowledges Percy as a propagandist; though I believe that Percy may have had other reasons for taking an indirect 
approach, which I unpack further below. Namely, Percy recognized how the devaluation of the language of 
Christendom and the disposition of his already evangelized audience made it very difficult to communicate with 
them directly (Percy, Signposts 322; Percy, Symbol & Existence 108).  
6 Lemon and Reis translate Shklovksy’s ostranenie as “defamiliarization,” whereas Sher translates ostranenie as 
“enstrangement” (Gratchev and Mancing 89n1; Lemon and Reis in a note preceding Shklovksy’s “Art as Device” 4; 
Sher, “Translator’s Introduction: Shklovsky and the Revolution” p. xviii-xix). Note that Sher deliberately writes 
“enstrangement” not “estrangement.” Sher indicates that Shklovsky himself had coined a neologism and so feels 
inclined to follow in Shklovsky’s footsteps and to coin a neologism of his own. For the sake of this dissertation, I 
use the term “defamiliarization” because it keeps with Percy’s usage. Interestingly, Sebeok suggests that 
Shklovsky’s ostranenie relates to Bertolt Brecht’s German word Verfremdung, which translates to “alienation” 
(Sebeok as qtd. in Samway, Thief 176).  
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himself described both art and ordeal as two options for breaking the simulacra and encountering 
being as being (Percy, Lost 105; Percy as qtd. in Samway, Thief 68-69). Percy learned about the 
term “defamiliarization” from the Russian literary theorist Viktor Shklovsky (1893-1984) (Percy, 
Lost 105). In the last decade of his life, Percy took a greater interest in Shklovsky’s writings, as 
Percy’s letters to the semioticists Kenneth Laine Ketner and Thomas Sebeok attest (Percy as qtd. 
in Samway, Thief 26, 68-69, 174-177, 180-181). In a 1986 letter to Sebeok, only a few years 
before Percy’s death in 1990, Percy explains how Shklovsky “is onto something with his notion 
of the evolution and ‘devolution’ of the esthetic symbol, and an esthetic device which he calls 
priëm ostrannenja which Eco translates as the ‘device for making strange,’ others as ‘fresh.’” 
(Percy as qtd. in Samway, Thief 174).7 In the first chapter of this dissertation, I briefly mentioned 
Shklovsky and his idea about how art can unsettle the taken for granted perception of reality 
(Shklovsky, “Art as Device” [Lemon and Reis] 12-13). Good art can puncture through the 
symbolic simulacra to “make the stone stony” again (Shklovsky, “Art as Device” [Lemon and 
Reis] 12). The symbol once again operates as a conduit to mediate existence, which temporarily 
liberates C2 consciousness from the thingified world of “being-in-itself.” According to Percy, 
Shklovsky understood the “devaluation” of the symbol that occurs in C2 consciousness and its 
subsequent “renewal,” or defamiliarization, through art (Percy, Lost 105; Percy as qtd. in 
Samway, Thief 180). Though Percy learned about the term “defamiliarization” and Shklovsky’s 
theories later in life, Percy had long written about how art and ordeal can restore the sense of 
existence (Percy, The Message 83-100; Percy, Symbol & Existence 110). Shklovsky merely 
articulated for Percy what Percy had already thought about the power of art and ordeal to slough 
off the simulacra and recover being.  
                                                   
7 Eco refers to Shklovsky’s “priëm ostrannenja,” or “the ‘device for making strange,’” in his A Theory of Semiotics 
(Eco 264).  
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 Like Percy, Shklovsky believed in the power of art to transform and enliven the ordinary 
perception of reality. Art renders the commonplace uncommon and the mundane magnificent. In 
short, art defamiliarizes experience. Shklovsky suggests that, by nature, perception becomes 
automatic and habituated (Shklovsky, “Art as Device” [Lemon and Reis] 11-12). Shklovsky 
invites his readers to consider the first time that they wrote with a pen or spoke in a foreign 
language (Shklovsky, “Art as Device” [Lemon and Reis] 11). Undertaking these activities for the 
first time may induce a certain amount of discomfort, but over time you gradually learn to use a 
pen and speak a language with greater facility and ease. Given enough time, speaking a language 
becomes second nature, tacit, and taken for granted (Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension 17-18, 29, 
45).8 In many ways, the automatization of perception makes life easier (Percy, Symbol & 
Existence 224-225; Shklovsky, “Art as Device” [Lemon and Reis] 11-12). Consider the case of 
typing on a computer. Imagine having to relearn your “home row” keys every time you sat down 
to type. The “hunt and peck” method of visually finding each key one at a time, a less 
economical way of typing than using the “home row” keys, puts the typist at a disadvantage. 
Arguably, the complexity of reality demands some level of habituation and automatization. Thus, 
for better or for worse, a priori symbolic constructions, the simulacra, help us to contend with 
day-to-day life. Art, however, deliberately upsets the ease and facility with which we process 
reality. Shklovsky writes, “The technique of art is to make objects ‘unfamiliar,’ to make forms 
difficult, to increase the difficulty and length of perception because the process of perception is 
an aesthetic end in itself and must be prolonged” (Shklovsky, “Art as Device” [Lemon and Reis] 
12). In other words, art delays and disrupts the automatic recognition of familiar objects or 
                                                   
8 Reading in foreign languages can invite defamiliarization. Eric McLuhan relates that his father, the media ecologist 
Marshall McLuhan, used to read the New Testament every morning in several different languages (Eric McLuhan, 
Introduction to The Medium and the Light p. xxi). Reading a passage in Hebrew, Greek, or Latin can invite renewed 
appreciation for the many layers of meaning contained therein. 
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events (Shklovsky, “Art as Device” [Lemon and Reis] 13, 19, 20, 21). In “Art as Device,” 
Shklovsky sets forth several different artistic tactics for delaying and disrupting the automatism 
of perception, including using a different rhythm or language (Shklovsky, “Art as Device” 
[Lemon and Reis] 22-24).9 Withholding the commonplace name for something and instead 
naming “corresponding parts of other objects” also contributes to defamiliarization (Shklovsky, 
“Art as Device” [Lemon and Reis] 13). Shklovsky uses an example from one of Tolstoy’s stories 
to illustrate this point. Tolstoy writes about the act of stripping someone, throwing him to the 
floor, and lashing his backside with birch rods. In this case, Shklovsky suggests how Tolstoy 
described flogging as if seeing it for the first time, which contributes to its defamiliarization 
(Shklovsky, “Art as Device” [Lemon and Reis] 12-13; Tolstoy, “Shame”). The description of 
what was then a commonplace yet humiliating practice has a powerful effect on the reader 
(Shklovsky, “Art as Device” [Lemon and Reis] 13; Tolstoy, “Shame”). Finally, a change in 
perspective may defamiliarize, too. Shklovsky gives the example of Tolstoy’s use of perspective 
in the story “Kholstomer,” wherein Tolstoy examines the nature of private property through the 
point of view of a horse (Shklovsky, “Art as Device” [Lemon and Reis] 14-15). In this story, the 
horse reflects upon what it means for something to belong to another, which indirectly invites the 
reader to consider the nature of private property (Tolstoy, “Kholstomer” 449-450). Regarding the 
use of a new perspective to defamiliarize, consider Percy’s own novelistic approach. Like 
Tolstoy’s horse, Percy advocates a shift in perspective and describes his tactic of taking a 
“Martian view” in The Message in the Bottle (Percy, The Message 11). Percy writes, “[O]nly a 
                                                   
9 Shklovsky refers to poetry as “a difficult, roughened, impeded language” (Shklovsky, “Art as Device” [Lemon and 
Reis] 22). Prose, on the other hand, is “economical, easy, proper” (Shklovsky, “Art as Device” [Lemon and Reis] 
23). In other words, Shklovsky explains how poetry and prose differ in terms of economy and ease of use. Poetry’s 
“roughened” quality contributes to the defamiliarization of language, which might otherwise fall beneath the level of 
awareness in its prosaic form (Shklovsky, “Art as Device” [Lemon and Reis] 22, 24).  
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Martian can see man as he is, because man is too close to himself and his vision too fragmented” 
(Percy, The Message 11). In Lost in the Cosmos, Percy literally takes a “Martian view”: Percy 
has an alien actually talk to a human being about the differences between C1, C2, and C3 
consciousness, among other things. The “Martian view” clears away any simulacra that might 
prevent Percy’s object of study, the human being, from appearing.  
 Words, especially, become familiar and worn out over time, which means that art can and 
should defamiliarize such depreciated words themselves. Words, just like any other perceptible 
phenomena, lose their potency through repetition and overuse.10 For example, take the word 
“love.” For Percy, sentimental television soap operas and sappy movies, among other forms of 
mass media, devalue the word “love” (Percy, Signposts 161). The word “love” becomes a 
thoughtless simulacra, a word degraded through its unreflective application to nearly everything 
and anything.11 Other commonly used, yet cheapened words include “truth, beauty, brotherhood 
of man, life, and so on” (Percy, Signposts 161). Even the most vulgar of curse words lose their 
“semantic charge” through careless repetition (Percy, Lost 191). In Lost in the Cosmos, Percy 
thoroughly defamiliarizes the term “self.” The final lines of the book come from an alien who 
asks, “Are you conscious? Do you have a self? Do you know how you are?” (Percy, Lost 262). 
Perhaps most importantly for Percy, religious words such as “God,” “grace,” “sin,” 
“redemption,” “salvation,” “Jesus,” and even “religion” itself have been devalued (Percy, 
                                                   
10 Percy explains how Heidegger and Marcel dealt with the problem of simulacra and the devaluation of words. 
Percy writes, “Being is elusive; it tends to escape, leaving only a simulacrum of symbol. … This is why new names 
must be found for being, as Heidegger thinks, or the old ones given new meaning, as Marcel thinks” (Percy, 
Signposts 135). Consider here Heidegger’s intimidating array of neologisms and concatenated strings of words: 
Dasein, being-in-the-world, etc. (Heidegger, Being and Time). For his own part, Marcel sought to give new meaning 
to old terms such as “being” and “having” (Collins 155-160).  
11 The Christian apologist C. S. Lewis defamiliarizes the word “love” in his book The Four Loves, which reviews 
four Greek understandings of love: storge (affection), philia (friendship), eros (erotic love), and agape (self-
sacrificing love) (Lewis, The Four Loves). Arguably, Lewis’ use of Greek terminology circumvents the simulacra 
that have formed around the notion of love and allows for new meaning to emerge.  
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Signposts 180, 306). Percy explains that religious words have become “worn smooth as poker 
chips” (Percy, The Message 116). Religious words no longer reveal anything about the 
underlying sacred dimension that they refer to. The religious poet and novelist, then, have the job 
of reanimating religious language. Percy writes, “One of the tasks of the saint is to renew 
language, to sing a new song” (Percy, Signposts 306). Psalm 91 reads, “Sing to the Lord a new 
song; sing to the Lord, all the earth” (Ps 96:1 NABRE). Percy believes that the Psalmist provides 
insight into the importance of coining new words (Percy, as qtd. in Bunting 41). Given the 
devaluation of religious language in the postmodern world, Percy asks. “How does he [the 
Christian novelist] set about writing, having cast his lot with a discredited Christendom and 
having inherited a defunct vocabulary?” (Percy, The Message 118). Elsewhere, Percy replies to 
his own question: “He [the Christian novelist] must use every ounce of skill, cunning, humor, 
even irony, to deliver religion from the merely edifying” (Percy, Signposts 306). Percy knew that 
the “merely edifying” would have no effect on his audience. Percy writes, “The fictional use of 
violence, shock, comedy, insult, the bizarre, are the everyday tools of his [the novelist’s] trade” 
(Percy, The Message 118). Percy notes how Flannery O’Connor portrays “baptism” through its 
exaggeration in The Violent Bear It Away (Percy, The Message 118). Many today might consider 
“baptism” as on par with “taking the kids to see Santa” (Percy, The Message 118). O’Connor, on 
the other hand, depicts “baptism” through death by drowning (O’Connor, The Violent Bear It 
Away). O’Connor’s fictional use of violence jolts the reader back into a religious mode in a most 
unconventional way.12 Beyond the fictional use of violence, satire can defamiliarize, too. Percy 
writes, “There may be times when the greatest service a novelist can do his fellow man is to 
                                                   
12 Even though Percy condones the fictional use of violence, Percy rejects the pornographic and sexually explicit 
(Percy, Signposts 214). The pornographic, which uses stimuli to elicit a response, operates on the dyadic plane as 
opposed to the symbolic, triadic plane (Percy, Signposts 362-363).  
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follow General Patton’s injunction: Attack, attack, attack. Attack the fake in the name of the 
real” (Percy, Signposts 161). The satirist, above all, attacks in a deliberately subversive way. 
Nevertheless, Percy rejects satire as a destructive enterprise and instead insists that “Satire is 
always launched in the mode of hope” (Percy, Signposts 182). Why? Because satire always 
“attacks one thing in order to affirm another” (Percy, Signposts 182). For example, Percy 
satirizes the self-help genre in Lost in the Cosmos for the sake of really helping others.13 For all 
of its splendor, the scientific method cannot help you find out who you are. With the assistance 
of a talking extraterrestrial, Percy aims to move his readers toward a recognition of the limits of 
the scientific method as well as their own predicament.  
 Ordeal, catastrophe, disaster, and crisis can also defamiliarize. Percy describes the 
alienated commuter who has a heart attack on the train and then sees his own hand “for the first 
time” with “wonder and delight” (Percy, The Message 4, 41, 60, 88, 109). Percy also repeatedly 
uses the example of Prince Andrei from Tolstoy’s War and Peace, who wondered at the 
grandeur of the clouds while lying wounded after combat (Percy, Symbol & Existence 110; 
Percy, The Message 41, 99; Tolstoy, War and Peace 164-167). Percy explains how disaster 
clears away “the simulacrum of everydayness and of consumption” (Percy, The Message 60). 
Even “bad news” of a catastrophe has a way of recalling the recipient of it back to reality (Percy, 
Lost 60; Percy, The Message 20). Percy’s description of the recovery of existence through ordeal 
resonates with the reader’s phenomenological experience. Why do people remember exactly 
what they were doing when the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor or when terrorists drove planes 
into the World Trade Center on 9/11 (Percy as qtd. in Tolson, The Correspondence of Shelby 
                                                   
13 Percy also wrote Love in the Ruins as a satire. The futuristic setting of Love in the Ruins allows Percy to caricature 
the worldviews of his historical moment, including those of the political left and right. Percy writes, “It [the 
futuristic novel] gives you a chance to speak to the present society from a futuristic point of view. Then you can 
exaggerate present trends so that they become noticeable and more subject to satire” (Percy as qtd. in Bunting 45).  
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Foote & Walker Percy 269; Percy as qtd. in Olesky 81; cf. Percy, Lost 58)? On September 11, I 
recall watching the burning buildings on a small television set in Mr. Hoover’s seventh grade 
classroom before being driven home by a family friend. Where were you? And why does 
memory become so vivid, distinct, and concrete when recalling a disaster (Percy, Lost 57-58)? 
Why does reality seem more real during a crisis? Even getting shot at can “dispense” someone 
from the commonplace (Percy, Lost 62-63). Percy’s novel The Second Coming begins with an 
alienated suburbanite taking a bullet while standing in his own garage (Percy, The Second 
Coming 15-21). Percy explains how Will Barrett, the protagonist, lay on the garage floor after 
getting hit, “speculating on the odd upsidedownness of the times, that on a beautiful Sunday in 
old Carolina, it takes a gunshot to restore a man to himself” (Percy, The Second Coming 18). 
Suffering, pain, and even nausea can “knock everything else out of one’s head, lofty thoughts, 
profound thoughts, crazy thoughts, even lust” (Percy, The Second Coming 223). Ordeal takes 
individuals out of themselves, for better or for worse, momentarily ending the solitary 
preoccupation with the self. Indeed, an ordeal often serves as a kairotic, or opportune, moment to 
realize some sublime truth about the human predicament.  
 Thus, Percy put both art and ordeal in the service of moving others toward C3 
consciousness. Percy believes that the novelist can make “vicarious use” of catastrophe to bring 
readers to themselves (Percy, The Message 118). The apocalyptic novel functions as a supremely 
effective tool for rendering the commonplace unfamiliar because it combines the defamiliarizing 
tactics of art and ordeal. Note well that the etymology of the word “apocalypse” implies an 
uncovering or disclosure (“Apocalypse”). What gets peeled away in an apocalyptic event? The 
simulacra. What gets revealed through ordeal? Existence itself. Percy’s Love in the Ruins takes 
place in a postapocalyptic scenario, where the vines have begun to sprout and overtake the 
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buildings (Percy, Love in the Ruins 9, 88, 115). Love in the Ruins begins with an account of how 
the psychiatrist protagonist Tom More treats one of his patients, Ted Tennis, for “angelism,” the 
abstracted and aloof state of solitary C2 consciousness (Percy, Love in the Ruins 32-37). In order 
to cure Ted of “angelism,” More has Ted walk through a swamp in order to get home, instead of 
having Ted take the commonplace commuter route. Ultimately, Ted’s ordeal clears away the 
simulacra for the better and takes him out of his abstracted state of mind (Percy, Love in the 
Ruins 37). In Love in the Ruins, Percy attempts to reanimate the word “love,” which has been 
cheapened and devalued over time, by depicting love in the ruins of a postapocalyptic world.14 
By contrast, Percy’s novel Lancelot seeks to restore meaning to the word “sin” (Percy, Lancelot 
52, 138; Percy, Signposts 383). Though written in a far more serious tone than Love in the Ruins, 
Lancelot bristles with a sense of the apocalyptic. For example, Lancelot, the main character, 
compares the revelation that his wife has been cheating on him and that another man has fathered 
his daughter to a scientist who has discovered that an asteroid will strike earth (Percy, Lancelot 
19-20, 27-33). The knowledge rocks Lancelot to his core. Later in the book, Lancelot prophesies, 
“This country [the US] is going to turn into a desert and it won’t be a bad thing” (Percy, Lancelot 
156). In Love in the Ruins, the world goes to ruins. In Lancelot, the main character’s life goes to 
ruins (Percy, “Questions They Never Asked Me” 179-180). In both cases, the catastrophic has a 
way of rendering reality more real. Both novels end by implying the significance of the most 
concrete and real of all phenomena for Catholics: the sacraments. According to Catholic 
tradition, the seven sacraments include baptism, holy orders, holy matrimony, confirmation, 
extreme unction (or anointing of the sick), confession, and the eucharist (“Baltimore Catechism 
#3: Lesson 13”). Love in the Ruins ends with a depiction of ordinary, domestic life in a marriage 
                                                   
14 Percy describes “ruin” as an exemplary “word-soul,” a pleasurable word worth savoring for itself (Percy, Symbol 
& Existence 225). 
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(Percy, Love in the Ruins 402-403). Lancelot, on the other hand, hints at the importance of holy 
orders. By the end of Lancelot, the priest, who has hitherto remained silent, finally begins to 
speak. Lancelot asks the priest, “Is there anything you wish to tell me before I leave?” The priest 
replies, “Yes,” and the novel ends (Percy, Lancelot 257). Only the priest as a priest, and not as a 
psychiatrist or anything else, can possibly help Lancelot at the end of Lancelot’s confession 
(Percy, Lancelot 4-5, 11). Only a priest has both the authority to preach the Good News and to 
grant absolution to Lancelot, provided that Lancelot expresses true contrition for his evil deeds. 
O’Gorman notes how the novel ends with “a real dialogue and therefore the possibility that 
Lance’s encounter with Percival [the priest] might become a saving confession after all” 
(O’Gorman 140). Despite the heinous deeds that Lancelot has committed, Lancelot does not lie 
beyond all hope (Percy, Signposts 385-386). In addition to Love in the Ruins and Lancelot, Percy 
has a way of leaving the reader with a sense of the importance of the sacraments in his other 
novels, too. The Last Gentleman, for example, involves a character receiving the sacrament of 
baptism near the end of the novel (Percy, The Last Gentleman 405-407). In the last few pages of 
The Moviegoer, the reader learns that Lonnie, the main character Binx Bolling’s half-brother, 
received extreme unction before passing away (Percy, The Moviegoer 240). Thus, Percy’s novels 
suggest the importance of the sacraments without explicitly stating as much. The “aesthetic 
limitations of the novel form” and the devaluation of the language of Christendom in this 
historical moment prevent any sort of direct utterance about the truths of revealed religion 
(Percy, Signposts 386).  
 Altogether, Percy uses tactics of defamiliarization to recover existence from the 
simulacra and to restore a sense of the transcendent. In this section, I began by reviewing the 
place of Viktor Shklovsky in Percy’s thought. Next, I discussed symbolic and non-symbolic 
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tactics of defamiliarization: art and ordeal. Third, I suggested that Percy combined art and ordeal 
in his novels to move audiences toward C3 consciousness.15 Non-religious individuals may seek 
to find value in the tactics of defamiliarization for their own sake. Nevertheless, the revelation of 
being that occurs after the simulacra have vanished may induce horror rather than joy. Catching 
sight of your own hand, “which can only be called a revelation of being,” results in either 
wonder or revulsion, depending on your religious persuasion (Percy, The Message 109). In 
distinction to the awestruck commuter, Percy explains how the atheist Sartre’s character 
Roquentin notices his hand with disgust (Percy, The Message 109).16 Further, with regard to the 
non-religious pursuit of defamiliarization, “reentry problems” will always accompany art and 
ordeal when individuals pursue these things as ends in themselves. The quest for sheer artistic 
transcendence of the human predicament may end in aestheticism and “art for art’s sake.” As 
with art, people can chase the transcendent highs of ordeal for its own sake, too. Think for a 
moment of free solo rock climbing, an extreme sport where climbers ascend rock faces without 
any safety gear. Free solo rock climbers like Alex Honnold climb hundreds of feet into the air 
without anything to catch them. Why on earth would someone put themselves on the edge of 
death in this way? Without question, the proximity and possibility of death revivifies experience. 
War stands as another example of ordeal that can result in the recovery of existence (Percy, Lost 
                                                   
15 In addition to art and ordeal, Percy hints at other tactics of defamiliarization that I did not cover above, including 
apprenticeship to a great figure. According to Percy, the great figure, such as a true scientist or artist, disdains 
specialist jargon and instead takes a sincere interest in the object of study (Percy, The Message 60-61). In other 
words, the great figure attends more to existence itself than simulacra, the symbolic constructions at one remove 
from reality.   
16 Percy suggests that Roquentin noticed that his hand looked like a “great fat slug with red hairs” (Percy, The 
Message 109). While I found no reference to a “slug” in Nausea, Sartre does have Roquentin compare his hand to a 
crab (Sartre, Nausea [trans. Lloyd Alexander] 98-99). Further, Roquentin’s reflections on his hands begins the 
novel. Roquentin writes in his journal, “[T]here is something new about my hands, a certain way of picking up my 
pipe or fork” (Sartre, Nausea [trans. Lloyd Alexander] 4). And a short bit later in the same journal entry, Roquentin 
reflects, “This morning in the library, when the Self-Taught Man came to say good morning to me, it took me ten 
seconds to recognize him. I saw an unknown face, barely a face. Then there was his hand like a fat white worm in 
my own hand. I dropped it almost immediately and the arm fell back flabbily” (Sartre, Nausea [trans. Lloyd 
Alexander] 4). 
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44, 124). In the 2008 film The Hurt Locker, the main character, a specialist in defusing bombs, 
struggles with “reentry problems” when returning home from combat. In one moment, the 
protagonist prevents a bomb from exploding, and in another he cleans leaves out of his gutter. 
Ordinary life cannot and does not compare to the thrill of defusing a bomb. Believe it or not, 
some escape the threat of boredom by risking life and limb. But how long can someone 
realistically tempt death? Ultimately, Percy suggests that people sin to escape the predicament of 
C2 consciousness (Percy, Lancelot 163-164). Violence renders the concrete infinitely real 
(Percy, Lancelot 242-243). Sex results in momentary ecstasy and transcendence (Percy, The Last 
Gentleman 279-280). But the visceral oscillations between sex and violence wreak havoc on the 
world and individuals’ lives (Percy, Lancelot 138-139; Percy, Lost 44, 175-192; Percy as qtd. in 
McCombs 200-201; Percy, The Second Coming 271). The soul seeking true redemption from C2 
consciousness thereby needs to hear “news” relative to his or her predicament that brings the 
promise of enduring relief. Only someone with authority, neither a novelist nor an academic, 
could possibly deliver such epic news. Thus, I now turn to consider how Percy understood the 
role of the apostolic messenger and the gifts that he bears: the Good News and the sacraments.   
 
Kierkegaard and Aquinas: The Apostle and the “Means” of Salvation in C3 Consciousness 
 Above, I noted how Percy defined a C3 consciousness as a C2 consciousness that has 
recognized its predicament and its need for help. Next, I suggested how art and ordeal can clear 
away the simulacra and open C2 consciousness up to the possibility of true, religious C3 
consciousness. In this section, I discuss the role of the apostle in moving the soul toward C3 
consciousness. Two philosophers influenced Percy’s understanding of the role of the apostle: 
Kierkegaard and Aquinas. First, I briefly explain how Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), the 
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Danish philosopher often labeled as an existentialist, influenced Percy’s thought. Kierkegaard 
vigorously attacked the Hegelianism and system building of his time. Like Marcel, Kierkegaard 
sought to combat idealism (Collins 135). I focus especially on Kierkegaard’s Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript, which provided Percy with insight into Kierkegaard’s critique of the 
idealistic approach to Christianity. Second, I consider how Kierkegaard’s essay “The Difference 
Between a Genius and an Apostle” informed Percy’s own essay “The Message in the Bottle.” In 
“The Message in the Bottle,” which appears in a collection of essays by the same name, Percy 
thoroughly defamiliarizes the term “news,” which he considers as both a special category of 
communication and as a form of knowing. Third, I distinguish St. Thomas Aquinas’ thought 
from Kierkegaard’s, insofar as the former understood faith as a type of knowledge and the latter 
understood faith as an irrational “leap” (Kierkegaard, Introduction to Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript 15; Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments 76; Kierkegaard, “The Present Age” 81-
82). Ultimately, Percy disagrees with Kierkegaard on the “means” of salvation, which include 
the sacraments and the Church. Thus, I conclude with a brief discussion on the importance of the 
sacraments and the Church in C3 consciousness. This dissertation began by highlighting how 
modern scientists may interpret events in nature in dyadic terms, as mere efficient causes, which 
can yield extraordinary scientific knowledge. Nevertheless, a hermeneutic that focuses 
exclusively on the dyadic obscures the symbolic, triadic nature of being human. Ironically, an 
overemphasis on the triadic can conceal the importance of dyadic events, especially in the 
religious sphere. Thus, I acknowledge at the end of this section the merits of understanding the 
sacraments as efficient causes, the “auspices other than symbolic conception” that help the self 
“know itself for what it is” (Percy, Lost 212n).   
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 To begin, Kierkegaard had a tremendous impact on the direction of Percy’s thought. As 
noted in the first chapter of this dissertation, Percy suggested that Kierkegaard’s essay “The 
Difference Between a Genius and an Apostle” had more of an influence on Percy becoming 
Catholic than any other writing (Percy as qtd. in Dewey 110). Kierkegaard’s indirect mode of 
communication, his understanding of rotation and repetition, and his categories of the aesthetic, 
ethical, and religious shaped Percy’s ideas.17 Percy also indicates how the category of the “trial,” 
which appears in the work of Kierkegaard, “absolutely transcends the objective-empirical” 
(Percy, The Message 86).18 A trial, or ordeal, strips away the simulacra, as I discussed above. 
Percy, of course, notes the irony in a Protestant like Kierkegaard having such an impact on him, 
a Catholic. Percy states, “Here I am a Catholic writer living in Louisiana, and yet the man to 
whom I owe the greatest debt is this great Protestant theologian” (Percy as qtd. in Dewey 127). 
Perhaps above all, Percy appreciated Kierkegaard’s critique of idealism. Kierkegaard’s 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript, an attack on the German idealist Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 
Hegel (1770-1831) and speculative philosophy, provided Percy with one of the primary 
entrances into Kierkegaard’s work (Percy as qtd. in Dewey 107). At first, Percy did not quite 
understand the significance of Kierkegaard’s attack on Hegel, but Percy later came to realize that 
he could extend Kierkegaard’s attack on Hegel to scientism in general (Percy as qtd. in Dewey 
117).19 Paraphrasing Kierkegaard, Percy referred to Hegel as he who “knew everything and said 
                                                   
17 For a more detailed account of Kierkegaard’s indirect method of communication, see Kierkegaard’s The Point of 
View for My Work as An Author: A Report to History (Kierkegaard, The Point of View for My Work as An Author). 
18 For an example of “trial” in the work of Kierkegaard, see Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, which reflects on 
the story of Abraham’s call to sacrifice his son Isaac (Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling). 
19 Kierkegaard attacks Hegel on several fronts, and I briefly summarize two of them here. First, Kierkegaard takes 
issue with Hegel’s rejection of the either/or, which Kierkegaard finds essential to the Christian leap of faith. Hegel 
writes, “Neither in heaven nor in earth, neither in the world of mind nor nature, is there anywhere such an abstract 
‘Either—or’ as the understanding maintains” (Hegel, “The Doctrine of Essence” 147). Kierkegaard writes, “Hegel is 
utterly and absolutely right in asserting that viewed eternally, sub specie aeterni, in the language of abstraction, in 
pure thought and pure being, there is no either-or” (Kierkegaard, Concluding 270). From an abstract and idealistic 
perspective, you can do away with the either/or. However, Kierkegaard understands faith in terms of the either/or 
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everything, except for what it is to be born and to live and to die” (Percy as qtd. in Dewey 109; 
cf. Percy, Signposts 188, 343). Concluding Unscientific Postscript, written by Kierkegaard under 
the pseudonym Johannes Climacus, appeared in 1846. According to Lowrie, the pseudonym 
Johannes Climacus represents a young man, not yet a Christian, contemplating how to become a 
Christian (Lowrie, Introduction by the Editor xiv-xvii). Indeed, the whole problem animating 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript is how to become a Christian (Lowrie, Introduction by the 
Editor p. xiv; Kierkegaard, Introduction to Concluding 20). As Kierkegaard outlines in his 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript, speculative philosophers have tended to treat the problem 
from an “objective,” disinterested posture (Kierkegaard, Concluding 23-24). Thus, Kierkegaard 
insists on the insignificance and unhelpfulness of the objective posture in becoming Christian, 
while associating the life of the passionate Christian with subjectivity, inwardness, and inner 
transformation (Kierkegaard, Concluding Ch. 1). Kierkegaard writes, “Christianity is spirit, spirit 
is inwardness, inwardness is subjectivity, subjectivity is essentially passion, and in its maximum 
an infinite, personal, passionate interest in one’s eternal happiness” (Kierkegaard, Concluding 
33). By treating the question of how to become a Christian as something objective, the idealist 
                                                   
(Kierkegaard, Concluding 273). Either you have faith or you do not, and in the end, you must decide one way or 
another (Kierkegaard, Concluding 23). Existence insists upon the either/or, and if you do away with the either/or, 
you must also do away with existence (Kierkegaard, Concluding 271). Hence, the abstract dialectician ends up 
trapped in his or her own mind, constantly contemplating and never deciding between two mutually exclusive 
propositions. Second, Kierkegaard takes issue with the skepticism baked into Hegel’s dialectical method. According 
to Kierkegaard, Hegelian idealism teaches the notion of truth as a product of an ongoing dialectic or “world process” 
as well as the relativity of truth, which, according to Kierkegaard, “cannot help any living individual” (Kierkegaard, 
Concluding 34n). The individual bewitched by the Hegelian method can only know the truth of preceding 
generations, or in retrospect, and never the truth of his or her own generation, which hinders any sort of personal 
commitment to the truth of Christianity (Kierkegaard, Concluding 34n). The Hegelian dialectic presupposes that 
every particular, individual truth gets contradicted and subsumed into the larger whole (Loewenberg, Introduction 
xii-xv). As Hegel writes, “The truth is the whole. The whole, however is merely the essential nature reaching its 
completeness through the process of its own development” (Hegel, “Preface to Phenomenology of Mind” 16). 
However, you cannot decide once and for all in favor of Christianity if the world spirit keeps unfolding. Kierkegaard 
writes, “When the subject does not put an end to his reflection, he is made infinite in reflection, i.e. [sic] he does not 
arrive at a decision” (Kierkegaard, Concluding 105). Ultimately, the question remains open as to when the world 
historical process will actually come to an end (or if it ever will) (Kierkegaard, Concluding 16-17). Thus, if the 
dialectic never ends, the individual remains trapped in inquiry without deciding.  
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tends to suck all of the vigor, passion, and decisiveness out of the Christian life. Indeed, 
speculation about the truth of Christianity does not necessarily translate to the interested 
“appropriation and assimilation” of Christianity (Kierkegaard, Concluding 23). If you want to 
become a Christian, you must make it your own, adopt it, and act on it. The objective approach 
tends to delay indefinitely the decision to become Christian (Kierkegaard, Concluding 28). The 
ideal of objectivity may work in other disciplines, especially the “strict scientific disciplines,” 
but such an objective posture cannot help with the problem of how to become Christian 
(Kierkegaard, Concluding 42).20 Kierkegaard attacks abstract thinking because it operates “sub 
specie aeterni,” or under the aegis of eternity, while it neglects the existential, temporal, and 
concrete (Kierkegaard, Concluding 75, 267, 271). In other words, Kierkegaard understood that 
idealism misses the “predicament of the existing individual” (Kierkegaard, Concluding 267). 
Percy would have likely latched onto precisely this disregard for the individual as essential to 
scientism. As discussed in the preceding chapter, Percy placed an extraordinary emphasis on the 
individual predicament. Science can understand everything under the sun except for the 
individual qua an individual. And thus, it is precisely for the individual in an existential 
predicament that the apostle carries “news” “from across the seas” (Percy, “The Message in the 
Bottle”). 
 Kierkegaard’s (1847) essay “The Difference Between a Genius and an Apostle” 
differentiates between the genius and the apostle and offers a reflection on the nature of 
authority.21 The essay begins with a critique of those who admire St. Paul for the aesthetic beauty 
                                                   
20 Having taken into consideration Kierkegaard’s idealistic milieu, Percy sympathized with Kierkegaard’s attack on 
“objectivity,” but Percy also thought that Kierkegaard’s emphasis on subjectivity tended to obscure the importance 
of intersubjectivity (Percy as qtd. in Dewey 119). 
21 Elsewhere, Kierkegaard’s essay appears titled with “of” at the beginning, rendering the title “Of the Difference 
Between a Genius and an Apostle” (Kierkegaard, “Of the Difference Between a Genius and an Apostle”). In text in 
this dissertation, I leave the preposition “of” out of the title to maintain the same usage as Dewey and Tolson, who 
have commented on the place of Kierkegaard’s essay in Percy’s thought (Dewey 110; Tolson, Pilgrim 174, 238). 
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of his writings. According to Kierkegaard, the aesthetic merit of St. Paul’s writings cannot 
compare with that of Shakespeare or Plato. With all due respect to St. Paul, Kierkegaard suggests 
that the latter are geniuses, while the former is an apostle (Kierkegaard, “Of the Difference 
Between a Genius and An Apostle” 89-90).22 Kierkegaard writes, “A genius and an Apostle [sic] 
are qualitatively different, they are definitions which each belong in their own spheres: the 
sphere of immanence, and the sphere of transcendence ….” (Kierkegaard, “Of the Difference” 
90-91). Thus, the genius, whether scientist or artist, may acquire world-historical significance, 
and he or she may gain renown for what he or she says and does in this world, in the immanent 
realm. But, as Kierkegaard notes, an apostle “is what he is by his divine authority” (Kierkegaard, 
“Of the Difference” 91). In other words, the apostle operates in the realm of transcendence. After 
making this distinction between the genius and the apostle, with one corresponding to 
immanence and the other to transcendence, Kierkegaard moves on to a consideration of 
authority. What is authority? Kierkegaard writes, “Authority is a specific quality which, coming 
from elsewhere, becomes qualitatively apparent when the content of the message or of the action 
is posited as indifferent” (Kierkegaard, “Of the Difference” 96). To illustrate the essence of 
authority, Kierkegaard invites the reader to consider two different people saying the same 
message (for example, “go!”) in the same way, except one person has authority and the other 
does not. When holding form and content constant, as in this hypothetical example, the 
“authority makes the difference” (Kierkegaard, “Of the Difference” 97). In other words, the 
authority functions as the determining factor in whether or not another heeds the message. 
Indeed, Kierkegaard suggests that people listen to geniuses not because they have authority, 
                                                   
22 Augustine, of course, appreciates the writings of St. Paul otherwise than Kierkegaard. According to Augustine in 
On Christian Doctrine, the reader can find eloquence in St. Paul’s writings, even if St. Paul did not deliberately use 
rhetorical precepts in his work (Augustine, On Christian Doctrine 124-125).  
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whether immanent or transcendent authority, but because of their intelligence and their talent to 
convey something in an intellectual and aesthetically pleasing manner (Kierkegaard, “Of the 
Difference” 93-95, 103-104). Plato may have had “profound” things to say about immortality 
because he was a genius; however, compared with Christ, “poor Plato has no authority 
whatsoever” when it comes to speaking about immortality (Kierkegaard, “Of the Difference” 
100-103). Kierkegaard suggests that whatever Christ says about eternal life is decisive simply 
because He said it (Kierkegaard, “Of the Difference” 102). Kierkegaard notes how authority in 
the immanent and worldly sense always remains transitory. Kierkegaard writes, “Authority is 
inconceivable within the sphere of immanence, or else it can only be thought of as something 
transitory” (Kierkegaard, “Of the Difference” 97). When understood on a merely worldly and 
historical plane, authority cannot endure. Consider here the fate of nations. The Percy Bysshe 
Shelley (1792-1822) poem “Ozymandias” sums up Kierkegaard’s sentiments about the 
transitoriness of immanent authority fairly well: “My name is Ozymandias, King of Kings, Look 
on my Works, ye Mighty, and despair!” (Shelley). History reveals the rise and fall kingdoms and 
leaders in a seemingly endless succession. Nevertheless, fathers, kings, and governments can 
command obedience, at least on a worldly plane, not because they are geniuses but because they 
have authority (Kierkegaard, “Of the Difference” 100, 104). Altogether, Kierkegaard suggests 
that an apostle, “who has divine authority to command both the masses and the public,” 
demonstrates his transcendent authority by his statement and his willingness to suffer 
(Kierkegaard, “Of the Difference” 105, 108). A close reading of Kierkegaard’s “The Difference 
Between a Genius and an Apostle” sheds light on how Kierkegaard influenced Percy’s 
understanding of the role of the apostle in his own essay “The Message in the Bottle.”  
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 In Percy’s essay “The Message in the Bottle,” Percy adopts in his own way 
Kierkegaard’s distinction between the genius and the apostle. Indeed, Percy understands the 
“news” that the apostle bears as both a special category of communication and a type of real 
knowledge. Percy’s essay begins with a hypothetical thought experiment. Imagine, Percy invites 
his reader, a castaway walking along the beach, picking up bottles washed up along the shore 
with various messages contained therein. Some bottles have universal scientific knowledge in 
them, like “Water boils at 100 degrees at sea level,” whereas others have messages bearing upon 
the predicament of the castaway, such as “There is fresh water in the next cove” (Percy, The 
Message 119-126). Percy understands the former type of knowledge as knowledge sub specie 
aeternitatis, or knowledge that holds good and true under the aegis of eternity, for all times and 
places.23 Percy understands the other statement about water in a neighboring cove as “news” 
relevant to the predicament of the castaway (Percy, The Message 126-128). Now, some news 
may concern life on the island, which Percy considers mere “island news,” like fresh water in a 
nearby cove, whereas other news may address the entire predicament of the castaway, of being 
stuck on an island, which Percy calls “news from across the seas” (Percy, The Message 143-
144). Percy argues by analogy here, comparing the castaway to the fallen creature. By “news 
from across the seas,” Percy means news from a transcendent, eternal source. In addition to the 
type of message contained in the bottle, Percy considers the posture of the castaway. Will the 
castaway read each message with an objective-minded posture? Or will the castaway assume the 
                                                   
23 The phrase “sub specie aeternitati” appears throughout Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Lowrie 
notes that the phrase “sub specie aeternitatis” with an “s” tacked onto the end comes from Spinoza; however, in 
Lowrie’s translation, Lowrie preserves the use of “sub specie aeternitati” as opposed to “sub specie aeternitatis” 
(see Lowrie’s note in Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript 560n). Percy, for his own part, uses the 
phrase “sub specie aeternitatis” simply to classify knowledge that holds true in all times and all places. Percy writes, 
“By sub specie aeternitatis, he [the castaway] means not what the philosopher usually means but rather knowledge 
which can be arrived at anywhere by anyone and at any time” (Percy, The Message 125). Thus, while similarities 
and differences might exist between Kierkegaard’s, Spinoza’s, and Percy’s use of the term, I use it here principally 
in the sense that Percy did as signifying universally true knowledge.  
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posture proper to his or her own predicament, namely, the posture of a castaway (Percy, The 
Message 128-129)? Percy writes, “Insofar as a man is objective-minded, no sentence is 
significant as a piece of news. For in order to be objective-minded one must stand outside and 
over against the world as its knower in one mode or another” (Percy, The Message 129). The 
ability of an individual to receive news requires some awareness of his or her predicament. Percy 
writes, “In summary, the hearer of news is a man who finds himself in a predicament. News is 
precisely that communication which has bearing on his predicament and is therefore good or bad 
news” (Percy, The Message 130). Supposing that you found yourself stuck in a desert, news of 
water over the next sand dune would appear as good news, whereas news of diamonds nearby 
would make little difference in remedying your predicament (Percy, The Message 133-134). 
Percy disclaims any apologetic motive behind writing his essay; instead, he insists, “My purpose 
is rather the investigation of news as a category of communication” (Percy, The Message 140). 
While theological implications may follow from what Percy argues, he remains focused on the 
nature of communication. Percy understands “news” as “the most significant” category of 
communication, more significant even than communication of knowledge sub specie aeternitatis 
(Percy, The Message 145-146). In Kierkegaardian terms, the genius communicates knowledge 
sub specie aeternitatis in the sphere of immanence, whereas the apostle communicates 
transcendent “news from across the seas” (Percy, The Message 147). Thus, Kierkegaard helps 
Percy to understand how the genius and the apostle communicate differently. Percy also nods to 
Kierkegaard and other so-called existentialists for advancing an anthropology consistent with the 
view of man as a castaway, or fallen creature (Percy, The Message 145-146). However, near the 
end of “The Message in the Bottle,” Percy takes issue with Kierkegaard’s understanding of faith 
as absurd and as separate from knowledge (Percy, The Message 145-146). Why? Because news 
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constitutes its own form of knowledge, which scientific modes of knowing typically elide as 
insignificant. Percy writes, “Ordinary epistemology does not take account of news as a form of 
knowing” (Percy as qtd. in Gretlund 205). Thus, Aquinas rather than Kierkegaard provided Percy 
with a way for making sense of news as a form of knowing.  
 When it comes to reconciling faith and reason, Percy turns to Aquinas instead of 
Kierkegaard. Percy notes how Kierkegaard considered the Christian faith as “a setting aside of 
reason” and a paradox (Percy, The Message 145). Kierkegaard indeed repeatedly refers to the 
setting aside of reason in the act of faith (Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments 72-73, 76, 79). 
Two epigraphs precede “The Message in the Bottle,” one from Kierkegaard and one from 
Aquinas. The epigraph from Kierkegaard reads,  
Faith is not a form of knowledge; for all knowledge is either knowledge of the eternal, 
excluding the temporal and the historical as indifferent, or it is pure historical knowledge. 
No knowledge can have for its object the absurdity that the eternal is the historical. 
(Kierkegaard as qtd. in Percy, The Message 119; Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments 
76)  
Percy uses this passage as one of the epigraphs to “The Message in the Bottle” because it 
exemplifies Kierkegaard’s stance against faith as a form of knowledge. In its original context, 
this quote appears in a larger discussion from Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments where 
Kierkegaard is explaining the relationship between the disciple and the Teacher, God Himself 
(Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments 19, 68-88). Kierkegaard distinguishes between two 
particular teachers, Socrates and Christ, in terms of how these two teachers relate to their 
students. Socrates seeks to divest himself of followers, whereas Christianity bids the disciples to 
cling to the Teacher (Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments 19, 28-29, 76-77). As Christ says 
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quite simply to Levi, the son of Alphaeus, “Follow me” (Mk 2:14 DRA). With regard to 
Christianity, Kierkegaard writes, “the object of faith is not the teaching but the Teacher” 
(Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments 77). For Kierkegaard, faith has as its object the Paradox 
that God took human form in the person of Christ (Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript 194; Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments 76). Kierkegaard writes, “That God has 
existed in human form, has been born, grown up, and so forth, is surely the paradox sensu 
strictissimo [in the strictest sense], the absolute paradox” (Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript 194). The paradox of the Incarnation, the union of the historical and the eternal, 
realizes itself in faith (Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments 73, 76). Percy attributes 
Kierkegaard’s stance on faith as a paradox and as contrary to reason to the Hegelian milieu that 
Kierkegaard lived and wrote in. Percy writes, “His [Kierkegaard’s] extreme position is at least in 
part attributable to his anxiety to rescue Christianity from the embrace of the Hegelians” (Percy, 
The Message 145). Thus, Percy excused much of Kierkegaard’s emphasis on faith as inwardness 
because Percy sympathized with Kierkegaard’s plight of writing in an idealistic milieu. Percy 
admired Kierkegaard’s phenomenology and his “analysis of the existential predicament of 
modern man,” but Percy rejected Kierkegaard’s notion of faith as an absurd leap in the dark 
(Percy as qtd. in Gretlund 204). As Tolson notes, “Much as he [Percy] admired Kierkegaard, 
though, Percy rejected the Dane’s notion of the ‘leap of faith’” (Tolson, Pilgrim 200). Rather, 
Percy believed in the compatibility between faith and reason (Tolson, Pilgrim 200). Percy 
thought that Kierkegaard ranked knowledge sub specie aeternitatis too highly and did not 
sufficiently value “contingent historical knowledge” like “news from across the seas” (Percy, 
The Message 145-146). Percy writes, “Yet to the castaway who becomes a Christian, it [the 
contingent historical knowledge of the Gospel] is not paradox but news from across the seas, the 
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very news he has been waiting for” (Percy, The Message 147). And so, instead of Kierkegaard, 
Percy sided with Aquinas on the reconciliation of faith and reason.  
 In formulating a response to Kierkegaard’s stance on faith and reason, Percy draws upon 
Aquinas’ De Veritate, Question 14, Articles 1 and 2. In Article 1, Aquinas asks, “What is 
belief?” (Aquinas, Truth: Volume II: Questions X-XX 207). In reply to his own question, Aquinas 
suggests that belief involves the simultaneity of discursive thought and assent. To assent means 
to hold firmly to one side of a set of contradictory propositions (Aquinas, Truth 210). Thus, 
following Augustine, Aquinas suggests that to believe is to think with assent (Aquinas, Summa 
II.II.2.1).24 Essentially, science follows from a discursive train of reasoning that causes assent.25 
Aquinas writes, “One who has scientific knowledge, however, does use discursive thought and 
gives assent, but the thought causes the assent, and the assent puts an end to the discursive 
thought” (Aquinas, Truth 210). With regard to belief, however, assent does not follow from a 
discursive train of reasoning. Rather, belief follows from an act of the will, which occurs in 
parallel with discursive, scientific thought (Aquinas, Truth 210-211). The will to believe follows 
from the promise of eternal life (Aquinas, Truth 210, 216). Understanding is held “captive” by 
the assent to believe, but the believer can still inquire deeper into that which he or she believes, 
and thus the process of discursive thought continues for the believer despite the assent to believe 
(Aquinas, Truth 211; 2 Co. 10:5 NABRE). With knowledge sub specie aeternitatis, discursive 
reason causes assent, whereas with “news across the seas,” or the “knowledge of faith,” 
“scientific knowledge and assent are undertaken simultaneously” (Percy, The Message 145). 
                                                   
24 With regard to the difference between belief and faith, Aquinas defines belief as the “internal act of faith” 
(Aquinas, Summa II.II.2). 
25 By “science,” Aquinas follows Aristotle’s usage of the term, which refers to certain knowledge obtained from 
demonstrations (Aquinas, Summa II.II.2.1; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Book 6, Ch. 3; Aristotle, Posterior 
Analytics Book I, Ch. 2; Hagen).  
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Thus, in Percy’s terminology, the castaway can both acquire knowledge sub specie aeternitatis 
and receive “news from across the seas” (Percy, The Message 145). Question 14, Article 2 of De 
Veritate takes up the question, “What is faith?” Aquinas builds upon the apostle Paul’s definition 
of faith as “the substance of things hoped for, the evidence [argumentum] of things that appear 
not” (Aquinas, Truth 213; Hebrews 11:1 DRA). The other epigraph from “The Message in the 
Bottle,” the one from Aquinas instead of Kierkegaard, appears in this particular question from 
De Veritate, which reads, “The act of faith consists essentially in knowledge and there we find its 
formal or specific perfection” (Percy, The Message 119; Aquinas, Truth 220). Aquinas 
immediately adds, “This [the preceding statement] is clear from its object, as has been said” 
(Aquinas, Truth 220) Now, scientific knowledge has for its “object” those things that appear 
(Aquinas, Truth 217-218, 220-221; Aquinas, Summa II.II.Q4.Ad1). Faith, on the other hand, has 
for its “object” those “things that appear not” (Aquinas, Truth 217, 220). In other words, the 
knowledge of faith has for its object the promise of eternal life, which the senses cannot 
immediately verify. As such, faith comes through hearing (Percy, The Message 146; Romans 
10:17 DRA). Thus, Aquinas defines faith as “a habit of our mind, by which eternal life begins in 
us, and which makes our understanding assent to things which are not evident” (Aquinas, Truth 
217). In Percy’s terminology, the castaway cannot immediately verify “news from across the 
seas” like he or she can verify knowledge sub specie aeternitatis; nevertheless, the castaway with 
faith can rest content knowing that help will indeed come from across the seas (Percy, The 
Message 138). By following Aquinas and insisting on the harmony of faith and reason, Percy 
saves the extraordinary capacity of the symbol to mediate real knowledge. Percy also rescues the 
fruits of the natural sciences and theology from skepticism. Beyond his rejection of 
Kierkegaard’s stance on faith and reason, Percy also argued for the necessity of the Catholic 
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Church in transmitting the “message in the bottle,” or “news from across the seas” (Percy, The 
Message 148).  
 Ultimately, Percy disagrees with Kierkegaard concerning the “means” of salvation 
(Percy, The Message 140, 149). The “means,” of course, include the Catholic Church and the 
sacraments, which themselves become available to the believer thanks to apostolic succession, or 
the authoritative handing down of the faith throughout the ages. In his Philosophical Fragments, 
Kierkegaard considers the transmission of the faith from Christ’s contemporaries to future 
generations (Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments Ch. 5). Kierkegaard explains that the 
disciples from Christ’s time needed only to have passed on the following “words” to future 
successors: “We have believed that in such and such a year the God appeared among us in the 
humble figure of a servant, that he lived and taught in our community and finally died” 
(Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments 130). Kierkegaard suggests that the first disciples would 
not have had to pass on anything beyond these words because “this little advertisement, this nota 
bene on a page of universal history, would be sufficient to afford an occasion for a successor, 
and the most voluminous account can in all eternity do nothing more” (Kierkegaard, 
Philosophical Fragments 130-131). Percy interprets Kierkegaard here as suggesting that the first 
disciples needed only to hand on “the message in the bottle” itself, or the “Absolute Paradox” 
that God Himself became man (Percy, The Message 148). However, Percy notes that 
Kierkegaard later came to recognize the importance of the apostle and “newsbearer” “who 
delivers the news and who speaks with authority” in the transmission of the “news from across 
the seas” (Percy, The Message 148). Note that Kierkegaard published his Philosophical 
Fragments in 1844 and “The Difference Between a Genius and an Apostle” in 1847. Percy 
concludes “The Message in the Bottle” by suggesting that the newsbearer brought with him not 
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only the “news” of “where he [the castaway] came from and who he is and what he must do” but 
also the very “means by which the castaway may do what he what must do” (Percy, The Message 
149). By “means,” I interpret Percy here as referring to the Catholic Church and the sacraments, 
the latter of which consist of outward signs instituted by Christ that dispense grace into the soul 
of the believer (“Baltimore Catechism #3: Lesson 13”). Throughout the entirety of Percy’s 
corpus, Percy outlines the power of the symbol to mediate knowledge (as in C1 consciousness) 
and the dangers of symbol usage (as in C2 consciousness). In the end, sacraments, which take 
precedence for the Catholic in C3 consciousness, differ from mere symbols. Sacraments operate 
both as symbols, in the sense that Percy uses the term, and as causes. In other words, sacraments 
effect what they signify (Aquinas, Summa III.62.1; Maritain, “Sign and Symbol” [Ransoming the 
Time] 226). In “Sign and Symbol,” which Percy would have read and which I discuss in Chapter 
2, Maritain describes a sacrament as “something external and sensory which signifies an effect of 
interior sanctification to be produced” (Maritain, “Sign and Symbol” [Ransoming the Time] 225). 
A sacrament of the New Law operates as an “instrumental cause,” a type of efficient cause, to 
effect grace in the soul (Aquinas, Summa III.62.1; Maritain, “Sign and Symbol” [Ransoming the 
Time] 226; “Instrumental Causality”). As an ardent defender of the inwardness of Christianity, 
Kierkegaard took issue with the individual who sought freedom from doubt and uncertainty in 
outward, sacramental rites like baptism (Kierkegaard, Concluding 35, 35n, 42-44, 44n).26 By 
                                                   
26 Kierkegaard writes, “When it is said that the reassuring thing in connection with baptism over against all 
temptations to doubt, is that in this sacrament God does something to us, the idea is naturally only an illusion, in so 
far as it is by this means intended to keep dialectics away” (Kierkegaard, Concluding 44n). By the term “dialectics,” 
Kierkegaard means challenges and questions posed by an interlocutor that may induce a believer to doubt. 
Kierkegaard also explains how a believer could repose in authority to keep “dialectics” away. Kierkegaard writes, 
“If the believer was asked about his faith, i.e. [sic] if he was dialectically challenged, he would declare with a certain 
easy air of confidence that he neither could nor needed to give any account of it, since his trust reposed in others, in 
the authority of the saints, and so forth. This is an illusion. For the dialectician has merely to shift his point of attack, 
so as to ask him, i.e. [sic] to challenge him dialectically to explain, what authority is, and why he regards just these 
as authorities” (Kierkegaard, Concluding 26). Note that Kierkegaard published this preceding statement in 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript prior to publishing “The Difference Between a Genius and an Apostle.”   
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contrast, the Catholic faith, which Aquinas and Percy adhered to, advances the belief in the real 
efficacy of the sacraments, which the apostle, no mere messenger, administers. 
 In this section, I read Kierkegaard alongside Aquinas to get a better understanding of how 
Percy understands the role of the apostle. First, I reviewed how Kierkegaard’s Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript influenced Percy. Second, I discussed Kierkegaard’s essay “The 
Difference Between a Genius and an Apostle” in light of Percy’s “The Message in the Bottle.” 
Importantly, Percy sought to classify “news” as both a real form of knowledge and a category of 
communication. Third, I differentiated Kierkegaard’s thought from Aquinas’ thought. Percy 
sided with Aquinas over Kierkegaard regarding the relationship between faith and reason. As a 
Catholic, Percy appreciated the sacraments, too, which cause grace in the soul of the believer. 
For Percy, the apostle comes bearing the sacraments in addition to “news from across the seas.” 
Percy also adopted a sacramental view of reality in his novels, which Percy associates with the 
tradition of Aquinas more so than the Kierkegaardian tradition (Dewey 122-123; Percy as qtd. in 
Dewey 124). Faith unfolds in the sensible, sacramental world. Natural things have supernatural 
significance. Altogether, unpacking the role of the apostle in Percy’s thought opens up a better 
understanding of C3 consciousness. Percy writes, “A C3 consciousness has managed by 
assistance from something other than self to recover itself from this [semiotic] mobility, through 
auspices other than symbolic conception, and knows itself for what it is” (Percy, Lost 212n). 
What does Percy mean by “assistance from something other than self” and “auspices other than 
symbolic conception”? In my estimation, though he does not explicitly say as much, Percy refers 
here to what he calls elsewhere the “unique Thing, the Jewish-People-Jesus-Christ-Catholic-
Church” (Percy, The Message 140). In other words, the Church, complete with the sacraments 
that dispense grace, helps C2 consciousness to recover from its semiotic mobility and to know 
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itself for what it is, a fallen soul in need of help. The Church provides the means for homo viator 
to subsist on the journey home. When Percy first became Catholic, he said of confession: “This 
is one of the main reasons I’ve become a Catholic” (Percy as qtd. in Tolson, Pilgrim in the Ruins 
204). While writing his second to last novel, The Second Coming, Percy began attending Mass 
every day (Tolson, Pilgrim 426). Finally, Percy received last rites from a priest before his death 
in 1990 (Tolson, Pilgrim 486). Clearly, the Church and the sacraments mattered to Percy. 
Nevertheless, recall that Percy never claimed to have had the authority to preach. In his 1990 
essay, “Why are you Catholic?” Percy writes, “Anyhow, I do not have the authority to bear good 
news or to proclaim a teaching” (Percy, Signposts 315). If Percy did not have the authority to 
preach in a novel, neither have I authority to preach in a dissertation. I have sought only to lay 
out the differences between C1, C2, and C3 consciousness, the last of which involves a most 
significant category of communication: “news.” Having described and defined C3 consciousness, 
I can now move on to a consideration of the implications that follow from the aforementioned for 
rhetoric, philosophy of communication, and media ecology.  
 
Implications for Rhetoric, Philosophy of Communication, and Media Ecology 
In this section, I offer some implications of this chapter for rhetoric, philosophy of 
communication, and media ecology. First, rhetoricians may find Percy’s discussion of the 
devaluation of words pragmatic. Percy describes how satire, a particular form of art, serves as an 
effective means for undermining prevalent, problematic worldviews (e.g., scientism). Second, 
scholars interested in the philosophy of communication could draw upon the tactics of 
defamiliarization outlined above to revivify the meaning of the word “communication,” a word 
that often gets taken for granted. Third, media ecologists may appreciate how a change in media 
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as well as questions can clear away problematic simulacra that cloud perception and hinder 
inquiry. Much of what follows in this section concerns the importance of defamiliarization in 
clearing away symbolic simulacra that characterize C2 consciousness. Defamiliarization creates 
the possibility for new discoveries, even if it does not eventually lead to true C3 consciousness.  
 The defamiliarizing tactic of satire described above has significant implications for those 
hoping to formulate religious and political rhetorical appeals in this historical moment. Mass 
communication technologies have devalued language, making it difficult for the religious or 
politically motivated rhetor to communicate meaningfully. For example, news reporters exhort 
their audiences that fake news endangers democracy. But what do they mean by “democracy”? 
Like the word “love” and the word “sin,” political words like “freedom” and “democracy” also 
fail to signify in this historical moment. Although many use these terms in a “eulogistic” sense, 
they still function like simulacra, impeding thought rather than facilitating it (Burke, Permanence 
and Change 189; Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives 92-93; Percy, Symbol & Existence 105). These a 
priori simulacra may contribute to what Kenneth Burke called “trained incapacity,” a 
symbolically induced blindness that prevents one from entertaining alternative modes of 
understanding the world (Burke, Permanence and Change 6-7). Following Percy’s lead, 
someone seeking to restore meaning to these words should resist employing them directly and 
should instead opt for indirect communication. Satire, especially, remains a promising indirect 
avenue for the rhetor with convictions to convey but no authority to convey them. Like Percy, 
Mikhail Bakhtin (1895-1975) noticed the efficacy of satire, irony, and the comical in a 
postmodern world suspicious of authoritative pronouncements. The old “proclamatory genres” of 
traditional authority no longer work, Bakhtin reminds us (Bakhtin, Speech Genres & Other Late 
Essays 132). And yet, the inefficacy of authoritative proclamations from traditional and 
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hierarchical institutions does not prevent moral exhortation altogether. In a world where 
advertisers, Communists, and Jehovah’s Witnesses clamor for attention and urge action one way 
or another, Percy suggests that silence itself may capture attention (Percy, The Message 148). In 
“The Message in the Bottle,” Percy writes, “In such times, when everyone is saying ‘Come!’ 
when radio and television say nothing else but ‘Come!’ it may be that the best way to say 
‘Come!’ is to remain silent. Sometimes silence itself is a ‘Come!’” (Percy, The Message 148). 
Compare Percy’s insight here with Bakhtin’s insight on irony in “From Notes Made in 1970-
1971.” Bakhtin writes, “Irony as a form of silence. Irony (and laughter) as a means for 
transcending a situation, rising above it. Only dogmatic and authoritarian cultures are one-
sidedly serious” (Bakhtin, Speech Genres & Other Late Essays 134). Percy might agree. To 
reiterate, Percy composed several satirical works, such as Love in the Ruins and Lost in the 
Cosmos. Imagine the irony, Percy invites his reader to consider, of a scientist who can explain 
everything under the sun except for what it means to be a human being. In other words, imagine 
a scientist who can explain everything except for the most important thing. How ridiculous! As 
an art form, satire defamiliarizes and invites reflection upon the taken-for-granted norms of a 
given society, like its pervasive scientism or technologism. Norms typically fall beneath the level 
of awareness, and like other objects or entities in the field of perception, individuals become 
habituated to them (Berger, The Sacred Canopy 24-25; Berger and Luckmann, The Social 
Construction of Reality 52-53; Shklovsky, “Art as Device” [Lemon and Reis] 11-13). During 
periods of breakdown, crisis, or ordeal, however, these norms come to the forefront of attention 
(Arnett and Arneson 48-49, 57-64; Arnett, Fritz, and Bell Ch. 1; Berger, The Sacred Canopy 22-
24). The term “postmodernity” refers to the historical moment when values and “metanarratives” 
have come into question (Arnett, Fritz, and Bell 13-14, 53, 216; Lyotard The Postmodern 
 
211 
Condition). Arguably, many of those with a postmodern orientation may question the privileged 
place of science in making authoritative pronouncements. Ironically, however, some postmodern 
critics of scientism may adopt an ironically authoritative position that exhorts in the name of 
anti-authoritarianism. What could be more ironic than the metanarrative that all metanarratives 
have collapsed? Such postmodern figures, comic to be sure, call out for satirical treatment as 
much as their opponents. The refusal to admit of laughter, even of oneself, among some 
postmodernists discloses how “one-sidedly serious” it is to some of its proponents (Bakhtin, 
Speech Genres 134). Percy’s insight into the efficacy of satire reflects his attentiveness to the 
historical moment and to his audience’s sensibilities, two important characteristics of any would-
be postmodern rhetor.   
 Percy’s insight into defamiliarization, especially the power of ordeal to reanimate 
perception and words themselves, has important implications for philosophy of communication. 
Different philosophers have advanced different perspectives on the nature of communication 
(Arneson, Perspectives on Philosophy of Communication; Arnett and Holba, An Overture to 
Philosophy of Communication; Klyukanov, A Communication Universe 3-22). Some may posit 
communication as the transmission of a message over a channel from a sender to a receiver, 
while others still might consider how communication ritually shapes a world (Carey, 
Communication as Culture 14-35, 42-43; McLuhan and McLuhan, Laws of Media 86). It almost 
goes without saying that the field of communication presupposes multiple, varied approaches to 
the study of communication. Nevertheless, the question remains as to whether or not the word 
“communication” has itself become a simulacrum meriting defamiliarization. Some, like Peters, 
have already helped to defamiliarize “communication” by reviewing the history of the idea 
(Peters, Speaking into the Air). Further, Peters considers communication among machines, 
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animals, and aliens, which contributes to the defamiliarization of “communication” (Peters, 
Speaking into the Air Ch. 6). Recall that Percy used the perspective of a talking alien in Lost in 
the Cosmos to defamiliarize his object of study, the human being. In addition to perspective-
taking, etymology, too, offers another way to defamiliarize “communication.” Peters explains 
how the words “munificent,” “community,” “meaning,” and Gemeinschaft relate to the root 
“mun” in “communication” (Peters, Speaking 7).27 As it pertains to the power of ordeal to 
defamiliarize, the question becomes, what would it mean to place “communication”—like “love” 
and “sin”—in the ruins? Arguably, studying communication during breakdown, crisis, or 
apocalypse promises to revivify the word “communication,” allowing it to appear as an object of 
study. The crisis communication scholar may study communication before, during, and after an 
ordeal (Coombs, “Parameters for Crisis Communication” 25-47). Perhaps, then, the philosopher 
of communication has something to learn from both the crisis communication scholar as well as 
the novelist. The novelist, of course, has an excellent means for exploring “communication” in 
during breakdown, crisis, and apocalypse. In his novels, Percy frequently considers the act of 
communication in its breakdown. For example, Allison from The Second Coming struggles to 
communicate with others; her communication borders on the schizophrenic (Percy, The Second 
92-94, 110, 165). Mickey LaFaye and Donna, two of Tom More’s patients in The Thanatos 
Syndrome, answer questions such as “Where is Chicago?” like robots, without relating such 
questions to themselves (Percy, The Thanatos Syndrome 1-22). The philosopher of 
communication has the task of preventing the word “communication” in addition to key related 
terms like “dialogue” and “content” from turning into mere reifications. Following Percy’s lead, 
                                                   
27 A fan of etymological analysis, Kylukanov uses the Latin root “munus” to reflect on communication as “mania” 
and as a “gift” (Kylukanov, A Communication Universe 51, 126). Butchart also investigates the etymological root 
“munus” (Butchart, Embodiment, Relation, Community Ch. 3).  
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the philosopher of communication looks more and more like a phenomenologist and a novelist 
than a natural scientist. Percy writes, “[T]he novelist must first and last be a good 
phenomenologist, and to most behavioral scientists phenomenologists are closer to novelists than 
to scientists” (Percy, The Message 186). Altogether, Percy remained committed to attending to 
the empirical communicative act before him (Percy, The Message 198).28 By consequence, the 
philosopher of communication should keep in mind the danger of falling prey to a priori 
theoretical constructs that prevent the object of study from appearing (Percy, The Message 198). 
The practice of modern science presents many issues for the philosopher of communication, 
especially ignorance of the individual predicament and problematic assumptions about the nature 
of what it means to be human. Nevertheless, Percy never intended to reinforce the divide 
between positivists and existentialists (Percy, The Message 198). Scientism can block true 
inquiry from getting off the ground, but irrationalism and antiscientific prejudice can move the 
scholar attempting to study communication away from existence and into the realm of the 
simulacra (cf. Percy, The Message 198). Postmodern idealism, then, remains as large a hindrance 
as modern scientism to the philosopher trying to study communication.  
 With regard to media ecology, a shift in the medium as well as questioning can induce 
defamiliarization. Changing from one medium to another tends to disrupt the automatism of 
perception (Shklovsky, “Art as Device” [Lemon and Reis] 11-13). Books, in particular, can 
revivify the taken for granted and lead to a totally renewed perception of existence. You may 
have learned about George Washington during classroom lectures in grade school, but reading a 
good biography about Washington might cultivate in you an entirely new appreciation of the first 
President of the United States (Percy, Symbol & Existence 107-109). Percy suggests that the 
                                                   
28 McLuhan and McLuhan, like Percy, aimed to study communication on the perceptual, empirical level (McLuhan 
and McLuhan, Laws of Media 116). 
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educational apparatus, complete with jargon and special pedagogical techniques, tends to 
obscure the existential object under consideration (Percy, The Message 57-60; Percy, Signposts 
353-355; Percy, Symbol & Existence 107-109). In other words, the media get in the way (Percy, 
The Message 57). Changing the media, by switching from a textbook to a novel, for example, 
defamiliarizes. Having recognized his own lack of authority to deliver transcendent “news from 
across the seas,” Percy nevertheless proposed to deliver a different message in a bottle (Percy, 
Signposts 356). What was Percy’s other message in the bottle? Percy writes, “It would be very 
simple. One word, in fact. Read!” (Percy, Signposts 356). In his essay “Another Message in the 
Bottle,” Percy highlights the importance of reading (Percy, Signposts 352-367). The prevalence 
of mass media such as television and films make reading books a practical necessity, a deeper 
way of penetrating into a subject that other media cannot always treat of in depth or even at all. 
As Anton explains in “The Practice of Reading Good Books,” mass media such as television, 
radio, and the Internet engender “reading atrophy” (Anton, Communication Uncovered 5). 
Textbooks do not ameliorate “reading atrophy” but only tend to make it worse, deadening and 
familiarizing what otherwise might be an exhilarating subject (Percy, The Message 57; Anton, 
Communication Uncovered 4-5, 9, 12). Furthermore, in addition to the other means noted above, 
Percy used questions to defamiliarize the taken for granted. As Postman and Weingartner note, 
“Questions are instruments of perception” (Postman and Weingartner 121). In Laws of Media, 
McLuhan and McLuhan structure the tetrad of media effects around the four questions of what 
technology enhances, what it obsolesces, what it retrieves, and what it flips into when pushed to 
the extreme (McLuhan and McLuhan, Introduction to Laws of Media 7). Questioning removes 
the automatism of perception to allow new meanings to appear. Further, questions enable new 
ways of thinking to emerge that go beyond instrumental rationality (Heidegger, “The Question 
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Concerning Technology”). Percy includes a litany of questions in Lost in the Cosmos aimed at 
opening up rather than closing avenues for thoughtful reflection. Percy writes, “Question: What 
does the saleslady mean when she fits a customer with an article of clothing and says: ‘It’s 
you’?” (Percy, Lost 24). Later, Percy asks, “Question: Why was there no such word [boredom] 
before the eighteenth century?” (Percy, Lost 70). A number of answers follow each question, 
aimed at getting the reader to think for themselves in an active way. Thus, Lost in the Cosmos 
functions like what McLuhan calls “cool media,” inviting the audience to actively participate in 
the process of constructing meaning and understanding (McLuhan, Understanding Media 38-50). 
Percy’s style in Lost in the Cosmos, the form of his content, aims to restore a sense of 
“sovereignty” to the reader, the otherwise passive consumer and denizen of a highly 
technological age (Percy, Lost 71, 74, 122; cf. Percy, The Message 46-63).  
 Thus, the study of C3 consciousness has many important implications for rhetoric, 
philosophy of communication, and media ecology. Rhetoricians can draw upon Percy’s insights 
to advance otherwise religious and political messages that oftentimes fall on deaf ears. Satire can 
work against those worldviews that dominate the public sphere, whether scientism or nihilism. 
Philosophers of communication can utilize tactics of defamiliarization to revivify the word 
“communication.” Media ecologists might appreciate how shifts in media and questions 
defamiliarize. Beyond rhetoricians, philosophers of communication, and media ecologists, 
communication scholars of all stripes might profit from sustained consideration of the distinction 
outlined above between knowledge sub specie aeternitatis and “news.” Do scholars in the field 
of communication pursue knowledge sub specie aeternitatis, which holds good and true for all 
times and all places? Perhaps some social scientific approaches might, while other critical or 
interpretive scholars may reject the aspiration toward such universal knowledge, citing the 
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neglect of subjectivity, individual experience, and issues of power. For his own part, Percy 
sought to give both universal knowledge and subjectivity their due. Water really does boil at 100 
degrees at sea level. But that knowledge alone is not enough to get you through a Wednesday 
afternoon. No, human beings find themselves in particular predicaments. Indeed, life itself may 
well be one gigantic predicament. Provided that that is the case, communication scholars might 
come to acknowledge “news” as a legitimate category of communication and form of 
knowledge.  
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